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This thesis is about transnational women’s organisations and their interaction with the 
European Union institutions. The focus is on how the EU’s turn to gender mainstreaming 
as its main approach to achieve gender equality has impacted the ability of women’s 
groups to organise, finance themselves, and contribute to the EU policymaking process. 
Three transnational women’s organisations that interact regularly with the EU in different 
policy fields were chosen as case studies.  
 
The starting point is the paradox that the adoption of gender mainstreaming seems to 
have created for women’s groups. Analysis of critiques to gender mainstreaming 
implementation in the literature brings out two scenarios: 1) By rhetorically opening up 
all policy areas to a consideration of gender, gender mainstreaming potentially affords 
opportunities for women’s groups’ engagement in new venues and issues; however, 2) 
the mal-implementation of the mechanism is widespread and may curtail not just the 
revolutionary potential of gender mainstreaming but can also justify the dismantling of 
existing women-targeting instruments and networks.  
 
The main goal of this thesis is to map out the political opportunities for women’s groups 
in the EU and the role of gender mainstreaming in their opening. Research proceeded in 
two stages: first, the implementation of gender mainstreaming in three policy areas was 
analysed, and second, examples of women’s groups engagement in these policy areas 
were scrutinised. To this end, I combined feminist institutionalist insights with the 
literature on EU interest representation to produce a multi-level theoretical approach 
capable of accounting for the EU’s characteristics that provide opportunities and 
constraints to women’s groups at the structural, institutional and individual level. This 
framework affords analytical space for women’s groups’ agency in adapting to the 
opportunities and pro-actively shaping them through their interaction with the EU 
political system.  
 
This research reveals that the political system of the EU affords opportunities and 
constraints for gender change and for the engagement of women’s groups. These vary 
according to the institutional characteristics of the diverse policy venues and to the 
initiative of individual actors in positions of power. Framing is a crucial strategy employed 
by women’s groups to circumvent resistance and shape political opportunities for 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This is a thesis about transnational women’s organisations and their interaction with the 
European Union (EU) institutions. The focus is on how the turn to gender mainstreaming 
in the mid-1990s as the EU’s main approach to achieve gender equality has impacted 
the ability of women’s groups to organise, finance themselves, and contribute to the EU 
policymaking process. The research sits at the crossroads where the literatures on 
political opportunity structures, EU interest representation, feminist political research, 
framing and feminist institutionalism all meet. Its main aim is to map out the political 
opportunities for women’s groups within the EU institutions. In order to do so, an 
extensive analysis of the implementation of gender mainstreaming is conducted in 
different policy fields, with a deeper analysis of prominent policy actions enacted in 
those fields, with the aim of finding where these opportunities are and what they consist 
of. 
 
The core of this research is formed by three transnational women’s groups: Women 
Against Violence Europe (WAVE), the European Platform of Women Scientists (EPWS) 
and Women in Europe for a Common Future (WECF). These topical organisations that 
work in justice, science and research, and sustainable development respectively, were 
chosen to cover a broad range of policy fields and thus to analyse the opportunities for 
engagement open to women’s groups across the EU policy competences and 
institutional spaces. By focusing on these organisations, I take political opportunity 
structures in its dynamic sense, as openings that the political system presents but that, 
to be relevant, have to be looked at together with the capacity that women’s groups 
have to take these up and even shape future opportunities. 
 
The research problem draws from two main literatures: research on the implementation 
of gender mainstreaming in the EU institutions and scholarship on the representation of 
interests in the EU policymaking process. In the next two sections I will locate the 
research problem by briefly exploring these two literatures. 
 




In the mid-1990s when the EU adopted gender mainstreaming (GM) as its main 
approach to tackle gender inequality and formalised it in the Treaty of Amsterdam there 
was optimism and hope from the part of women’s organisations and feminist scholars on 
the potential for meaningful results for gender equality. Contrary to other approaches 
such as equal opportunities or positive action, gender mainstreaming starts from the 
premise that gender inequality is a structural problem (Verloo 2005), and therefore 
should be tackled across all sectors in society and policy fields. The hope initially 
brought by GM adoption and its revolutionary potential meant that it was devoted much 
attention by feminist EU scholars in the last two decades since it was first inscribed in 
the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. Findings on the actual implementation of the mechanism 
and its effective use in the policymaking process quickly became disappointing and 
critiques of various sorts began to mount. Among these, two types stood out: 1) 
critiques based on institutional challenges to the mechanism, springing often from 
incomprehension and uncertainty over what gender mainstreaming actually entailed or 
confidence about its irrelevance in that particular policy area (Cavaghan 2016; Jacquot 
2010; Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000), and 2) critiques based on the structural 
opposition that gender mainstreaming faces, due to a clash with the dominant political 
aims of the EU as a whole (Laatikainen 2001; Stratigaki 2005; Weiner & MacRae 
2014a). While the first set of critiques still foresees room for improvement in how the 
mechanism is used in practice through education and the commitment of well-placed 
allies, the second set of critiques renders gender mainstreaming as was adopted in the 
EU as unsalvageable since it cannot hope to secure gender equality as a goal in the 
face of competing stronger projects such as increasing the competitiveness and 
economic growth of the European Single Market. Moreover, some feminist scholars 
raising the structural challenges faced by GM also point to the risk of gender 
mainstreaming, adopted in a purely rhetorical and window-dressing fashion, displacing 
existing equal treatment guarantees (Stratigaki 2005). Two groups of critics thus seem 
to expect two different futures for gender mainstreaming in the EU: one where it is 
improved through training and expertise, the other where it is preferable for it to be 
overhauled.       
 
1.2 Research on the representation of women’s interests in the EU  
 
Throughout the history of gender equality policy at the EU level, external women’s rights 
advocates have been crucial in pushing for change by teaming up with politicians and 
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policymakers within the EU institutions that espoused their demands for gender equality 
(Mazey 2012). Sophie Locher and Elisabeth Prügl argue that 'one of the key 
contributions of feminist approaches to European integration has been to theorise 
activism, the power of framing and the "opportunity structures" for advocacy networks 
activism’ (Locher & Prügl 2009, p. 185). Many studies have been conducted on how 
women’s rights organisations contributed to EU action in several policy issues such as 
sexual harassment (Zippel 2004), violence against women (Montoya, 2008), agriculture 
(Locher & Prügl 2009), and in political processes such as European constitution-making 
(Lombardo 2005) and the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations (Helfferich & Kolb 2001). The 
literature also shows how women’s groups were key in the process that led to the formal 
adoption of gender mainstreaming as an EU policy instrument (True & Mintrom 2001; 
Mazey 2012). So studying these women’s organisations directly and their ability to 
access the European policymaking process seems to be an important basis in order to 
understand how well gender equality policy and mechanisms stand a chance of 
progressing.     
 
Some EU scholars have commented on the ‘additional layer of opportunities for social 
movements’ (Zippel 2004, p. 66) that the EU adds, including for women’s organisations 
(Kriesi et al. 1995; Roggeband & Verloo 1999; Van der Vleuten 2012). More broadly, 
the literature on EU interest representation is entirely built on the assumptions about the 
relationship of interdependence between EU institutions and interest groups in terms of 
access and influence, on one side, and information, expertise and legitimacy, on the 
other. Certainly, this interdependence faces different levels of strength depending on the 
interest groups in question and the EU institutional arena/unit we are examining, 
meaning that different interest groups will face distinct political opportunity structures in 
each arena. These different political opportunity structures are ‘shaped by the specific 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures of the EU as an institution, as well as by 
the dominant administrative and normative cultures that prevail in its different bodies’ 
(Locher 2012, p. 77). Nevertheless, the bottom line here is that EU institutions are often 
receptive venues for women’s groups’ advocacy and expertise and the latter enjoy some 
success in shaping EU gender equality policy.  
 




Bearing in mind, on one hand, the two sets of critiques on gender mainstreaming in the 
EU that point to diverse obstacles to its full implementation and, on the other, the 
importance of women’s groups in the EU gender equality apparatus, some lines of 
enquiry are brought forward for analysis. The first is that, with gender mainstreaming, 
there is potential for new opportunities for advocacy, resource-funding and overall 
access into new areas of policy not traditionally associated with gender equality, such as 
the environment, trade or macroeconomics. The first set of critiques identified in gender 
mainstreaming implementation brought to the fore the unevenness in the 
implementation of this mechanism across institutions and policy fields, mostly through 
matters of ignorance about the mechanism and unawareness of the gender relevance in 
certain policies. The absence of an established process to apply gender mainstreaming 
means it is left at the discretion of individual policymakers to implement it in practice. 
However, the EU institutions very often use the expertise of diverse interest groups to 
improve the technical detail, the legitimacy and the robustness of their legislative and 
policy proposals. Therefore, it would seem that there would be a demand for expertise 
on gender equality and gender mainstreaming from civil society groups that have it. 
Traditionally, the most enthusiastic interlocutors of women’s groups in the EU have been 
the women’s rights and gender equality (FEMM) committee in the European Parliament 
and the DG employment and social affairs in the European Commission. With the 
expansion of a mandatory consideration of gender to all policy areas it would seem that 
women’s groups’ expertise would now be in demand throughout all other DGs and EP 
committees. Thus, women’s groups would now be able to advocate on a broader range 
of issues that would go beyond the narrow employment-related scope often criticised in 
the EU gender equality policy (Guerrina 2002; Lombardo & Meier 2006). 
 
The second line of enquiry, however, leads to different expectations. If we follow the 
arguing behind the second set of critiques, on the structural opposition to gender 
mainstreaming, the picture for women’s groups’ political opportunities looks rather 
bleak. The mal-implementation, in this understanding, is not a matter of flawed design or 
ignorance but of conscious side-lining: the general subservience of gender equality 
goals to economic growth and competitiveness is translated into a half-hearted 
application of gender mainstreaming through tick-box exercises or downright disregard 
for the mechanism in the first place. Instead of making new venues receptive to the 
demands and expertise of women’s groups the mechanism of gender mainstreaming 
seems to have made advocating for women’s rights more difficult. Sabine Lang has 
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discovered that women's organisations find it now much more difficult to lobby for 
women's empowerment programmes or for affirmative action than before gender 
mainstreaming was adopted (Lang 2009, p. 338). Civil society input is only sought and 
listened to insofar as it uses gender-mainstreaming language. Moreover, structural 
critiques see the botched implementation of gender mainstreaming as destabilising the 
close cooperation between gender advocates and femocrats within the EU institutions 
that used to characterise the EU equality policy area (Jacquot 2010). This 
destabilisation occurred due to the opening of the gender equality field to include new 
policy areas and new actors. 
 
By pursuing these two strands of enquiry simultaneously, the gender mainstreaming 
mechanism seems to pose a paradox for women’s organisations in the EU. On the one 
hand, the obligation of all EU policymaking institutions to apply gender mainstreaming to 
all policies in consideration – even institutions not used to working with gender – seems 
to indicate that the expertise of women’s groups is now sought on a broader range of 
issues in a broader range of venues. Effective implementation is thus just a matter of 
increasing the gender expertise available to policymakers and educating them on the 
topic. On the other hand, there seems to be a problem with gender mainstreaming 
receptiveness that runs structurally and therefore deeper. Treating gender 
mainstreaming as a tick-box exercise strips it of its revolutionary potential and at the 
same time undermines networks and sites within the EU institutions where gender 
equality was traditionally taken seriously. The extended mandate of gender 
mainstreaming to virtually every policymaking area makes it now more difficult to 
advocate for programmes correcting women-specific disadvantages. Summing up the 
paradox in a sentence, gender mainstreaming seems to have extended the scope of 
opportunities for women’s groups while at the same time closed down their opportunities 
for influence in traditional equality-friendly arenas. 
So the main question that this research seeks to answer is: has gender mainstreaming 
had a positive or negative impact on women’s groups’ engagement with the EU 
institutions? To answer this question, the research will proceed in two stages: first, it will 
analyse gender mainstreaming implementation in three broad policy fields: justice, 
science and research, and sustainable development, and in 13 specific policy initiatives 
within these fields; second, it will map out the political opportunities for women’s 
organisations within these policy areas by looking at the participation of three women’s 
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groups in the 13 policy cases mentioned above, along with the characteristics of these 
groups that are conducive to their successful engagement with the EU.  
 
1.4 Theorising opportunities and resistance to gendered change 
and gender equality advocacy 
 
To answer the research question and solve the paradox about the opening and closing 
of opportunities for women’s groups with gender mainstreaming, this thesis combines 
features from two broad literatures: interest representation in the EU and feminist 
institutionalism. Feminist institutionalism, with its focus on formal and informal institutions 
as the main drivers in explaining political outcomes, is an extremely useful theory to 
explain uneven levels of implementation in different policy fields and institutional arenas. 
Different gendered logics of appropriateness are helpful in explaining diverse degrees of 
resistance to the formal requirement of gender mainstreaming. So feminist 
institutionalism is a useful lens through which to look at resistance to gender 
mainstreaming implementation and explain why it manifests in the ways and in the 
specific places that it does. Since the mechanisms behind resistance to GM are also 
anticipated to explain the lack of political opportunity structures for women’s groups in 
certain fields, feminist institutionalism also sheds light on the receptiveness of specific 
arenas to women’s rights and gender equality advocacy. EU interest representation 
theories, on their part, present helpful perspectives on why and under which 
circumstances policymakers are receptive to interest groups’ input, based on mostly 
utilitarian understandings of the relationship between formal political institutions – 
interest groups. Its focus on the characteristics and strategies of interest groups to 
explain their ability to engage successfully with political institutions is important to draw 
attention to the agency of groups in making sense and taking advantage of the political 
opportunities provided by the political system. 
 
Locher and Prügl tells us that ‘[t]he relationships of agency at different levels and their 
embedding in different opportunity structures presents a weakly explored frontier of 
feminist research’ (Locher & Prügl 2009, p. 200). Moreover, Cavaghan argues that 
‘[g]endered meanings and interpretations are made locally, through organisational 
processes and structures that constitute institutions’ (Cavaghan 2016, p. 5). Individuals 
and institutions are both crucial in determining whether the statutory requirement for 
gender mainstreaming will succeed or fail in specific political arenas. Theories of EU 
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interest representation, on the other hand, stress the importance of the EU structural 
characteristics, mostly defined constitutionally, and the balance of power among the 
different EU institutional components – the Parliament, the Commission, the Council and 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – as determining to a considerable extent the 
opportunities that the system presents to certain types of advocacy demands. Context, 
institutions and individuals are therefore important in determining the opportunities and 
resistances to gender change (in the form of gender mainstreaming) and advocacy (in 
the form of women’s groups’ input). A multi-tiered framework thus seems like the 
appropriate way to look at resistance and opportunity, and the role of each level, macro 
(context), meso (institutions) and micro (individuals), in determining those. This multi-
tiered approach is an original and significant contribution of this thesis to the literature. It 
is developed in Chapter 3, operationalised in Chapters 6-8 and assessed in Chapter 9.          
 
It is necessary, to gauge the capacity of women’s groups, to engage with these 
resistances and opportunities provided by the EU political system at different levels if we 
are to evaluate political opportunities in its most comprehensive sense. Another 
framework is thus developed in this thesis in order to analyse the processes of reaction 
of women’s groups to opportunities and obstacles in the EU: how do they adapt to 
these? Are they able to proactively chip away at resistance and create new 
opportunities for themselves in the political system by their very interaction with it? 
These are the two main questions that the case study chapters plus the comparative 
chapter attempt to answer (see Chapters 6-9). Processes of adaptation and proactivism 
are thus analysed for three different dimensions that encompass women’s groups’ 
interaction with the EU institutions: discourse, actors and resources. Again, this 
framework is developed in Chapter 3, operationalised in Chapters 6-8 and assessed in 
Chapter 9. 
 
Both of these frameworks give a comprehensive picture of the political opportunity 
structures for women’s groups in the European political system by accounting for both 
the system’s characteristics and those of the interest groups’. Although designed 
specifically for analysing opportunities for women’s groups, they can be easily 
transferable to the analysis of other types of groups that interact with the EU, particularly 
groups advocating for public interests. The theoretical framework is thus the major 
contribution that this thesis seeks to make to both the EU interest representation 
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literature and to the literature on gender equality policy in the EU (see Chapter 10 for full 
list of original contributions). 
 
1.5 Structure of thesis  
 
This introduction (Chapter 1) opened the thesis by briefly discussing the literatures this 
research draws from and by sketching out the research problem in the form of a 
paradox that it intends to solve. It then introduced the theoretical approach that will be 
developed and used for this endeavour. The thesis will then proceed in two broader 
parts.  
 
The first part will start in Chapter 2 with the weaving of the paradox by exploring the EU 
gender equality and EU interest representation literatures and what they have to say on 
gender mainstreaming implementation and women’s groups’ engagement with the EU. 
Chapter 3 will then dig further into theoretical considerations from theories of interest 
representation and feminist institutionalism to design a theoretical approach capable of 
assessing opportunities and obstacles for gender change (i.e. gender mainstreaming 
implementation) and gender advocacy (i.e. women’s groups’ demands) in its most 
comprehensive form: at different political system levels and through different processes 
of adaptation and proactivism on the part of women’s groups. The first part closes with a 
methodology chapter (Chapter 4) describing how the theoretical approach will be 
operationalised and applied to the case studies under study. It also includes some 
reflections on methodological challenges encountered during the fieldwork stage of this 
research.  
 
The second part (Chapter 5-9) relates to the empirical section of this thesis and includes 
the case study chapters. The case studies, along with the revision of gender 
mainstreaming implementation (Chapter 5), look at four different Directorate-Generals of 
the Commission in detail – their institutional structure, the strategies and instruments 
used to promote gender equality, and the results of gender mainstreaming 
implementation – and 13 specific policy instances to search for the opportunities and 
obstacles presented to women’s rights groups in diverse arenas across the EU. The 
case study chapters (Chapters 6-8) focus on one thematic women’s organisation each 
and are centred on each of these organisations’ engagement with the relevant EU policy 
field. Chapter 9 brings together findings from the case study chapters to compare how 
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different women’s groups fare in the political opportunity structures that the EU presents 
for them in their specific policy areas. It also starts to unravel the wider picture of where 
the political opportunities and resistances are for gender mainstreaming and for 
women’s rights advocacy in the EU as a whole. The conclusion (Chapter 10) further 
reflects on the location of these opportunities and obstacles and what they mean for 
women’s groups’ engagement in the EU policymaking process. It reflects on the 
paradox, on the theory used, on the methodology, describes the contributions that this 
research makes to the literature, and closes the thesis with a suggestion of research 




CHAPTER 2. GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN THE EU: THE 
ROLE OF WOMEN’S GROUPS IN ADOPTION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
This chapter analyses the link that there is between the adoption and implementation of 
gender mainstreaming in the EU and the activity of transnational women’s interest 
groups. It asks the question of what role did women’s groups play in the adoption of 
gender mainstreaming and what role do they play now in its implementation. I start this 
analysis with a brief description of how gender equality as a policy evolved in the EU 
from its inception until the adoption of gender mainstreaming and how women’s groups 
have participated in this process. The following section sets out the different critiques 
that are levelled at the poor implementation of the gender mainstreaming mechanism in 
the diverse policy fields in which the EU has a mandate. The aim of this thesis is to take 
stock of how women’s groups have fared in the gender mainstreaming era and the 
opportunities and obstacles afforded by the political system of the EU. The second half 
of the chapter thus turns to theories of interest representation in the EU to explain what 
the EU institutions might want from women’s groups in exchange for access and which 
strategies women’s groups apply to be successful in interacting with the EU. The 
chapter closes with an exposition of the paradox that seems to arise from the adoption 
of gender mainstreaming: women’s groups seem to be afforded new widespread 
opportunities but at the same time face new obstacles accessing traditionally gender-
sensitive policy areas.  
 
2.1. Origins and adoption of gender mainstreaming in the EU   
 
2.1.1. EU gender equality policy: from Article 119 to gender mainstreaming 
 
Gender equality is often considered the most advanced social policy at the EU level (see 
for example Hix 2005; Jacquot 2010) and one of the best examples of the EU as a 
‘regulatory state’ (Jacquot 2010, p. 128). It is nearly as old as the European Community 
itself. Born out of former Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome,1 this policy area has 
                                                      
1 ‘Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle 
that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work. 
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changed dramatically over the last decades from a narrow focus on equal pay legislation 
to considering gender equality in all policy areas of EU competence. Teresa Rees (Rees 
1998) identified three different approaches to gender equality and these can be applied 
to classify the different ways through which the EU has tried to address inequalities 
between women and men: equal opportunities (or anti-discrimination), positive action, 
and gender mainstreaming. Much of the EU’s focus has been on the equal opportunities 
approach that addresses inequality through the law, by eliminating obstacles or 
prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sex. By removing the legal barriers to 
equality, the aim is to ensure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed. This 
approach forms the bulk of the EU binding legislation on gender equality. In positive 
action the emphasis is no longer only on equality of access but more on equality of 
outcome. It is about making sure that specific disadvantages of a group are minimised 
for there to be equality of outcome. In the EU positive action policies have been applied 
very sporadically and left mostly to the discretion of member states (e.g. soft measures 
to improve childcare provision in member states, training programmes targeted to 
women to improve their employability – particularly through structural funds). Gender 
mainstreaming constitutes the third and potentially the most revolutionary approach to 
gender equality. These three approaches do not necessarily represent different stages 
of gender equality policy in the EU; rather, they can be understood as approaches that 
have been sought in parallel (Jacquot 2017), although gender mainstreaming is the 
most recent of the three to be applied. 
 
Formally adopted by the European Union in the mid-1990s and inscribed in its 
constitutional law with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, gender mainstreaming was 
regarded as a revolutionary mechanism to potentially transform the way gender was 
considered in the Union. It was regarded as a tool that could guarantee a more gender-
equal polity by making it mandatory for civil servants in all policy areas to consider how 
policy would impact women and men’s lives in different ways and to redress gender 
inequalities where they existed. More importantly, and in its most revolutionary 
understanding, gender mainstreaming was supposed to inscribe equality as the ultimate 
goal of the policymaking process so that policies were to be designed to ultimately 
                                                      
For the purpose of this Article, “pay” means the ordinary basic it minimum wage or salary and any other 
consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his 
employment from his employer. 
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means: 
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the basis of the same unit of measurement; 
(b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job.’ (European Union 1957, Art. 119) 
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contribute to equality between women and men. This was the approach taken by the 
Commission in its rhetoric: gender mainstreaming would be about ‘mobilising all general 
policies and measures specifically for the purpose of achieving equality’ (Commission of 
the European Communities 1996, p. 2). It was supported by the Council of Europe and 
championed worldwide at the Beijing UN Women Conference in 1995. In the EU it was 
hailed by gender scholars (Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000; Rees 1998; Squires 2005) 
and women’s organisations as a serious way of taking gender into account in all policy 
fields and thus of addressing gender inequality in all areas of political action. Women’s 
organisations were indeed crucial actors in the lobbying for the inclusion of gender 
mainstreaming in the UN Women Conference in 1995 (True & Mintrom 2001), which in 
turn increased the pressure on the EU to implement the mechanism in its own 
policymaking process. 
 
The mid-1990s saw the introduction of the gender mainstreaming mechanism in the 
European Union due to a favourable window of opportunity at the time that went beyond 
international pressure from the UN (Jacquot 2010; Mazey 2012). This window of 
opportunity meant that gender equality in general and gender mainstreaming in 
particular were welcomed in and around 1995. Three circumstances were identified as 
crucial for this favourable environment. Firstly, the nineties saw three new countries with 
high levels of institutionalisation of gender equality join the Union. Austria, Sweden and 
Finland brought new attention to gender inequalities in the EU and a high commitment to 
an encompassing approach to it that went beyond the piecemeal equal opportunities 
approach favoured so far. Related to this circumstance, new civil servants that came 
from the enlargement countries entered the EU institutions. They were familiar with 
gender mainstreaming already and so they ensured that the mechanism was not an 
entirely foreign concept to policymakers within the European institutions. The new 
Santer Commission appointed in 1995 had members with a strong commitment to 
gender equality and with an interest in professionalising it as well (Jacquot 2010, p. 
123), and the proportion of women MEPs grew, with most of them being from gender-
equality-committed countries with strong ties with women's organisations (Mazey 2012, 
p. 139). This created a favourable environment for claims to gender equality to be 
furthered in the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference that resulted in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. A women’s coalition made the successful case for the inclusion of women's 
rights as human rights in the new treaty, which anchored the Union’s commitment to 
gender equality in constitutional law. Finally, and as mentioned above, the 1995 UN 
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Conference on Women in Beijing was a crucial propeller of the notion of gender 
mainstreaming as an important instrument to foster gender equality (Jacquot 2010, p. 
123). Summing it up, in the mid-1990s there was an extraordinary favourable 
institutional setting for a renewed commitment to gender equality that was conducive to 
the implementation of the new gender mainstreaming mechanism in the European Union 
from then onwards.  
 
2.1.2. The role of women’s groups in the adoption of gender mainstreaming 
 
Women’s transnational networks are considered some of the most efficient and the most 
active of public interest groups since the 1980s (Silliman 1999; Moghadam 2000; 2005; 
Ferree & Tripp 2006; Lang 2009). In the Beijing 1995 Conference on Women, these 
transnational networks were extremely important in pushing for gender mainstreaming 
to be hailed as the most comprehensive and promising approach to achieve gender 
equality (True & Mintron 2001). Partly thanks to the cooperation leading up to the 
Beijing 1995 Conference, women’s groups increased their institutionalisation and their 
transnational links with one another and with governments, increasing their cooperation 
in areas such as health and reproductive rights, the environment, violence against 
women and trade (Lang 2009, p. 328). The linkage between international and European 
networks of women's rights during the Beijing 1995 Conference was crucial in 
broadening the policy frame of gender equality in the EU: it linked human rights and 
women's rights together, virtually opening up the scope of equality to all areas of politics. 
This linkage made the rationale behind gender mainstreaming possible and acceptable 
in the EU (Mazey 2012, p. 138-9).  
 
By their inclusion in lobbying for international recognition of gender mainstreaming and 
for their efficiency in cooperating transnationally, women’s groups came to be seen as 
natural agents in the implementation of the gender mainstreaming mechanism 
internationally but especially at the national and local level. Women’s groups are seen as 
external actors that, due to their knowledge and constituency base, can put pressure on 
governments and state machineries to keep gender mainstreaming on the agenda 
(Verloo 2005, p. 351; Lang 2009, p. 332). While this may translate into new potential 
avenues for accessing the political process, it also entails particular expectations of the 
role of women’s groups that turn into an extra workload for organisations that are 
generally under-staffed and under-resourced. As Sabine Lang noted, ‘women’s NGOs 
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across Europe are facing demands to monitor gender mainstreaming, to train gender 
experts, and to practice and implement it when being part of EU-funded projects’ (Lang 
2009, p. 333). On the case of the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) specifically, Sonia 
Mazey argued that ‘mainstreaming places new demands upon the limited resources of 
the E.W.L. and raises difficult strategic issues’ (Mazey 2002, p. 228). The difficult 
strategic issues that Mazey refers to are the expectations that the EWL, as the most 
salient transnational women’s organisation in Europe and a central link point between 
the EU institutions and women’s organisations at the local and national level, will be 
responsible for disseminating the gender mainstreaming mechanism, as well as taking 
care of the monitoring of the strategy across Europe. These expectations in fact not only 
create an extra workload for an under-resourced transnational NGO, but also impact on 
EWL’s overall strategy, risking turning it from a lobbying organisation into a de-politicised 
monitoring body. Indeed, Sabine Lang found that several women’s organisations were 
less than enthusiastic about gender mainstreaming since, due to their scarce resources, 
it often involved making a choice between monitoring the implementation of gender 
mainstreaming and institutional advocacy, with the latter being more effective for their 
success (Lang 2009, p. 343) and survival. Bearing this in mind, the main question that 
guides the present research is what kinds of political opportunities and what kinds of 
obstacles does the gender mainstreaming approach to equality raise for women’s 
groups in the EU? Does the demand for gender expertise open up opportunities for 
access and influence in new policy areas? Or does it instead place undue burdens on 
women’s groups and change their political strategies threatening their own survival? 
 
2.2. Between ignorance and refusal: critiques of gender 
mainstreaming implementation      
 
Two decades after its adoption in the EU the critiques in the literature abound regarding 
the way the method was implemented in the Union and there is disagreement over the 
potential that this instrument still holds for the creation of a more gender-equal polity. 
Two sets of critiques can be identified in the literature, which, although related, are 
distinct. Both agree that the mechanism was badly implemented but they point to 
different reasons as to why that was the case.  
 
The first set of critiques is geared towards the institutional challenges that this 
mechanism faces. Some scholars (Jacquot 2010; Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000) argue 
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that gender mainstreaming has been implemented wrongly in the EU, with some 
directorate-generals (DGs) using this mechanism as a tick-box exercise only and not 
considering gender and gender relations seriously in the policies proposed. A lack of 
awareness of gender issues in general and how gender relates to their particular policy 
area is identified as one cause for bad implementation (Cavaghan 2017b), particularly in 
areas not traditionally associated with gender equality. Whilst there is no overt 
opposition to it, the fact that there is no overall mandatory process as to how to do 
gender mainstreaming means that some DGs have paid ‘lip-service’ to this mechanism 
(Jacquot 2010, p. 126). Rhetorical commitments to gender mainstreaming are not 
translated into practical steps that guide action locally (Cavaghan 2016) and so its 
transformative potential is severely undermined. Nevertheless, for these authors the 
mechanism is salvageable as long as the causes for this mal-implementation are 
addressed (e.g. lack of expertise or awareness on gender in certain DGs).  
 
The second set of critiques relate to the purpose for which gender mainstreaming was 
implemented in the first place. Some authors (Laatikainen 2001; Stratigaki 2005; Weiner 
& MacRae 2014a) have pointed to a more structural opposition in the EU for embracing 
gender mainstreaming that, albeit not overt, is manifest in the side-lining of gender in 
comparison to growth and competitiveness goals (Stratigaki 2004; 2005; MacRae 
2010). Although officially adopted in order to realise gender equality by expanding the 
scope of equality policy to sectors that so far had not considered gender seriously, 
scholars claim that gender mainstreaming was promoted politically but in practice is 
largely a symbolic policy, as it cannot secure gender equality as a goal in itself in the 
face of other (economic) competing goals. Moreover, some authors go further and 
argue that gender mainstreaming actually risks displacing existing equal treatment 
guarantees (Stratigaki 2005, p. 167). Its bad implementation, coupled with a non-
reliance on law enforcement mechanisms, risks gender mainstreaming being used only 
as window dressing, to look like something is being done about gender inequality in all 
areas and thus to disprove the need for a dedicated policy area and administrative 
apparatus for gender equality. Programmes specifically aimed at addressing women’s 
disadvantages are rendered unnecessary; equality is supposedly gauged by impact 
assessments and achieved through correct policy choices. For these critics, the 
mechanism as it stands is unsalvageable as it holds no hope for a more gender-equal 
polity and bears the risk of watering down the already existing gender equality policies at 




2.2.1. ‘Institutionalized non-awareness of gender’: institutional obstacles to the 
implementation of gender mainstreaming 
 
The diverse levels of implementation of gender mainstreaming in different policy areas in 
the EU correspond quite well to the tradition of considering or not considering gender 
equality in those policy fields. Policy issues that have traditionally been associated with 
addressing inequalities between women and men – employment, development and the 
structural funds – are the ones that have made consistent efforts in implementing 
gender mainstreaming, while traditionally-considered gender-neutral areas such as 
competition and trade are where resistance to gender mainstreaming is most 
pronounced (Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000). Lack of knowledge thus becomes an 
important factor in explaining mal-implementation. Gender mainstreaming presupposes 
that policymakers accept two things: that gender inequality is a structural problem and 
that the state plays a role in it by regulating gender relations (Cavaghan 2017a). Even 
people that are sympathetic to the goal of gender equality can struggle to grasp these 
two assumptions. So incomprehension plays an important role in gender mainstreaming 
failures and disappointing results (Cavaghan 2017a). Often it might be a case of 
policymakers not knowing what the different policy interests of women and men are – or 
simply not caring (Schmidt 2005; Cavaghan 2017; Mergaert & Lombardo 2017). There 
is thus an ‘institutionalized non-awareness of gender’ (Cavaghan 2016, p. 11) that 
prevents its relevance being considered in the first place. As a consequence, resources 
like time, staff, training and budgetary lines are scarcely allocated to gender 
mainstreaming since the pertinence of this mechanism in most policy areas is highly 
questioned. This could be the result of the opposition of specific individuals, whose 
positions make them pivotal in furthering or hindering gender mainstreaming as a 
mechanism to be taken seriously, or there could be a more systematic opposition to 
gender change or systematic inaction on it that renders gender mainstreaming rhetoric 
void in practice (Mergaert & Lombardo 2017). The theorisation of the gendered formal 
and informal rules that permeate institutions offered by feminist institutionalism (see 
Chapter 3) is very useful to help further dissect the circumstances under which gender 
mainstreaming can be hoped to thrive or not. The bottom line of this set of critiques is 
that, regardless of the source of mal-implementation (i.e. individual or institutional) it 





2.2.2. Structural challenges: economic goals vs. gender equality goals – a bad fit?  
 
The structural challenges that gender mainstreaming face in the European Union are 
much less explored in the literature than the institutional challenges. The structural 
challenges come from the fact that the EU was created with a strong economic rationale 
behind it and which is still its major propeller. So gender equality policy in the EU could 
never have been built with a different purpose than to cater for the Single Market: ‘the 
EU has crafted its gender equality project on top of (and out of) this arguably skewed 
economic edifice’ and ‘[e]ven as the EU seeks to increase the scope and purview of its 
gender equality project, the focus remains on economic growth and competitiveness’ 
(Weiner & MacRae 2014b, p. 4). Even the positive action programmes that the Union 
started to promote in the eighties ‘were intended to fit women into a Common Market 
designed for men’ (Weiner & MacRae 2014b, p. 4). Considering gender equality in the 
(public) economic sphere is just a partial way of addressing inequalities between men 
and women. Addressing issues often treated as belonging to the private domain by 
mainstream politics, like gender roles, domestic and sexual violence, unpaid care, and 
gender stereotypes, is crucial not just to realise economic equality but also because 
they are problems in themselves that violate women’s human rights. The problem with 
gender equality policy in the EU identified by several scholars is thus one of ‘narrowing’ 
the meaning of gender equality (Lombardo et al. 2009, p. 4) in the sense that the 
meaning of gender equality is reduced and simplified to mean mostly equality in the 
labour market (Lombardo et al. 2009, p. 6). Equality in this narrow sense translates into 
getting women into the labour market by emulating the male full-time worker pattern, 
which is taken as the ideal (Elomäki 2015). The justification for the EU to act on gender 
equality become one of efficiency, of tapping into the under-used human resources that 
women constitute to improve the European economy (Ibid., but see also Kantola 2010; 
Lewis 2006; Stratigaki 2004; Young 2000). Thus ‘bending’ of the meaning of gender 
equality (Lombardo et al. 2009, p. 6) also occurs in the sense that gender equality 
becomes not an end in itself but a means to achieve other goals: competitiveness and 
economic growth.  
 
Mark Pollack and Emilie Hafner-Burton (2000) argue that bending gender equality may 
not be bad in itself if it means that concerns of equality between men and women enter 
reluctant political agendas or sceptical institutional environments and therefore expands 
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the policy into new fields of action. If gender equality is reconciled with the goal of 
climate change or economic competitiveness then it can be better received, since it 
stops being an either/or choice to become a win-win situation. Gender equality can thus 
gain new interpretations by its expansion into new policy areas, new meanings and 
potentially new proposed solutions for its achievement, in a process that Emanuela 
Lombardo et al. refer to as ‘stretching’ (Lombardo et al. 2009, p. 9). Other authors are 
more sceptical about the possibility of reconciling gender equality with the overall 
mission and goals of the European Union. Anna Elomäki (2015) refers to the damage 
that the economic case for gender equality has caused due to a de-politicisation of 
gender and gender relations (see also Rönnblom 2009). This is further accentuated by 
the neoliberal ethos that heavily permeates the EU institutions. Elaine Weiner and 
Heather MacRae (2014b) refer to the ‘(ir)reconcilability of gender equality goals with the 
European integration project’ due to its inherent neoliberal rationale and its male bias, 
describing the process of integration as an ‘agglomeration of largely self-perpetuating 
‘male power’ and masculine interests’ (Weiner & MacRae 2014b, p. 6). Similarly, in her 
study about gender equality considerations in EU trade policy, Jacqui True finds that the 
frame of gender equality as a human rights issue is subordinate to the neoliberal frame 
of women as an untapped resource to achieve greater economic growth (True 2009). 
Whenever the two frames clashed, it is the human rights frame that is dropped from the 
political discourse (True 2009, p. 125-127). 
 
One of the reasons for the seeming irreconcilability of gender equality as an end in itself 
and the neoliberal rationale is that they have two very different conceptions of the role of 
the state and of what it means to be a citizen. Gender equality very often requires 
redistribution of resources in what could be termed ‘state-led equality’, while 
neoliberalism praises efficiency driven by market-led economic growth with the state 
playing a limited regulatory role. Gender equality, and the mandate of gender 
mainstreaming in particular, is about dismantling the gendered assumptions of public 
policies, while neoliberalism seeks to promote policies that are understood as value-free. 
Finally, gender equality draws attention to gendered individuals and the links between 
productive and reproductive work, while neoliberalism treats people blindly as rational 
and autonomous citizens, consumers and workers (Teghtsoonian 2004), disregarding 
the relationships of dependence that particularly shape the lives of women as mothers 
(Abels & Mushaben 2012a). In terms of the state’s role of redistribution versus 
regulation, Rainer Eising et al. (Eising et al. 2015) argue that the institutional context of 
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the EU is more prone to accept and to promote policy frames related to ‘market 
integration, regulation and policy harmonization while being, for example, less 
permeable to redistributive frames’ (Ibid., p. 519). The fact that EU’s competences are 
most notable in regulating the internal market and are very scarce in fiscal policy and 
social security largely explains the above and limits the perceived relevance of gender 
mainstreaming in many of the EU’s policy arenas. 
 
2.3. Explaining receptiveness of the EU to (women’s) interest groups 
  
In order to understand how gender mainstreaming affects political opportunities for 
women’s groups in the EU, we need to understand why and in what ways the EU 
institutions provide access to interest groups in general and women’s groups in 
particular. What motivates EU policymakers and politicians to interact with interest 
groups? What do they gain from these interactions? What do they need from 
interactions with interest groups and women’s groups in particular? The literature on 
interest representation in the EU has delved into these questions in the last decade, 
drawing from the more substantive US interest representation literature and wider 
research on social movements.  
 
2.3.1. Perspectives on interest representation in the European Union 
 
The political structure of the EU is quite promising to interest groups (Pollack 1997; Imig 
& Tarrow 2001; Hooghe 2008; Klüver 2013). This is mostly a consequence of the 
structural characteristics of its political system that make it relatively porous and 
receptive to interest groups. The EU’s structural composition of a handful of institutional 
arenas – the Commission, the Parliament, the Council, and the European Court of 
Justice, to name the most prominent – and the complex constitutional power balance 
between them means that policies move along distinct political settings of equal 
relevance during the policymaking cycle. This provides plenty of opportunities for 
interest groups to access the legislative process and, since the different institutions have 
different concerns and resource requirements, no interest group is dominant throughout 
the entire process (Pollack 1997; Imig & Tarrow 2001). The multi-level nature of the EU 
also adds to the variety of access points for interest groups (see for example Imig & 
Tarrow 2001; Hooghe 2008): they are able to participate in the European policymaking 
process supranationally by lobbying the European Commission and the Parliament, 
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nationally by getting in touch with domestic governments, and/or locally by getting a 
voice in shaping implementation strategies of local authorities for EU legislation. But the 
EU is not just porous to interest groups – it is also largely receptive to their input. This 
receptiveness is largely the consequence of two factors: the understaffing of its 
institutions and the perceived democratic deficit of its political system. The resource 
exchange theory digs deeper into these two elements and connects them with interest 
group lobbying through a rational-choice approach.  
 
Lobbying as a resource exchange 
 
The resource exchange perspective of EU interest representation (Dür 2008; 
Greenwood 2003; Princen & Kerremans 2008; Schmitter & Streeck 1999) is based on 
the uncontroversial notion that the European institutions and the European Commission 
in particular are relatively understaffed for the task of legislating in diverse matters to 
500 million citizens (see for example Bouwen 2009, p. 20). It provides an explanation of 
interest representation as a transaction of information for access (Dür 2008; Greenwood 
2003; Princen & Kerremans 2008; Schmitter & Streeck 1999). It assumes that interest 
groups have something that the European institutions need, and vice versa. Lobbying is 
itself represented as an ‘exchange relationship between interdependent actors in which 
the European institutions trade influence for information, citizen support, and economic 
power’ (Klüver 2013, p. 15). In the case of the Commission, due to its role as sole 
initiator of legislative proposals, there is a strong need for detailed expertise on a wide 
range of policy areas to inform and legitimise its policy proposals (Bouwen 2002; 2004).  
 
The kind of knowledge that the EU institutions seek from interest groups can take a 
myriad of shapes. Iskander De Bruycker distinguishes between two big types of 
knowledge resources that groups can provide: political information and expertise (De 
Bruycker 2015). Political information is information garnered about whether a proposal 
is likely to enjoy support or opposition, whereas expertise can take many forms: 
technical, economic, legal or administrative (Ibid.). Expertise can also translate into 
information about the domestic interest, information about the aggregated interest of a 
particular domestic sector, or information on the European interest (Bouwen 2002; 
2004). All of these contribute to increase the legitimacy of a policy proposal but the 
information about interests at different geographical levels are relevant for the EU 




Citizen support, although a resource particularly sought after by elected bodies such as 
the EP, is also important for the Commission. The Commission cares about the 
democratic legitimacy of its policy proposals in order to secure support for them by the 
other institutions along the policymaking process (Bouwen 2009; Lehmann 2009, p. 50) 
and to close the democratic gap it is often criticised for (Pollack 1997). This is 
particularly relevant for public interest groups that claim to represent a broader social 
group than just their own members, which is the case of women’s groups. Regardless of 
the representative clout of these public interest groups, the Commission sees them as 
representative of their constituents, especially when it comes to European umbrella 
groups that gather within their structure domestic groups from most of the EU member 
states. Thus, beyond expertise on matters of gender equality such as support for victims 
of gender-based violence, equal opportunities in the job market, or measures for 
increasing women’s political representation, the consultation of women’s groups gives 
the European Commission increased legitimacy as it counterbalances the business bias 
often criticised in EU policies (Dür 2008, p. 1215; Dür & De Bièvre 2007; Pollack 1997). 
 
The perspective of the resource exchange framework is that opportunities for access 
are derived by the characteristics of the EU political institution in question. These are 
fixed by the treaties and by institutional constraints, which means that presumably 
interest groups cannot change them. In this view opportunities are exogenous to interest 
groups (Princen & Kerremans 2008, p. 1136). 
 
Interest groups go venue-shopping 
 
While they cannot change the institutional layout and constraints, interest groups can 
change the target of their lobbying – they can engage in ‘venue shopping’ (Baumgartner 
& Jones 1993; Mazey & Richardson 2001; Richardson 2000). The EU is a complex and 
loose multi-level system (Hooghe 2008, p. 73-74; Pollack 1997, p. 573) and these types 
of polities are more porous to a proliferation of interest group lobbying. Due to multiple 
points of access and no single decision-making body they are more difficult to be 
controlled by a few powerful groups. Interest groups have many alternative venues to 
lobby, and it is very difficult for a single group to secure their demands along the 
policymaking process that spans multiple institutions with different concerns and 
resource needs (Imig & Tarrow 2001; Pollack 1997). This is of particular relevance to 
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marginalised groups or groups that end up on the losing side of a policy proposal: there 
are more chances to try to get their demands heard as the policymaking process 
trudges along and the most relevant actor in each stage changes. 
 
Of course, changing the venue where groups target their lobbying efforts is not without 
its costs. Moving from venue to venue involves a transaction cost of money and human 
resources, so change will not be just a rational choice to maximise a group’s chance of 
their demands being heard (Princen & Kerremans 2008, p. 1137). Effective lobbying 
requires trust, which in turn requires regular contact and a history of reliable information 
provision from the part of the interest groups (Coen 2009, p. 152). It also requires a 
practical knowledge of the formal and informal rules of each particular unit engaged 
with, since each EU institution is not a monolithic body and different policy fields will also 
have their own idiosyncrasies (see Chapter 3). 
 
Nevertheless, the venue-shopping perspective acknowledges the agency of 
stakeholders in either framing the debate in a way that ties in with a venue’s institutional 
concerns or – more difficult – try to involve an already amenable venue into the policy 
debate (Princen & Kerremans 2008, p. 1138). As a consequence of their role and policy 
remit, different venues will be particularly sensitive to different ‘policy images’ 
(Baumgartner & Jones 1993, p. 1046). So an interest group has to be able to strategize 
its own discourse to make it fit with the discourse of the venue it is aiming to include in 
the policymaking process, or try to change the terms of the overall debate to turn an 
amenable venue into a stakeholder in that policy. Losers, of course, have the most 
incentive to try and shift venues and policy images. For attempts at changing venues 
‘well-placed allies are essential’ (Ibid., p. 1050). The authors mention subsystem politics 
('iron triangles', 'issue networks' and 'advocacy coalitions') as important to understand 
the process of change in policy images and venues (Ibid., p. 1051). This will be further 
expanded in section 3.3.2 on feminist allies and velvet triangles. 
 
The venue-shopping perspective acknowledges the agency of interest groups in their 
lobbying by recognising their capacity to frame their discourse and their attempts to 
frame the overall debate of a policy issue strategically: ‘Instead of adapting themselves 
to the characteristics and requests of particular venues, groups use strategic framing 
with the purpose of shifting policy issues to those venues that show the highest level of 




2.3.2. Transnational advocacy for women’s rights in Europe 
 
Anne Van der Vleuten argues that ‘equality advocates have proved very adept at playing 
a multilevel game’ (Van der Vleuten 2012, p. 41). The EU’s structural characteristics 
and the drive of the Commission in the last three decades in encouraging public interest 
representation has given women’s groups political opportunities for engagement and 
financial survival. Feminism – or at least a part of the movement – has grown in close 
cooperation with the state and learned how to navigate its institutions (Walby 2002). 
Nevertheless, engagement with the state comes with its own compromises. This section 
gives an overview of those compromises, along with a brief analysis of the Commission’s 
efforts in setting up structures for the representation of women’s interests, illustrated 
most vividly in the European Women’s Lobby (EWL).  
 
From contentious strategies to cooperation with the state 
 
In recent decades, the women’s liberation movement across the industrialised world 
saw a significant change in the strategies used to engage with the state authorities and 
in the role played by the women’s organisations that sprung from the wider social 
movement. There was a trend from contention to cooperation: women’s rights’ 
advocates moved from the sectarian protests of second-wave feminists to an 
institutionalised and conventional relationship with state institutions (Squires 2007). The 
protest methods also changed: feminists became more willing to address gender 
equality through the lens of utilitarian arguments rather than rights-based ones, to make 
their demands resonate with the neoliberal political and economic paradigm of less 
state, more (free) market. Gender equality was framed as an added value for the 
realisation of other goals – competitiveness, economic growth – and thus feminist 
advocates made gender equality compatible with other governance goals. Some 
feminist groups therefore undertook a process of institutionalisation (Silliman 1999, p. 
25) that made them external partners of public authorities that relied on these groups for 
the provision of services the state was no longer willing and/or able to provide, for the 
provision of expert knowledge on gender issues, and for monitoring and benchmarking 




This process of institutionalisation that many women’s groups went through meant that 
they had to change not only their goals and discourse but also their internal structures. 
The current focus on quotas and gender mainstreaming is a reflection of the neoliberal 
governance penchant for evidence-based policies that are empirically quantifiable 
(through number of women and impact assessments respectively). The expertise sought 
from women’s groups is mostly a quantitative one, based on the traditional scientific 
method. Gender equality thus becomes depoliticised, since both quotas and gender 
mainstreaming understood in this quantitative way tend to side-line the discussion of the 
very concept of gender equality (Squires 2007, p. 3) and to ignore the impact of policy 
on gender relations (Elomäki 2015; Rönnbom 2005). For many groups, the adaptation 
to this neoliberal political and economic paradigm was crucial not just for them to 
maintain their relevance within the political system; it is also very often a question of 
survival. Funding agencies – with the EU being no exception – have adopted the 
empirically quantifiable rationale as the criteria to award funding, which women’s groups 
are forced to adopt to be successful in their applications (Silliman 1999, p. 25). To be 
able to apply this paradigm, women’s groups have also been forced to professionalise 
and bureaucratise themselves (Silliman 1999), since they must be able to navigate the 
complex funding procedures and report on their project grants regularly. The adoption 
of the language of ‘rational empiricism’, reflecting the demands from the state for 
quantifiable knowledge to inform policies, ultimately translates into a loss of political 
edge (Squires 2007, p. 143) and the de-politicisation of gender equality and women’s 
rights. This trade-off, which some feminist organisations were willing to accept and 
others were not, led to the inclusion in the policymaking process of some groups but the 
marginalisation of others (Ibid., p. 146). 
 
The creation of EWL and the Commission’s entrepreneurship in the representation of 
women’s interests  
 
The creation and successes of the most recognised transnational European women’s 
group – the European Women’s Lobby – must be understood in the context of this shift 
from contentious politics to engagement with the state that a large part of the feminist 
movement worldwide has gone through. The relative strength of the EU gender equality 
policy, compared with the soft measures that are the staple of the rest of EU social 
policy, is striking. Sonia Mazey presents a bold argument for why this is so: gender 
equality policy in the European Union was developed through the efforts of women's 
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groups' advocates and committed officials within the EU institutions (mostly in the 
Commission but also in the European Parliament and in the European Court of Justice) 
(Mazey 2012, p. 128). The fruitfulness of this alliance was the result of a series of 
windows of opportunity that were seized by femocrats and women’s organisations 
combined (Ibid., p. 131-132). The United Nations declared the years 1975 to 1985 the 
UN Decade for Women. Beyond raising global awareness of gender inequalities, this 
commemoration spurred cooperation between governments, women’s rights activists 
and other actors, which in turn created networks around the issue of women’s rights 
that became influential and spurred change. At the EU level, the Nordic enlargement in 
the mid-1990s had the effect of increasing the number of femocrats within the EU and 
thus provide women’s rights advocates with allies inside the EU institutions, often in 
senior positions. Also during the 1990s and in the first years of the new millennium, a 
succession of treaty changes provided women’s groups and women’s rights’ advocates 
within the European institutions several opportunities to expand and reinforce the remit 
of competences of the EU in gender equality (Ibid., p. 132). This included the inscription 
in the Amsterdam and Lisbon treaties of gender equality as a fundamental value of the 
Union.  
 
Mazey also attributes the success of this symbiosis between women’s groups and EU 
institutions to the close relationship between EU policymakers and organised interests in 
general (Mazey 2012, p. 130; but see also Mazey & Richardson 2006). In fact, the 
Commission has often gone further than being a recipient of interest groups’ demands 
to be an active motivator of the institutionalisation of certain interests, particularly public 
interests (Kronsell 2005). Taking the case of women’s rights, the most salient 
organisation representing women at the European level had its set-up encouraged and 
financed by the European Commission. The European Women’s Lobby was created in 
large measure because the Commission wanted a one-stop shop to go to whenever 
gender equality legislation was being considered (Hoskyns 1996; Mazey 1998; Zippel 
2004). The expertise on gender issues, coupled with a European-wide 
representativeness, provided the EWL with the legitimacy the Commission was looking 
for to represent women’s interests. This in turn also conferred legitimacy to the 
Commission to expand the scope of its competences further into social policies beyond 
a strictly employment-related rationale, the traditional reserve of gender equality in the 




The complex nature of the EU decision-making process provided women’s rights’ 
advocates with multiple access points to the European policymaking process. The 
Commission, for the reasons mentioned above and for its nature as the legislation-
initiator body of the Union, was particularly keen on establishing regular links with 
women’s groups, often actively seeking advice from feminist experts and other women’s 
advocates (Hoskyns 1996). It was not the only European institution amenable to gender 
equality demands. During the 1970s, links between women’s organisations and women 
MEPs were crucial for putting and maintaining women’s rights in the political agenda of 
the European Union (Mazey 2012, p. 134; Vallance & Davies 1986) and since its 
creation in the eighties the FEMM (Gender Equality and Women’s Rights) committee of 
the European Parliament has been one of the most welcoming receptors of women’s 
rights’ demands. 
 
The EU also stimulated the creation and development of women's networks within and 
outside the EU institutions. These networks were able to link issues such as human 
trafficking, violence against women and sexual harassment to the wider framework of 
fundamental human rights that made the expansion of gender equality beyond 
employment policy an acceptable action in the EU (Mazey 2012, p. 131). The 
culmination of this movement was the Beijing 1995 Conference on Women and the 
international hailing of gender mainstreaming as the best approach to achieve gender 
equality. One of the reasons for this active propelling of women’s networks was the 
desire from both the Commission and the EP to expand the EU’s competences on social 
policy (Ibid., p. 132; Van der Vleuten 2012).  
 
Today, the EU continues to foster women’s rights’ networks in two ways. It offers 
women’s groups not just occasional opportunities for engagement but rather ‘regular 
institutional spaces’ (e.g. groups promoted and sponsored by the Commission, 
organisation of parallel NGO conferences) that foment the cooperation between 
women’s NGOs by promoting the exchange of practices between them and with the 
policymakers (Lang 2009, p. 328; but also Cichowski 2002; 2007; Pudrovska & Ferree 
2004; Rolandsen Agustín 2008; Woodward 2003). Furthermore, the EU also fosters 
transnational cooperation between women’s organisations by establishing it as a 




To sum up, a penchant for evidence-based policies from the state means that feminist 
NGOs have been permitted and even requested to participate in the policymaking 
process and some have been quick to take this opportunity (Squires 2007, p. 143). The 
EU, due to a series of favourable circumstances (e.g. the Commission’s keenness to 
involve groups representing public interests to increase legitimacy and expand its 
mandate) and structural characteristics (a porous and understaffed political system), is 
a particularly welcoming arena for women’s rights’ advocates that have had successes 
in navigating and influencing the multi-level system (Van der Vleuten 2012). 
Nevertheless, this required a shift from contentious strategies to more legitimised modes 
of political engagement with political systems and a consequent loss of political edge to 
women’s groups’ demands. 
 
2.4. Receptiveness to gender mainstreaming and to women’s 
groups: the paradox 
 
Fusing together insights from interest representation theories in the EU with the 
literature that critically analyses the implementation of gender mainstreaming already 
allows for the paradox of political opportunities for women’s groups to be spelled out 
more clearly. In section 2.2. I identified two different sets of critiques to gender 
mainstreaming implementation in the EU that stem from two different understandings of 
what the obstacles are. Whether the opposition to gender mainstreaming is structural or 
institutional seems to indicate two different outcomes for women’s groups.  
 
If, as the institutional set of critiques indicates, the shortcomings of the gender 
mainstreaming mechanism in the EU are due to bad implementation as a result of a lack 
of gender expertise in DGs that traditionally did not have to deal with a gendered 
perspective to their policies, then it would appear that there would be a demand for said 
expertise from civil society groups that have it. The EU institutions, as we have seen, 
trade expertise and other informational needs for access to the policymaking process 
(Bouwen 2002; Dür 2008; Kohler-Koch 1994), partly because they are understaffed and 
partly because they want legitimacy for their policies (Dür 2008). In certain issues, the 
EU may be more receptive to public interests as an attempt to close the democratic 
gap, on one hand (Ibid., p. 1215), and to improve its political legitimacy in certain policy 
fields vis-à-vis de member states, on the other (Young & Wallace 2000). This would 
seem to suggest that gender mainstreaming opened new ‘privileged points of access’ 
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for women’s groups (Van der Vleuten 2012, p. 62). Traditionally, the most enthusiastic 
interlocutors of women’s groups in the EU have been the women’s rights and gender 
equality (FEMM) committee in the European Parliament and the DG responsible for 
employment and social affairs in the European Commission. With the expansion of a 
mandatory consideration of gender to all policy areas it would seem that women’s 
groups expertise would now be in demand throughout all other DGs and EP committees 
as well. Thus, women’s groups would now be able to advocate on a broader range of 
issues that would go beyond the narrow employment-related scope often criticised in 
the EU gender equality policy (Guerrina 2002; Lombardo & Meier 2006). 
 
However, the other set of critiques – on the structural opposition to gender 
mainstreaming – seems to indicate the very opposite. Instead of making new venues 
receptive to the demands and expertise of women’s groups the mechanism of gender 
mainstreaming seems to have made advocating for women’s rights more difficult. 
Sabine Lang has discovered that women's organisations find it now much more difficult 
to lobby for women's empowerment programmes or for affirmative action than before 
gender mainstreaming was adopted (Lang 2009, p. 338). Civil society input is only 
sought and listened to insofar as it uses gender-mainstreaming language. The mal-
implementation here is not a matter of flawed design but of conscious side-lining: the 
general subservience of gender equality goals to economic growth and competitiveness 
is translated into a half-hearted application of gender mainstreaming through tick-box 
exercises or downright disregard for the mechanism in the first place. Moreover, 
structural critiques see the botched implementation of gender mainstreaming as 
destabilising the close cooperation between gender advocates and femocrats within the 
EU institutions that used to characterise the EU equality policy area (Jacquot 2010). 
This destabilisation occurred due to the opening of the gender equality field to include 
new policy areas and new actors. However, such destabilisation could be regarded as 
an advantage for women’s organisations (i.e. more venues for advocacy) or as a 
weakness (i.e. disruption of institutional alliances). 
 
Based on these two contradictory indications, the gender mainstreaming mechanism 
seems to pose a paradox for women’s organisations in the EU. On the one hand, the 
obligation of all EU policymaking institutions to apply gender mainstreaming to all 
policies in consideration – even institutions not used to working with gender – seems to 
indicate that the expertise of women’s groups is now sought on a broader range of 
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issues in a broader range of venues. Effective implementation is thus just a matter of 
increasing the gender expertise available to policymakers and educating them on the 
topic. On the other hand, there seems to be a structural problem with gender 
mainstreaming receptiveness that runs deeper. Treating gender mainstreaming as a 
tick-box exercise strips it of its revolutionary potential and at the same time undermines 
networks and sites within the EU institutions where gender equality was traditionally 
taken seriously. The extended mandate of gender mainstreaming to virtually every 
policymaking area makes it now more difficult to advocate for programmes correcting 
women-specific disadvantages. Summing up the paradox in a brief sentence, gender 
mainstreaming seems to have extended the scope of opportunities for women’s groups 
while at the same time closed down their opportunities for influence in traditional 
equality-friendly arenas. 
 
The remainder of this section will deal with two issues that are intimately related to this 
paradox. Firstly, I will analyse the distinction between adding a gender perspective to 
policy – which is the mandate of gender mainstreaming – and focusing specifically on 
women’s interests, and what this difference means for women’s groups’ participation in 
the EU political process. Secondly, I will distinguish between different gender 
mainstreaming approaches that may help to explain at least partially the difference 
between the potential and the expectations deposited in the gender mainstreaming 
mechanism, and its use in the EU policymaking process. Different gender 
mainstreaming approaches also mean different roles for external gender experts and 
civil society, which explains whether women’s groups can anticipate being included in 
the process. 
 
2.4.1. Different mainstreaming approaches: a bureaucratic exercise or a 
participative endeavour? 
 
Gender mainstreaming as a mechanism for achieving gender equality has become 
ubiquitous not just in the European Union but throughout the world since the 1990s. 
What the mechanism entails in practice, however, remains rather vague and so largely 
open to interpretation. Expectations and reality can thus clash not just due to a matter of 
practical obstacles or lack of political will but also due to different interpretations of what 
is to a large extent an ambiguous mechanism. Judith Squires (2007), based on earlier 
distinctions of gender mainstreaming by Rounaq Jahan (Jahan 1995), identified two 
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different mainstreaming approaches that have different understandings of the role of the 
state and of civil society in the implementation of the mechanism: the expert-
bureaucratic (or integrationist) and the participative-democratic (or agenda-setting) 
approaches (Squires 2007, p. 41). 
 
The expert-bureaucratic approach is the process whereby political institutions decide 
how to gender-mainstream issues through a top-down logic. It is an approach that 
produces evidence-based knowledge for policymaking through gender experts, and 
measures gendered impacts without questioning existing policy paradigms. Therefore, 
this approach often does not question prevailing frames that permeate the political 
institutions, leaving gender equality not as an end in itself but as a means to achieve 
competing goals such as economic competitiveness and efficiency. The expert-
bureaucratic approach leaves very little space for civil society participation since the 
process is mostly conducted through a top-down logic and the space and input required 
from external stakeholders is limited and very much defined by the political institutions 
that seek it. In this approach to gender mainstreaming, women’s groups risk not being 
active participators since the opportunities for their engagement turn out to be very 
limited. On the other hand, the participative-democratic approach is one that, as the 
name indicates, implements gender mainstreaming by an extensive process of 
engagement with civil society actors and gender experts. It focuses on the 
empowerment and participation of disadvantaged groups by engaging civil society, with 
the aim of rethinking policy paradigms to make them more gender equal (Squires 2007, 
p. 138). Women’s groups are able to set the agenda of what concerns gender equality 
and are consulted extensively throughout the process, not just by virtue of their 
expertise in gender issues but also to confer legitimacy and representativeness to the 
gender mainstreaming mechanism. 
 
Which approach has the EU taken concerning gender mainstreaming? At first glance, 
the EU’s understanding of gender mainstreaming seems to match the expert-
bureaucratic approach. The EU conceives gender mainstreaming as correcting the 
limitations of the equal opportunities and positive action approaches previously based 
on equality for the Single Market, resulting in an ‘equal opportunities mainstreaming’ 
approach (Squires 2007, p. 45) since its major focus remains economic equality. 
Emanuela Lombardo and Petra Meier, in their analysis of the gender discourse used in 
EU family policy and inequality in politics found that there is an ‘almost non-existent 
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voice of feminist movements in official texts’ (Lombardo & Meier 2006, p. 60) and the 
‘modest space given to civil society’ (Ibid., p. 62) could explain the lack of a feminist 
understanding of gender equality on the two issues concerned. Similarly, Emanuela 
Lombardo found that the European Constitutional Convention of 2001-2003 also 
adopted an integrationist approach to gender mainstreaming (Lombardo 2005), since 
‘issues and perspectives that accepted the existing neoliberal trend were prioritized, 
while social and gender issues that challenged this model were marginalized, and the 
actors defending them were constrained to adopt "realistic" (that is, within the dominant 
paradigm) standpoints to participate in the debate’ (Ibid., p. 428). Participation of civil 
society was ‘passive’ and opportunities for influence was limited to women’s 
organisations used to the EU jargon and political processes (Ibid., p. 427). 
 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a large discrepancy between policy fields and between 
the different DGs in their acceptance and adoption of gender mainstreaming (see 
MacRae & Weiner 2017). Participation of women’s groups in the policymaking process 
is also expected to vary according to policy field. Even in their study on feminist frames 
in EU policy, Emanuela Lombardo and Petra Meier found that feminist frames were 
extensively used in EU policy documents on gender inequality in political representation, 
while almost none were used in EU family policy (Lombardo & Meier 2006, p. 60). This 
may reflect the more or less successful framing that women’s groups developed for their 
demands on different issues. Even if an expert-bureaucratic approach is applied for 
gender mainstreaming, the EU privileges evidence-based policies, and these require 
(gender) experts.   
 
Thus, gender mainstreaming can either be used to bring women's voices into the 
policymaking process, in defining the policies, change from within (agenda-setting or 
participative-democratic approach), or it can just be used to more fully realise the goals 
of economic efficiency, being no more than a 'technocratic integrationist project' 
(Squires 2007, p. 140). One of the goals of this research will be to analyse, for each 
policy field in question, which approach was adopted by the European Union and how 
they work in practice. 
 




One set of critiques on gender mainstreaming in the EU focuses on the structural 
opposition to the goal of gender equality in itself when it clashes with competing 
economic goals. The harshest critics argue that gender mainstreaming was on the 
surface readily accepted by EU politicians because it was seen as a pretext to dilute 
existing women-friendly provisions (Stratigaki 2005).  
 
At first glance, a potential tension exists between using a gender approach in policies – 
gender mainstreaming – and tailoring programmes to address the specific 
disadvantages of women, of which positive discrimination, or gender quotas, is the most 
familiar face. The mandate of gender mainstreaming in the EU is one focused on 
‘difference’ (Bacchi & Eveline 2010, p. 42): to consider the effects of policies on both 
women and men when drafting legislation and correct imbalances when spotted. This 
indeed seems to render positive action programmes as unnecessary, or even frowned 
upon for violating the principle of equality in ‘gender equality’ policy. However, and on 
closer inspection, some misconceptions can be spotted. The problem with gender 
mainstreaming conceptualised in this way is that it equates gender with man and 
woman or – more commonly – with woman through its emphasis on sex-disaggregated 
statistics. It locates difference in women (Bacchi & Eveline 2010). This perspective 
renders the privilege and advantages of current legislation to men invisible, while, in fact, 
the deeper problem of gender is the male-as-norm in most policy fields (Kronsell 2012). 
The revolutionary potential of gender mainstreaming is of shedding light onto existing 
biases and thus of leading the policymaking process into a self-reflective overhaul. In 
order to spot the norms that advantage men the focus should be on what makes women 
different, the power relations between the genders and how gender is itself constructed 
through these asymmetrical relations (Bacchi & Eveline 2010). In order to do so, gender 
mainstreaming needs to focus on ex-ante evaluations, not on reactive policies of 
discerning the impacts of already-made policies on women and men (Ibid., p. 41). Policy 
needs to be seen as creative of gender relations, and not just as a reaction to problems 
(Ibid.).  
 
The ‘difference’ approach to gender mainstreaming is often used to repudiate quotas 
and women’s agencies (Squires 2007, p. 13). Mainstreaming a gender equality 
perspective into policies is therefore not a guarantee of including women’s voices in the 
process or of furthering women’s interests. ‘To mainstream a gender equality 
perspective is not necessarily to democratize the state’ (Ibid., p. 17) since gender 
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mainstreaming is concerned with implementing gender equality measures but not with 
discussing what gender equality actually entails or the impact of policy on gender 
relations (Kronsell 2012). Inequality has many possible indicators and deciding what to 
measure is ‘a political process with political consequences’ (Squires 2007, p. 17). The 
necessity to discuss what is gender equality renders the participative-democratic 
approach to gender mainstreaming the most positive one for furthering women’s 
interests. But if gender mainstreaming is not a guarantee of furthering women’s interests 
on its own, neither are gender quotas. Judith Squires captures the limitations of both 
gender mainstreaming and gender quotas (in politics) for the representation of women’s 
interests: ‘mainstreaming requires that policy-makers take gendered effects into 
account when drafting legislation but does not require that policy-makers be women, 
while quotas promote women to the ranks of policy-makers, but do not compel them to 
consider gender when proposing public policy’ (Ibid., p. 13). Therefore, what seems 
desirable is the conciliation of both approaches to achieve true equality in a process that 




Gender mainstreaming seems to have constituted a paradoxical opportunity for 
women’s organisations in the EU. A gender equality strategy that is mostly based on 
monitoring and checking existing and newly-formulated policies for their impact on men 
and women offers less leeway for actors that wish to develop European legislation that 
further women’s rights and positive discrimination programmes to correct women’s 
disadvantages. Most importantly for this research, some of the literature on gender 
mainstreaming seems to suggest that there is less room for activists to advocate for 
women’s rights legislation and gender quotas politically (see for example Stratigaki 
2005). Gender equality through gender mainstreaming gets reduced to considering the 
impacts of existing policies on men and women but a women’s equality agenda gets 
side-lined and there is the risk of losing sight of existing inequalities that disadvantage 
women disproportionately (Lang 2009, p. 339). Radical discourses and structural 
changes are ignored in favour of proof of added value of gender equality to existing 
policies (Ibid.). Moreover, the functioning of the EU gender policy, traditionally based on 
a close-knit network of actors that were all expressly committed to gender equality – the 
velvet triangles (Woodward 2003) – was destabilised to now include actors from 
potentially all policy fields and who often have competing interests (Lang 2009, p. 129). 
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The loosening of the velvet triangles is also the reflection of the greatest opportunity that 
gender mainstreaming brought for women’s organisations: new and specific-issue 
organisations can now mobilise and groups such as the European Women’s Lobby have 
been able to broaden their objectives and advocate for gender equality on new issues 
that are not traditionally associated with employment and social policy (Ibib., p. 130; 
Walby 2004). 
 
Bearing in mind the differential in receptiveness to gender mainstreaming and what the 
diverse EU institutions seek from interest groups, the next chapter’s endeavour is to 
create a theoretical framework capable of mapping out the political opportunities and 
hindrances that the EU affords to women’s groups. It will also focus on the agency of 
these groups in taking up these opportunities or even shaping new ones for themselves 




CHAPTER 3. A MULTI-LEVEL FEMINIST 
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH TO POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITIES IN THE EU FOR WOMEN’S GROUPS 
 
The previous chapter explored the change in the women’s movement political strategies 
in the last half-century, crystallising contentious politics into formal and professionalised 
organisations that seek to engage with the state and change it from within. As a 
consequence of that shift came the contribution of women’s groups to the adoption of 
gender mainstreaming and their potential in its realisation. The chapter also introduced 
some theories about interest representation in the EU, and considerations about the 
Commission’s entrepreneurship in interest-group making, particularly groups 
representing citizens’ rights, such as the European Women’s Lobby. This chapter seeks 
to dig further into the interaction between women’s interest groups and the EU 
institutions and build a theoretical framework that allows us to analyse the political 
opportunity structures – and the constraints – that the EU as a system and the varied 
units that compose it present for feminist advocacy. The framework will also seek to 
account for the agency of women’s groups and the strategies available to take 
advantage of those opportunities. Crucially, this framework will take a dynamic 
approach to political opportunity structures, following the approach of Sebastiaan 
Princen and Bart Kerremans (2008) of reserving analytical space for the possibility of 
interest groups to affect political behaviour of the actors and institutions they interact 
with and thus to shape political opportunities. Similarly, it is anticipated in the present 
theoretical framework that women’s groups do not just sit idly waiting for opportunities of 
engagement to present themselves but may try to circumvent constraints and 
resistances and, potentially, open new opportunities for themselves within the EU 
political system by, for instance, changing the preferences of its actors and the 
receptiveness of its institutions to gender mainstreaming. As a consequence, 
opportunity structures are here understood to be ‘both exogenous and endogenous to 
political processes: they impose opportunities and constraints on interest groups, but 
they may also vary as a result of group activities.’ (Princen & Kerremans 2008, p. 1130). 
 
3.1. Understanding political opportunities from both points of view: 




3.1.1. Modes of engagement 
 
According to the resource exchange perspective, interest groups gain access because 
they are able to provide the type of resource that an institution needs at a particular 
point in time. There is however a lack of theorisation in the interest representation 
literature of what the concept of access actually means (Halpin & Fraussen 2017). In 
their engagement with policymakers, stakeholders gain, or expect to gain, not just 
access but also the ability to impact public policy being considered, drafted or 
amended. Indeed, there is an important difference between access and influence: 
interest group advocates may be able to communicate directly with policymakers but 
whether their positions are really taken up is another matter. Influence has to do with 
'the ability of an actor to shape a political decision in line with his preferences’ (Dür 
2008, p. 561) and is distinct from luck because it presupposes that the actor has done 
something to contribute to that convergence of positions (Klüver 2013). Darren Halpin 
and Bert Fraussen fine-grain this distinction even more by listing involvement, access 
and prominence as the different types of engagement that an interest group can have in 
the policymaking process (Halpin & Fraussen 2017). Involvement is the easiest level and 
it happens through responses to online public consultations and letters sent to 
politicians. It is virtually open to all interest groups and is bounded only by the effort that 
the interest group is willing to expend to be involved in policy, determined in part by the 
resources a group possesses. Access involves a direct exchange of information with 
policymakers – a meeting, membership of advisory groups, invitation to hearings. These 
are at the discretion of policymakers and are not something all groups achieve; they 
have to be granted access by gatekeepers or earn it (Ibid.) and this is therefore very 
much determined by the policymakers’ needs and preferences. Lastly there is 
prominence, the type of engagement where an interest group is acknowledged by 
policymakers as representative of a particular constituency, such as the European 
Women’s Lobby and women’s rights in the EU (Helfferich & Kolb 2001; Karlberg & 
Jacobson 2015; Ramot 2006). Prominence is about the perception of policymakers of 
the representativeness of the group and is related to the salience of an issue on the 
political agenda at a given point in time, rather than to any particular efforts that an 





This differentiation of modes of engagement is useful because it helps us to anticipate 
the influence that an interest group might have in a particular policy context. It also 
brings to the fore the importance of groups’ characteristics to their ability to engage in 
the policymaking process. For involvement and access, interest groups have to be able 
to develop policy goods that will be suitable for the institutions they are trying to interact 
with. Two of the most relevant, information and expertise, require research and 
professionalisation, which in turn require human and financial resources. Even the act of 
involvement in the process of policymaking demands constant monitoring of new 
consultations and input requests from institutions, with access demanding time for 
meeting political actors, and ability to attend those meetings and satisfy informational 
requests. Similarly, applying for EU funding programmes, an important strategy of 
survival for many national and transnational NGOs in Europe, requires human and time 
resources, as well as experience of the application, budgeting and reporting process, 
and therefore a degree of professionalisation to be able to comply with the bureaucratic 
requirements of these programmes. Therefore, analysing the characteristics of women’s 
groups will be a crucial pre-condition to understanding their types of engagement in the 
EU policymaking process in different arenas and the level of influence they may be able 
to have, as well as their capacity to seize other political opportunities such as EU 
funding crucial to their survival and strengthening.  
 
3.1.2. The importance of interest groups’ characteristics 
 
Following the typology made by Sebastiaan Princen and Bart Kerremans (2008) of the 
conditions that have to be in place for interest groups to seize available political 
opportunities, we can build a lens through which to analyse the capability of groups to 
engage with the political system. Three conditions are thus expected to impact on a 
group’s ability to engage with policymakers: resources, location and the identification of 
opportunities to mobilise. 
 
Resources and location 
 
Rainer Eising’s (2004) study on the response of business groups to European 
integration found that the strategies employed by interest groups very much depend on 
their location (i.e. either at the local, national and/or European-level), and on their 
negotiation capacities and organisational resources. It is important to note though that 
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the relationship between resources and lobbying success is not clear-cut. Heike Klüver 
(2012), in her large-N case study of variation of lobbying success in the EU draws 
attention to the contradiction of conclusions of previous work on that question (Ibid., p. 
60). She shows that if on one hand Eising (2007) demonstrates that resource capacity 
impacts positively on interest group access to European institutions, on the other hand 
Christine Mahoney (2007) and Frank Baumgartner et al. (2009) cannot find a clear 
relation between resources and success in lobbying. However, resource endowment is 
still relevant for obtaining characteristics that are relevant for lobbying success. 
Information supply requires the capacity to generate detail-rich, rigorous and in-depth 
reports on the issue at hand, which in turn requires resource capacity. Large financial 
resources allow groups to have permanent and specialised staff, which in turn enables 
them to be more effective in their goals, think longer-term and thus build up more 
durable relations with policymakers (Eising 2007, p. 339). 
 
The identification of the opportunities to mobilise 
 
It is not enough for opportunities to simply be there. They have to be identifiable by the 
interest groups as seizable opportunities. The identification of opportunities will depend 
to some extent on the financial and human resources of an interest group – since it 
requires monitoring, knowledge and experience of the political system and the specific 
policymaking process. It also requires a relevant contact network. It is pertinent to look 
not just at a single group’s characteristics but also at the relationships between interest 
groups. Analysing the ties between organisations helps us to understand how they gain 
access to political actors and venues and how they trade information among themselves 
and with policymakers (Bunea 2015, p. 284). Already-granted access feeds into this 
capacity to identify opportunities to mobilise. A group that maintains frequent contacts 
with other interest groups and with the EU institutions will identify more readily the 
emergence of new opportunities for access to new venues and/or the acceptance of 
new demands. An ‘insider’ status thus seems to be an important characteristic that will 
impact positively on the identification of the opportunities to mobilise. 
Types of information 
 
The type of information and expertise required by the EU from interest groups varies 
from one institution to the next and is determined by the role that institutions play in the 
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policy-making process. In the particular case of the European Commission, due to its 
role as initiator of legislative proposals, there is a strong need for detailed expertise on a 
wide range of policy areas to inform and legitimize its policy proposals (Bouwen 2002; 
2004). In the case of the European Parliament, for instance, information about citizens’ 
interests and the aggregated European interest is welcomed, as the institution is 
particularly keen to increase its democratic legitimacy (Lehmann 2009). It is important 
that an interest group is able to shape the content of its communications in a way that 
fits the needs of various institutions to maximise its chances of being heard as the 
policymaking process trudges along and the relevant institution changes. So the types 
of information a women’s interest group is able to provide – descriptive statistics, 
technical details, best practices, surveys about citizens’ policy preferences, etc. – will 
determine to some extent their success in accessing and influencing the EU 
policymaking decisions. Another important strategy related to this – framing – and its 
importance for lobbying success, will be explored in more detail in the next sections of 
this chapter.     
 
3.1.3. Granting access: the importance of EU institutions’ characteristics 
 
We have seen that access to policymakers is something granted to groups; it is not 
automatic. Interest groups have to earn access and so access is in part determined by 
the effort of a group to ‘generate capabilities that will shape their “value” to 
policymakers’ (Halpin & Fraussen 2017, p. 728). Resources here matter because they 
will shape the extent to which these valuable capabilities can be generated. However, 
analysing the efforts of a group is not sufficient to understand access since it is ‘the 
policymakers’ needs and preferences that shape the granting of access’ (Ibid.). These, 
as resource exchange predicts, are largely determined by an institution’s 
characteristics. David Coen and Jeremy Richardson (2009) demonstrate that each EU 
institution has developed over time their own 'formal and informal institutional criteria for 
access' (Coen & Richardson 2009, p. 7), closely related to the function of that institution 
in the policymaking process. As mentioned above, bodies that face electoral scrutiny will 
be more sensitive to concerns of the public. Also, an institution’s role in the policymaking 
cycle will affect the type of resource required. A greater level of technical expertise may 
be needed in the proposal stage while legitimacy is more readily sought-after in the 
agenda-setting and decision-making stages (Princen & Kerremans 2008, p. 1136). 
More importantly for this research, whose focus is on sub-units (DGs) of the same EU 
 
 52 
institution (Commission), the type of policy will determine the policymakers’ needs and 
their preferences. Coen makes a distinction between ‘regulatory policies’ that need 
technical details, are based around relationships of trust and credibility, and formulated 
in a depoliticised context, and ‘redistributive policies’ involving a wider range of actors 
and consultations (Coen 2009, p. 152). The type of issue discussed is thus an important 
factor in determining which frames are more likely to be acceptable in different 
institutional arenas. However, ‘the formal and informal institutional criteria for access’ 
(Coen & Richardson 2009, p. 7) is not sufficiently explored in EU interest representation 
literature. 
 
The implementation of gender mainstreaming varies widely across DGs and across 
policy fields in the EU. This is attributed to the diverse characteristics of these 
institutions, such as whether the policy issue in question is of a regulatory or 
redistributive nature (Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000), the EU competences in that field 
(Van der Vleuten 2012; Walby 2004), gender expertise tradition (Pollack & Hafner-
Burton 2000) and the (gendered) power distribution within each DG (Debusscher 
2017). The goal of this research is to analyse the role of gender mainstreaming in the 
dynamic of receptiveness to women’s groups: how does it affect the existence of 
opportunities for women’s groups, for lobbying and funding access, across the EU? Are 
DGs that have implemented gender mainstreaming more rigorously also the ones that 
women’s groups find more receptive? Can women’s groups have a say on the 
implementation of gender mainstreaming? Are they able to bring a gender perspective 
to different policy areas? It is not expected that gender mainstreaming implementation 
and women’s groups’ receptiveness are bound by a relationship of causality; it is much 
rather likelier that the characteristics of institutions are impacting both phenomena. 
 
If we want to reconcile the assertion that the EU is a relatively welcoming polity to 
groups advocating for gender equality and women’s rights (Hoskyns 1996; Pollack 
1997; Van der Vleuten 2012) with the stark variation of gender mainstreaming 
implementation across EU policy fields, we need to look at two different levels of 
institutional criteria for interest group access: the macro-structural and the meso-
institutional levels. Moreover, several EU gender equality scholars have pointed out the 
importance of feminist individuals within the EU institutions teaming up with advocates 
from civil society to advance equality policy at the supranational level (Holli 2008; 
Locher 2012; Mazey 2012; Woodward 2003); this seems to indicate a role for individual 
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actors in shaping the political opportunities for women’s groups. These findings point to 
the usefulness of looking at institutions’ characteristics – and at political opportunities – 
through a multi-level approach. The analytical macro level is where we situate 
statements like the EU being a porous and relatively receptive system to groups 
representing public interests. The variation of gender mainstreaming implementation 
and an anticipated variation in the receptiveness to women’s groups according to policy 
fields would make the case for exploring the meso level of the EU institutional 
components (e.g. DGs). The importance of well-placed allies and the opportunities 
brought about by individual actors throughout the history of EU gender equality policy 
justifies a closer look at the micro-level, the level of the individual. The mixture of new 
institutionalism, with its focus on institutional structures as shapers and constrainers of 
individual behaviour, and feminist scholarship on organisations, with its emphasis on 
gender as ‘an organising principle of social relations’, will aid me in devising a theoretical 
framework capable of teasing out the variations of receptiveness to gender 
mainstreaming and gender equality advocacy vertically and horizontally in the EU. 
 
3.2. Bringing gender in: a multi-tiered feminist institutionalist 
approach to political opportunity structures in the EU 
 
Resistance to change is an important part of understanding the successes and failures 
of the implementation of gender mainstreaming in the different institutions of the EU. If 
gender mainstreaming became constitutionally mandatory across all policy fields, what 
explains the variation in its implementation? An analytical framework based on the 
concept of resistance is a useful tool to help us answer that question. 
 
New institutionalism, in all its variants (i.e. historical, rational choice, sociological and 
discursive), stresses the importance of institutions, both formal and informal, in 
explaining individuals’ behaviours and in explaining why some political outcomes are 
more likely than others. ‘[P]olitical structures shape political conduct, and are 
normatively and historical embedded’ (Lowndes & Roberts 2013, p. 28). This means 
that institutions are rules that structure political behaviour and that are relatively stable 
and enduring as they cannot be changed easily (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, p. 4). 
Processes of change are usually incremental in the sense that new features are 
imprinted onto settings that already have their own rules and norms – the mingling of the 
old and new can therefore produce unintended consequences (Krook & Mackay 2010; 
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Waylen 2009). Gender mainstreaming, for instance, was ‘layered on, to some extent, to 
the prevailing institutional order’ (Weiner & MacRae 2017, p. 81, italic original), which 
explains the divergent degrees of acceptance of the mechanism across different EU 
institutions. Furthermore, changes to formal institutions can also have unintended 
consequences if there are informal rules that subvert them (Chappell & Waylen 2013). 
Formal change, such as the inclusion in the Amsterdam Treaty of the obligation to 
promote equality between women and men across all EU policies, can thus be 
subverted by informal norms in certain organisational settings that are in tension with the 
new mandate. However, informal rules don’t necessarily always sabotage formal 
change; they may complement formal institutions and therefore facilitate change (Ibid.). 
 
Analysing the formal and informal institutions that permeate the different DGs is 
therefore a crucial step to, on one hand, understand processes of resistance to the 
implementation of gender mainstreaming and, on the other, to set out the diverse 
institutional criteria of access for interest groups that generate distinct levels of 
receptiveness to women’s groups. The blind spot in mainstream new institutionalism is 
its disregard for gender as ‘a basic organizing principle of the social and political world’ 
(Locher & Prügl 2009) that is also a constitutive element of institutions. Political 
institutions are nominally gendered, in the sense that it has been men who have 
historically held positions of power (Waylen 2014). Women have entered these spaces 
in the last decades in increasingly large numbers and thus have exposed some of the 
hidden expectations – i.e. informal rules – of these institutions (Chappell & Waylen 
2013). However, even if the number of women holding positions of power reached parity 
with men it does not mean that institutions would work differently; that is because 
institutions are also substantively gendered and biased towards masculine norms. 
Positive traits such as rationality, power, strength, competitiveness, autonomy, logic, 
control are associated with masculinity whereas contrasting traits such as passivity, 
care, emotion, irrationality are associated with femininity (Ibid.). The masculine ideal is 
what underlines institutional structures, practices and norms, and it shapes ‘ways of 
valuing things, ways of behaving and ways of being’ (Duerst-Lahti & Kelly 1995, p. 20 
quoted in Mackay et al. 2010, p. 582). Gender thus plays out within institutions in 
different ways: it is a category but also a process. Political institutions are gendered in 
the sense that they prescribe rules about gender and rules that have gendered effects 
(even if not specifically and explicitly concerned with gender), and also because they 
produce policies that impact women and men differently and shape the relations 
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between the two (Gains & Lowndes 2014). Gender mainstreaming, in itself a policy 
mechanism whose main goal is to make the gendered aspects of institutions visible in all 
these three dimensions and correct them in order to eliminate gender bias, lends itself 
particularly well to a feminist institutionalist analysis.2 
 
Two sets of critiques to the haphazard implementation of gender mainstreaming were 
identified in the first chapter: one which focuses on institutional obstacles including lack 
of knowledge and resources and another which focuses on a wider and more structural 
misfit between gender mainstreaming and other EU’s objectives. Similarly, we can see 
political opportunity structures divided in two categories: the general receptiveness of 
the EU to interest groups, a macro-level dimension that is largely determined by the 
constitutional characteristics of the polity; and the receptiveness to interest groups at a 
given point in time and space, contingent on power relations, policy priorities and likely 
to diverge according to the meso-level institutional arena we are looking at. To make a 
meaningful contribution to the gender mainstreaming literature in the EU I will map out 
the types of resistances to the mechanism at different levels – vertically and horizontally 
– and thus a multi-level approach will be particularly advantageous. Moreover, a multi-
level feminist institutionalist approach is well-suited to analyse the overall EU’s openness 
to women’s groups’ advocacy while permitting us to distinguish different levels of 
receptiveness among DGs and policy fields.  
 
3.2.1. Revisiting gender mainstreaming implementation critiques: categorising 
multi-tiered resistance 
 
Resistance to change is an important part in understanding the successes and failures 
of implementation of gender mainstreaming in the different institutions of the EU. Lut 
Mergaert and Emanuela Lombardo, in their analysis of gender mainstreaming 
implementation in EU research policy, came up with a typology of resistance that is 
useful to distinguish different hindrances to gender mainstreaming across Commission 
units (Mergaert & Lombardo 2017). They distinguish between individual and institutional 
obstacles to change, with the former located in specific actors that oppose gender 
                                                      
2 The terms ‘feminist institutionalism’ and ‘gender institutionalism’ are often used interchangeably to mean an approach 
that combines new institutionalism and feminist research and that sees gender as a central organising element of political 
institutions. I use ‘feminist institutionalism’ rather than ‘gender institutionalism’ to accentuate the normative drive for 
gender equality: feminist institutionalism attempts not just to analyse political institutions but also to contribute to our 
understanding of when and under which circumstances they work or can be made to work for the benefit of gender 
equality (Lovenduski 2010 [foreword in next citation]; Krook & Mackay 2010, p. 1). 
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mainstreaming, or lack information about it, and the latter being about the systematic 
opposition to gender change or systematic inaction on it (Ibid., p. 107). Individual 
resistance may take the form of reluctance to implement gender mainstreaming due to 
its burden: an individual that lacks time, resources and knowledge might simply refuse 
to do it. An institutional form of resistance would be a refusal by the higher ranks of the 
institution to allocate resources and training to gender mainstreaming in the first place. 
A further distinction is made between resistance made explicit (when opposition is 
clearly made apparent by actions and discourses of actors) and implicit (when there is 
no overt opposition to gender change but actors distance themselves systematically 





Types of resistance Features 
Individual 
Resistance expressed through the action or 
inaction of an individual to oppose gender 
change. 
Institutional 
Resistance revealed by a pattern of 
aggregated action or inaction that is 
systematically repeated and that suggests a 
collective orchestration to oppose gender 
change. 
Explicit 
Resistance expressed overtly when actors 
oppose gender equality initiatives through 
their action and discourses, or do not do what 
they ought to do to advance gender equality 
even when they are made aware of gender 
equality commitments. 
Implicit 
Resistance not overtly manifested that can be 
verified by observing the extent to which 
actors, in their discourses and inactions or 
inadequate actions, distance themselves from 
the goal of gender equality itself. 
 
Table 1. Types of resistance to gender mainstreaming (source: Mergaert & Lombardo 2017, p. 107) 
 
3.2.2.  Logics of appropriateness of EU institutions: the meso/institutional level 
 
A question that follows from this typology is why do these resistances happen in the first 
place? Feminist institutionalism provides useful concepts and tools to analyse resistance 
to gender mainstreaming in the EU. The attention to informal rules and how these may 
subvert formal ones is crucial to understand resistance to a mandatory policymaking 
mechanism. Informal rules, ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke & 
Levitsky 2004, p. 727), matter because they may affect the implementation success of 
formal rules and contribute to the subverting of formally established mechanisms – in 
this case, gender mainstreaming. Informal rules are closely related to the logic of 
appropriateness of a specific institution. New (sociological) institutionalism contends that 
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the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March & Olsen, 1989) of each Directorate-General (DG) 
in the European Commission, each committee of the European Parliament, and each 
working group in the European Council is the mechanism that largely determines the 
behaviours, norms, values, and frames used by each of these political units. 
Furthermore, feminist research on political institutions tells us that these different logics 
of appropriateness are inescapably gendered (Chappell 2006; Chappell & Waylen 
2013). This can be expressed, for example, as they establish the acceptable behaviour 
of individuals within these units, while privileging norms and values typically associated 
with masculinity (e.g. competitiveness, assertiveness, rationality). As a result, they also 
limit the ways that policy issues are understood, approached, and debated. 
 
Different DGs within the European Commission present distinct levels of implementation 
of gender mainstreaming and, necessarily, gender mainstreaming will have faced 
different types of resistances. Implementation differences are a consequence of the 
disparate amount of resources that each DG allocated for this mechanism – staff, 
training, money and time – and of the existence or absence of explicit commitments to 
gender equality in policy-specific documents. This is a reflection of the gender work 
distribution (i.e. proportion of women and men present in each role and hierarchical 
level) – and therefore of each unit’s distribution of power – and its own logic of 
appropriateness which dictate the behaviour, values and norms suitable for individuals 
within the unit. Gendered logics of appropriateness, in addition to prescribing the proper 
roles for individuals working within each institutional setting, also limit the ways in which 
an issue is handled, and the frames used to debate it. We know that the purpose of a 
policy, whether it is regulatory or distributive, will influence the type of expertise 
required, the frames used to discuss it and the practices of engaging with stakeholders 
(Reis 2017). Policies such as social affairs and development, and regional policy and 
cohesion are more amenable to the inclusion of a gender dimension into their actions as 
they are used traditionally to address inequalities (Locher & Prügl 2009; Pollack & 
Hafner-Burton 2000). Competition policy, on the other hand, is a much more market-
oriented policy field concerned with taking down barriers to free trade and much less 
accustomed to considering and redressing disadvantages of liberalisation to certain 
groups (Coen 2009). Due to their depoliticised context and the attention to technical 
detail, regulatory policies also reflect a stronger adherence to the idea of a neutral and 
objective bureaucracy (Reis 2017). These circumstances can make it harder for gender 
mainstreaming to be implemented and women’s rights advocates to be heard, since 
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they both can be seen as biased towards a gender equality policy position (Chappell 
2006; Minto & Mergaert 2015). Looking at the different logics of appropriateness across 
DGs is important because they show us not just the masculine and feminine behaviours 
that they prescribe for men and women within the institutions but also – and more 
importantly for this research – because they reveal the appropriate frames to debate 
policies in each institutional arena (Reis 2017). The policies and legislation produced by 
political institutions will therefore be shaped by gender norms; in addition, these are 
‘outcomes which, in turn, help to re/produce broader social and political expectations’ 
(Chappell 2006, p. 226). 
 
The issue that is seldom addressed is the uneven distribution of power between policy 
areas and units within the EU. The main raison d’être of the EU is the concretisation of 
an open and single market, meaning that European Commission DGs directly related to 
this goal – regulatory DGs such as DG Competition or DG Trade – are given 
preponderance, with more resources and more power than redistributive DGs such as 
EMPL. Moreover, many of these redistributive DGs share their policy competence with 
the member states and so have their legitimacy more in question. The former are also 
the ones where feminist advocates have had the most difficulty gaining access (Pollack 
& Hafner-Burton 2000), for the reasons explained above (i.e., smaller network of actors, 
requirement of technical detail, depoliticised and neutrally-perceived policies, lack of 
gender-mainstreaming implementation). However, the importance of power inequalities 
between venues is not something taken into account when exploring women’s groups’ 
strategic decisions about where to seek access. We know that the most amenable 
venues for women’s groups are linked to the redistributive policies, the ones on the 
fringes of EU-policy competence. Therefore, the literature already hints that the chances 
for women’s groups to change their lobbying target and be successful are limited to a 
few peripheral institutional settings (Reis 2017).  
 
3.2.3.  Introducing the macro/structural level: hegemonic masculinity, neoliberalism 
and master frames  
 
In the context of an analysis of resistance to gender mainstreaming and political 
opportunity structures across three DGs, it is useful to refine the category of institutional 
as given in Lut Mergaert and Emanuela Lombardo’s typology, separating it into 
institutional resistances at the meso level, i.e. a pattern of refusal to implement gender 
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mainstreaming within a particular unit or DG, and institutional resistances at the macro 
level, i.e. the structural obstacles that gender mainstreaming faces in the EU and that 
thread through the different institutions that make up the whole organisation. The 
gendered logic of appropriateness of each institution is what connects the macro aspect 
of an organisation such as the EU – that can be understood as composed by several 
different institutions, the EU institutions – to the micro level of the individual that does the 
resisting (Kronsell 2016). This research thus narrows the institutional category to the 
DG-level, and adds a category of structural resistance, to make a distinction about 
resistances that are local to a specific DG and resistances that are common across DGs 
and that stem from the EU constitutional characteristics. 
 
Types of resistance Features 
Structural 
Resistance that stems from the EU’s 
constitutional make-up including the balance 
of power between its institutional 
components, treaty-ascribed competences, 
and long-term political projects.   
 
Institutional 
Resistance revealed by a pattern of 
aggregated action or inaction that is 
systematically repeated and that suggests a 
collective orchestration to oppose gender 
change. 
Individual 
Resistance expressed through the action or 
inaction of an individual to oppose gender 
change. 
 
Table 2. Typology of multi-tiered resistances to gender mainstreaming 
 
 
Hegemonic masculinity, neoliberalism and Weberian bureaucratic neutrality 
 
In recent years the focus of the engagement of gender scholars with the EU has shifted 
from an exclusive attention to the impact of feminist advocates on EU gender equality 
policies, to a theoretical challenge of the very concepts of European integration and EU 
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studies (Abels & Mushaben 2012a). A small literature has been growing that challenges 
the gender-blindness of EU integration literature and that analyses the gendered nature 
of the integration project and its impact on gender power relations within the EU 
institutions and in European society more broadly (Abels & MacRae 2015; Abels & 
Mushaben 2012a; Kronsell 2005; Kronsell 2016; Locher & Prügl 2009; Weiner & 
MacRae 2017). These scholars bring attention to the male bias of the European 
integration project since its inception. The complete absence of women at the 
negotiating and decision-making table in the first three decades of European integration, 
and the original focus of integration on male-dominated industries such as coal and steel 
nominally reflects the male bias of the EU’s origins (Abels & Mushaben 2012b). 
Substantively, the EU has also ‘institutionalized hegemonic masculinity’ (Locher & Prügl 
2009, p. 187), meaning not only that institutions have been dominated by men but also 
that they have been constituted on norms associated with masculinity (Kronsell 2005). 
Moreover, EU policies have crystallised particular forms of masculinity into 
institutionalised norms (Locher & Prügl 2009), transforming originally masculine norms 
into the standard and thus rendering characteristics associated with masculinity – 
assertiveness, rationality, control, autonomy - hegemonic (Kronsell 2005; Locher & 
Prügl 2009).  
 
A case in point is the EU’s long-standing and prioritised focus on the neoliberal market 
project that ‘can be understood as validating and constructing rational, autonomous, 
economic man as the hegemonic type of masculinity’ (Locher & Prügl 2009, p. 187 but 
see also Kronsell 2006). As feminist economists have shown, the concept of an 
autonomous individual is deeply gendered since it neglects the relations of dependency 
between individuals that is relegated to the publicly-invisible realm of care, a role that is 
in its vast majority performed by women (Locher & Prügl 2009). Therefore, ‘[i]n so far as 
EU policies adopt liberal presumptions – as for example in the neoliberal market model – 
its prescriptions for the making of a single market and a political union reproduce 
masculinist commitments’ (Ibid., p. 198). This has led several feminist scholars to 
question the reconcilability of gender equality commitment with the neoliberal logic that 
permeates an EU integration project that has been an ‘agglomeration of largely self-
perpetuating “male power” and masculine interests’ (Weiner & MacRae 2014b, p. 6).  
 
The predominance of men in positions of power has ‘permitted a set of male-centred 
institutional practices to evolve without comment or protest (Lovenduski 2005, p. 27)’ 
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(Haastrup & Kenny 2015, p. 6). These practices, because they constitute the norm, are 
rendered invisible and seen as gender-neutral because they are presented as common-
sense. (Connell 1995; Haastrup & Kenny 2015). The ideal of the Weberian neutral 
bureaucracy is a reflection of this invisibility of gender. The EU institutions understood in 
Weberian terms as neutral and de-politicised institutional sites masquerade the actual 
male-as-norm women-as-deviant model of the neoliberal single market project. 
Moreover, this illusion of bureaucratic neutrality represents a problem for the 
implementation of gender mainstreaming because women-advancement strategies tend 
to be portrayed as ideologically biased and running contrary to norms of neutrality and 
de-politicisation (Chappell 2006) that are more pronounced in more markedly neoliberal 
institutional settings such as the ones that deal with competition and trade (Locher & 
Prügl 2009).    
 
The resilience of the economic master frame for gender equality 
 
As referred to in the previous section, the (gendered) logics of appropriateness of the 
diverse institutions generate receptiveness to different discursive policy frames. 
However, not all frames have the same resilience or dependence on political opportunity 
structures (Thomas & Turnbull 2016): while some frames are fleeting, others enjoy 
continuity in their resonance within a political system for decades (Benford & Snow 
2000). For issues of gender equality, an economic frame, such as the one adopted in 
the case of sexual harassment, has been a very resilient one (Kantola 2010; Lewis 
2006; Ostner 2000; Stratigaki 2004; Young 2000) and can be considered the ‘master’ 
frame of gender equality in the EU (Elomäki 2015). Typically, feminist actors have taken 
advantage of the fact that the EU is built around the neoliberal concepts of an open 
market and economic competitiveness and have framed gender equality as a way of 
correcting market inefficiencies (e.g. non-discrimination legislation as a way of getting 
more women into the labour market to increase competitiveness of European economy). 
Sexual harassment was framed as a problem of inequality of treatment between women 
and men in the workplace (Zippel 2004); women’s marginalisation in science and 
research was framed as a problem of inefficiency (i.e. of human resources 
mismanagement) (Abels 2012). So, the economic frame of gender equality is a generic 
frame that can be employed across policy areas and has been resilient over time. 
Notwithstanding the institutional differences in frame resonance across DGs, the 
economic frame of gender equality is frequently successful because it resonates with 
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the overarching neoliberal ethos that dominates the EU institutions. In fact, Richard 
Thomas and Peter Turnbull (2016) conceptualise neoliberalism as the master frame 
used by the Commission to ‘establish a mandate for sector-specific policies that can be 
pursued via autonomous action by the Commission and/or collective action by 
adherents of Commission policies’ (Thomas & Turnbull 2016, p. 1). In other words, the 
Commission persuaded a varied group of political actors – including women’s 
organisations – that the market was the solution to Europe’s problems (Thomas & 
Turnbull 2016). 
 
In addition to the content of the frame, its empirical validity, or the form in which it is 
presented, also matters (Benford & Snow 2000). In the EU, there is generally a 
penchant for evidence-based policies that are empirically quantifiable, particularly 
through impact assessments, and a valuation of the cost and benefits of policies. This is 
also true of the criteria for applying to funding programmes. Funding agencies, including 
the EU, have adopted an empirically quantifiable rationale as criteria to award funding. 
The expertise sought is thus mostly a quantitative one, based on the traditional scientific 
method. Yet often, feminist issues cannot be easily captured through stereotypically 
‘masculine’ methods. Many issues of interest to women’s groups, including sexual 
harassment at work, are difficult to quantify because of problems of underreporting and 
even difficulties in reaching a consensus over what constitutes harassment. These 
empirical validity requirements have important consequences for the take up of political 
opportunities by women’s groups in the EU.  
 
To sum up the relevance of the EU’s structural characteristics, the EU is permeated by a 
hegemonic masculinity at the macro-level that heavily influences the diverse institutions 
that are part of it, which in turn shape the behaviours, values and norms to which 
individual actors abide. Hegemonic masculinity also limits the acceptable ways around 
which an issue is problematised and the solutions prescribed to it. In other words, the 
hegemonic masculinity that permeates the EU limits the frames used by the EU 
institutions. This hegemonic masculinity is rendered invisible by its elevation to the status 
of normal; the bureaucracy of the EU, like other Western bureaucracies, is thus 
understood as neutral and guided by objective values, when in fact it is gendered 
because the appropriate forms of behaviour for civil servants are masculine (Chappell 
2006, p. 227; Longwe 1997). Gender mainstreaming has the potential to make this 
hegemonic logic visible and counteract its disadvantages but precisely because of that it 
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runs counter to the underlying logic of most of this institutionalised modus operandi 
across the EU and is therefore a potential disruptor of the status quo. 
 
3.2.4. Individual agency and change: the micro/individual level 
Looking at political opportunity structures through a feminist institutionalist lens is useful 
because while it concedes that institutions tend towards path dependency, it also leaves 
room for political agency. The logic of appropriateness of institutions only matters 
because individuals enact the script provided by these logics. The macro is connected 
to the micro level by these gendered logics of appropriateness, ‘whereby individuals 
follow embedded rules and routines, according to what is appropriate for their social and 
professional role and the individual's identity’ (Kronsell 2016, p. 5). The enforcement of 
these norms and modes of behaviour, particularly informal rules, is not done by third 
parties but rather ‘through internal actors and self-enactment and self-assertion’ 
(Chappell & Waylen 2013, p. 605 but see also Lauth 2000). It is also at the micro level 
that gender mainstreaming happens: rhetorical commitments to gender equality have to 
be translated into practical and precise tasks that will in part depend on an individual’s 
gender expertise and gender equality commitment. For instance, Lut Mergaert and 
Emanuela Lombardo identified a series of resistances to gender change in DG Research 
by individuals who refused to mainstream gender due to insufficient time, resources and 
training (Mergaert & Lombardo 2017).  
 
On a more optimistic note, feminist scholars looking at political institutions also 
recognise the importance of individual agency for institutional change. Political 
institutions are not neutral monolithic arenas: ‘institutions are battlegrounds in which 
opposing principles, interests, values, norms, and objectives are overtly or covertly 
articulated.’ (Mergaert & Lombardo 2017, p. 104). Individual actors are constrained by 
the institutional environment they operate within but, under certain circumstances, they 
can trigger change and thus alter the gendered rules of institutions (Beckwith 2005; 
Krook & Mackay 2010). This is because there is an interactive relationship between 
gendered individuals and institutions structurally gendered: institutions shape gender 
performance but gendered ways of acting and being can also in turn shape institutions 
(Krook & Mackay 2010). Change can also be brought about externally by the interaction 
with social actors, including feminist advocates, leading up to a dynamic and interactive 
understanding of the political opportunity structure: by interacting with the political 
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system, interest groups can disrupt the norms and open new spaces for themselves 
(Chappell 2006). Change is not always linear or progressive due to the stickiness of 
institutional norms; however, the task of the researcher is precisely ‘to clarify the 
conditions under which gender norms can be disrupted and to enable equality seekers 
to target when and where there are institutions that are most likely to be open to their 
demands' (Ibid.).  
 
Individual agency is thus important to explain change in institutions. Sometimes a 
powerful feminist actor can change the opportunities for women’s groups at a certain 
point in time. For example, the legislative actions on equal pay and equal treatment in 
the 70s and 80s, and the creation of the European Women’s Lobby were very much 
propelled by a series of feminist female civil servants in high-up positions.3 However, 
these actors benefitted from a European Commission keen to expand its competence in 
social policy by increasing input legitimacy of its policy proposals; this led to a 
willingness to institutionalise transnational feminist advocacy in the form of the EWL, for 
instance. When analysing the political opportunity structures and institutional change, 
the challenge is often to establish causation between all of these sets of variables: did 
opportunities arise because the system changed or did the system change precisely 
because interest groups interacted and altered it from the outside? An interactive and 
dynamic approach to the political opportunity structures is thus essential to avoid falsely 
attributing causation (Gains & Lowndes 2014, p. 531). 
 
3.3. Resisting resistance: a dynamic approach to political opportunity 
structures 
 
Stating the institutional and structural characteristics of the EU and how these impact 
the successful implementation of gender mainstreaming and receptiveness to women’s 
advocates is by no means to affirm that resistance to gender change is inevitable and 
gender equality an irreconcilable goal with other EU projects. As Raewyn Connell 
reminds us, the state is internally complex and even contradictory; it is 'by no means 
consistent in [its] processing of the gender issue' (Connell 1987, p. 129). That is why 
hegemonic masculinity does not preclude the Commission from pursuing feminist 
                                                      
3 Some of these individuals include Fausta Deshormes La Vallé: leader of the Information Service of Women of the 
Commission; Marcelle Devaud: vice-president of the consultative committee for employment and equality of opportunities 




policies in certain fields and why change is possible through windows of opportunity and 
actor agency. These internal conflicts and contradictions of the EU as a ‘quasi-state’ 
mean that sometimes unintended consequences of institutions provide marginal groups 
with opportunities for change (Kenny 2007). The literatures on venue shopping and on 
framing, along with empirical research on feminist alliances in the EU, provides 
important material to design an approach to political opportunity structures that takes 
into account the agency and proactiveness of women’s groups in not only taking up 
existing opportunities but carving new ones for themselves by their interaction with the 
EU.   
 
3.3.1. The importance of framing 
 
Framing is a tool that interest groups—including women’s organisations—have at their 
disposal to effect change. Framing is strategic, goal oriented, and purposeful (Ferree & 
Merrill 2000). It is about ‘making some aspects of reality more salient at the expense of 
other aspects’ (Thomas & Turnbull 2016, p. 6). It is directly connected to the idea of 
venue shopping, as it is framing (and specifically, differential frames) that allows an 
interest group to reshape its position to appeal to a variety of institutions. Generally, 
interest groups frame their discourse and demands to fit with the dominant discourses of 
the institutions they are trying to influence so as to have a higher chance of being heard 
(Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000).  
 
Framing strategies can be employed in two different ways in order to increase the 
chances of successful venue shopping. First, interest groups can frame their own 
demands to fit with the existing discourse of a certain venue. Alternatively, groups can 
frame an issue in a way that makes it fall under the responsibility of a venue that is 
already amenable to their demands (Princen & Kerremans 2008). The latter is a more 
dynamic understanding of venue shopping, but it is also much more difficult for interest 
groups to achieve. It is arguably easier to succeed when an issue is new to the agenda 
of the political system and has not been dealt with by any institution within it. In the EU, 
there is often an additional problem of framing issues in a way that justifies policy action 
at the EU level based on the EU’s policy competences. For example, when feminist 
activists raised the issue of sexual harassment in the 1980s at the EU level, they framed 
it as a problem of sex discrimination in employment rather than a problem of violence 
against women. This reflected the dominant frame in the EU – the economic master 
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frame – but it also revealed the need to address the issue through a legal basis wherein 
the EU had a clear competence: there was a much stronger mandate to act on 
employment-related affairs than on questions of violence and justice (Zippel 2004). In 
this case, the cooperation between feminist activists in civil society and EU civil servants 
with feminist preferences successfully brought a new issue of gender equality onto the 
EU agenda and under the responsibility of a venue that had experience in dealing with 
equality issues: the Equal Opportunities Unit of the DG responsible for employment and 
social affairs. This means that the framing of sexual harassment was constrained by the 
existing dominant frames of the EU and by its institutional characteristics (e.g. its 
constitutionally dictated competences). 
 
While framing can explain how groups access institutions, in the case of women’s 
organisations, it is also important to consider which frames women’s groups should 
employ in order to have their demands heard in various EU institutions. As mentioned 
before, an economic framing, infused with a neoliberal ethos, has been a very resilient 
frame for gender equality in the EU throughout the decades, enjoying the status of 
master frame in this policy area. Yet the content of the frames is not the only dimension 
that matters in their acceptance. The agent, or group, who proffers the frame also 
matters for its credibility (Benford & Snow 2000; Thomas & Turnbull 2016). From a 
resource-exchange perspective, EU institutions are looking for legitimacy for their 
policies, not just technical expertise. Interest groups that advocate for public interests, 
such as women’s groups and, particularly, transnational umbrella organisations, are 
capable of lending (input) legitimacy to the European Commission’s proposals because 
they are perceived as representing the interests of the European citizens at the 
grassroots level (Dür 2008; Dür & De Bièvre 2007; Pollack 1997). In addition, the 
empirical validity of the frame is also a factor that determines its receptiveness (Benford 
& Snow 2000). Women’s groups are thus limited in how they can present and advocate 
for issues that often do not fit an evidence-based quantifiable approach to policy 
information, favoured by the EU institutions. This is also true of the criteria for applying to 
funding programmes. Funding agencies, including the EU, have adopted an empirically 
quantifiable rationale as criteria to award funding. Moreover, the award of funding is 
always linked to the EU’s defined priorities for a particular policy field, which can often 
be quite strictly limited. Women’s groups are forced to adopt these methods and frame 
their projects according to the EU’s priorities in order to be successful in their 
applications (Silliman 1999). This has consequences for the nature and characteristics 
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of women’s groups, since, in order to apply this paradigm, women’s groups may be 
forced to professionalise (Ibid.), and to hire qualified staff to monitor, benchmark, and 
produce quality reports. Women’s groups are thus in a difficult position. On the one 
hand, they may be required to ‘masculinise’ their approach to issues. They may also be 
required to fit within the dominant neoliberal frame of the EU, even as this reality often 
clashes with the gender-equality expertise women’s groups possess (Locher & Prügl 
2009). Finally, in professionalising, they may compromise the representativeness which 
helped to generate a (perceived) legitimacy for the group by the European Commission.  
 
This adaptation of discourse through framing presents a conundrum for groups, which is 
not easily solved. Groups may choose to engage with the state to effect change and to 
survive but, in so doing, may be required to compromise aspects of their demands that 
are central to their goals. Framing involves a loss of radical edge of the original goals 
and demands of interest groups and may also hinder groups’ ability to criticise the 
assumptions behind the state’s discourse on certain issues. The question of why some 
frames are more dominant (or how they become dominant) is generally underexplored in 
the literature. It is particularly interesting from an FI perspective to question whether 
masculine frames are more likely to become dominant than feminist ones. This is where 
a feminist institutionalist approach to the characteristics of the EU as a polity and its 
institutional components proves useful to explore this blind-spot in the framing literature. 
In the case of the EU, we know that women’s interests have to be framed in economic 
terms – women and men viewed as customers, with a need to cater to their different 
needs to optimise satisfaction (Squires 2007) – in line with a neoliberal paradigm. 
Arguments for gender equality have to be based on utility and economic efficiency 
rather than on rights-based justice (Ibid.).  
 
3.3.2. Linking up with feminist allies within EU institutions 
 
One of feminist institutionalism’s focus points is change and under which circumstances 
can ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Kingdon 1995) change the gendered rules of institutions to 
bring about gender equality (Chappell 2006). Feminist agency is thus an important issue 
for feminist scholars working with new institutionalism. The majority of the literature on 
the history of EU gender policy fails to address the importance of women’s agency in 
furthering this policy area at the EU level (Locher 2012). In her critique of this 
overlooking of women’s agency in EU gender policy in research, Birgit Locher mentions 
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the importance not only of gender advocates from women’s groups but also of female 
politicians with a feminist agenda and civil servants committed to gender equality in 
developing gender policies in the EU (Ibid.). Policymakers and politicians with a feminist 
preference are thus important features to be analysed, in order to understand the 
interaction between women’s groups and EU institutions. 
 
Alison Woodward pioneered the conceptualisation of these feminist alliances in the 
European Union using the term ‘velvet triangles’. These are networks between ‘the 
Commission officials (the so-called femocrats) and europarlamentarians with feminist 
agendas, gender experts in academia or consultancies, and the established organized 
women's movement’ (Woodward 2003, p. 85). Woodward borrowed the term from the 
US notion of ‘iron triangles’, powerful and closed alliances of actors that have 
considerable influence over specific policy issues (Gais et al. 1984). The use of the 
adjective ‘velvet’ is to oppose the EU gender alliances to the original ‘iron’ concept: the 
velvet triangles are characterised by their marginal position relatively to core EU policies 
such as competition, trade and agriculture, and by the fact that the actors are almost all 
female navigating within a predominantly male environment (Woodward 2003, p. 84). 
Woodward conceives the velvet triangles as informal networks where exchange of 
information is key, but networks with scarce power. Important is also the ambiguity and 
fluidity of the loyalties of the actors and their input into these alliances. These policy 
networks are flimsy and fluctuating, constituted by many actors, actors that may often 
have divergent interests (Vargas & Wieringa 1998, p. 3). In her study of women 
trafficking Sabine Locher (2007) applied the velvet triangle concept to describe in detail 
how a policy was created on human trafficking of women through the powerful 
combination of 'technocratic, procedural, testimonial' types of knowledge to form 
powerful policy frames that translated then into policies through the use of windows of 
opportunity. 
 
It is the seeming lack of fluidity of the velvet triangles concept that led some scholars to 
criticise the feminist alliances as conceptualised by Woodward. The pre-determination of 
the actors important in these gender alliances was contested by some (see for example 
Holli 2008) who argued that defining a priori the relevant sets of actors limited the ability 
of researchers to analyse the contributions of male allies and other organisations that 
might also play a part in furthering specific gender equality issues. Thus, the terms 
‘transnational advocacy networks’ (TAN) or ‘feminist advocacy coalitions’ are often 
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preferred by scholars interested in exploring the connections between the women’s 
movement and the state. Notwithstanding these critiques, Woodward had from the start 
room for the consideration of other actors in her velvet triangles. She argued that with 
the application of gender mainstreaming, the actors giving input into these alliances now 
come potentially from all policy areas (Woodward 2003, p. 86). These new dynamics, 
how women’s groups adapted to them and whether they were active contributors w ill be 
interesting to explore and relevant to understand how gender mainstreaming affected 
the ability of women’s groups to access EU institutions. Moreover, the velvet triangle 
concept is specifically useful in the sense that it is the only network concept that was 
designed with the particularities of gender advocates in the EU in mind, their specific 
close connections and their marginalised power relative to EU core policy areas. The 
relevance of the concept of velvet triangles for this research is to analyse whether new 
actors (including male EU civil servants) and venues, which were typically not involved in 
gender equality policymaking, have become allies to the women’s groups in gendering 
new policies. For this analysis I will use venue-shopping concepts of EU lobbying 
literature to find out whether women’s groups ‘shop around’ for contacts that look more 
amenable to their demands, even if they have to reframe them to be heard.  
 
3.3.3. Re-gendering the rules of EU institutions: opening new opportunities for 
themselves? 
 
The previous section delved into the ability theorised by the venue-shopping literature of 
women’s groups to ‘shop around’ for the most amenable contacts – often dubbed 
femocrats or feminist allies – within the EU institutions even if it means reframing their 
demands to resonate with a unit’s goals. The importance of these coalitions of women’s 
groups, femocrats and other gender experts – the ‘velvet triangles’ – was thus explained 
in the capacity of women’s groups to access the EU institutions. The velvet triangles, 
and feminist institutionalism in general, refer to the importance of the individual actor in 
enacting the norms and practices dictated by the logic of appropriateness of institutions 
and their crucial role in changing these. It thus follows that the existence of policymakers 
with feminist preferences in a particular unit is important to consider when analysing the 
formal and informal institutional rules that are most conducive to regular interaction with 
women’s groups. The present section presents a bolder and arguably more-difficult-to-
answer question: To what extent are women’s groups able to influence the (formal and 




Women’s groups in Europe have relative ease in accessing institutional spaces in the EU 
political system on a regular basis (Lang 2009, p. 328). Regarding the origins of gender 
mainstreaming, women’s groups were vocal supporters of it during the 1995 UN 
Conference on Women (True & Mintrom 2001) and important catalysts for the 
implementation of the mechanism in the EU shortly afterwards (Lang 2009, p. 332; 
Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000). Women’s groups are conceptualised as actors that can 
support mainstreaming efforts through their expertise both by training policymakers and 
by helping to devise concrete gender mainstreaming rules to orientate the policymaking 
process. Women’s groups also help to generate political will to maintain gender 
mainstreaming on the political agenda (Lang 2009, p. 332; Verloo 2005, p. 351). 
Pollack and Hafner-Burton argued that more advanced implementation of gender 
mainstreaming in the European Commission was expected specifically ‘where the 
political opportunity structure is the most open, where the networks of gender experts 
and advocates are most developed, and where the policy frame of mainstreaming 
resonates with the organizational culture of individual DGs’ (Pollack & Hafner-Burton 
2000, p. 439). Women’s groups are therefore an integral part of the implementation of 
gender mainstreaming in the EU.  
 
The question that this section poses is whether women’s groups also contribute to a 
better acceptance of gender mainstreaming in the units they interact with. Could 
women’s groups’ interaction with policymakers in DG Environment and DG Research, 
for instance, help improve these institutions’ approval of a gendered view of the effects 
of their policies? Of course, care should be taken not to confound correlation with 
causality since it might simply be that units that are more comfortable to work with a 
gendered view of policies from the start are also those more willing to engage and listen 
to interest groups with gender expertise anyway. The intention will therefore be to 
analyse both women’s groups and policy areas that already engage with gender equality 
regularly and those that were traditionally considered gender neutral, and what changed 
or did not change since the implementation of gender mainstreaming in their interaction 
with women’s groups. 
 
3.4. A dynamic approach to political opportunity structures in the EU 




The last section of this chapter will summarise and tie up the perspectives from EU 
interest representation, feminist institutionalism and framing literatures into a coherent 
theoretical framework that will guide the data collection and analysis and give the 
findings a robust and pertinent interpretation. The foundational goal of this research is to 
examine the political opportunity structures for women’s groups in the EU. The adoption 
of gender mainstreaming is the cornerstone around which these opportunities are 
analysed. Therefore, two main things are theorised: 1) the characteristics of the EU as a 
political system that explain its receptiveness to gender mainstreaming and create 
opportunities for feminist advocacy, and 2) the strategies used by women’s groups to 
take advantage of these opportunities, circumvent resistance and carve up new 
opportunities for gender change within the EU political system.       
            
 
3.4.1. The EU as both an enabling and restricting political system 
 
Feminist EU scholars recognise that the political system of the European Union 
constitutes simultaneously an opportunity for women’s rights advocacy and for the 
enactment of gender equality policies as well as an obstacle for gender change and for 
a feminist political project. Sabine Locher and Elisabeth Prügl, for instance, ascertain 
that ‘power is both enabling and constraining’ – ‘institutions not only delimit our world 
but systematically distribute privilege and thereby create patterns of subordination’ 
(Locher & Prügl 2001, p. 117 cited in Kronsell 2005, p. 1035) This simultaneous 
restrictive and enabling nature is due to the EU’s constitutional make-up and the internal 
contradictions that, as with any other political system, a complex polity is bound to 
develop. Opportunities and constraints also spring from the multiple logics of 
appropriateness of the EU’s institutions and from the agency that individual actors 
working within it and outside exercise. The following table is thus a summary of the 
opportunities and obstacles that the EU’s political configuration present for gender 




 Opportunities Resistance/obstacles 
Structural 
Multi-level, porous system, 
democratic-deficit awareness 
Neoliberal master frame, 
neutral bureaucracy 
Institutional 
Consultations, funding (specific 
opportunities in specific units) 
Logics of appropriateness, 
regulatory vs redistributive 
policies 
Individual 
Feminist preferences, gender 
awareness, velvet triangles 
Ignorance, refusal 
 
Table 3. Multi-tiered approach to opportunities and obstacles to gender change and advocacy in EU 
 
This table will guide the analysis of the particular institutional arenas used as case 
studies in this research to reveal ther level of receptiveness to gender mainstreaming 
and to women’s groups’ participation in their policymaking process. It will also drive the 
comparison of the case studies to deliver and structure the mapping out of political 
opportunities for women’s groups in the EU as a whole.   
 
3.4.2. Reacting to resistance and developing opportunities: women’s groups’ 
agency 
 
The previous section provided a theoretical framework to help me map out the 
opportunities and constraints for women’s groups in the EU. Important is also to sketch 
a framework that guides the analysis of women’s groups strategy in adapting to and 
shaping those opportunities. Two sets of strategies are thus identified: processes of 
adaptation and processes of proactivism from the part of the groups towards the 
institutions they interact with. These are only artificially separate to allow for ease in 
structuring research and analysis. Yet in practice the same dimension can 
simultaneously be a mechanism of adaptation to a new development in EU policy but 





 Processes of adaptation Processes of proactivism 
Discourse 
(Framing) 
Framing the issue in a way acceptable to 
EU policymakers in a different DG / in that 
same DG 
Influencing the terms in which 
issues are discussed 
Actors 
(Institutional allies) 
Linking up with policymakers that have 
feminist preferences / venue-shopping for 
those 
Training policymakers to have 
feminist preferences (e.g. through 




Developing their capability to interact with 
EU institutions and to improve their 
expertise in their field 
Advocating for budgeting for these 
programmes in the first place 
 
Table 4. Women’s groups’ strategies for take-up and creation of political opportunities in EU 
 
Tailoring their discourse and their demands to resonate with a particular EU institution is 
part of what interest groups do to have a chance of access and/or influencing the 
policymaking process. Groups that choose to interact with the European Union 
institutions are thus constrained in the terms that they can articulate their demands and 
so the framing process can be seen as an adaptation to political opportunities as they 
arise. Groups can and do also look for venues where their discourse will be most 
welcome, although the costs of moving their attention and efforts from one venue to 
another mean that groups and institutions are not always linked up in the most optimal 
way.  However, sometimes groups may be able to shape the very terms in which an 
issue is debated. This would mean opening up an opportunity to push forward their own 
understanding of the policy problem that would include the diagnosis and the prognosis 
(Lombardo & Meier 2006, p. 154). 
 
Similar to the venue-shopping theory, groups can also look around for individual actors 
that are sympathetic to their cause. In the case of EU gender policy, Woodward 
theorised the alliances made up of women’s groups, femocrats and feminist academics 
as the ‘velvet triangles’ (Woodward 2003). These alliances direct attention to the fact 
that EU gender policy observes successful advances when these three types of actors 
team up. So looking for policymakers with feminist preferences within the EU institutions 
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can be a way of accessing and potentially influencing the EU policymaking process for 
women’s groups. A bolder question is whether women’s groups can stem feminist 
preferences in actors by a process of socialisation, simply by regularly interacting with 
certain individuals. The training of gender experts is a responsibility identified by some 
authors as something women’s groups are often tasked with (Lang 2009, p. 332; Verloo 
2005, p. 351). Could women’s groups thus contribute to a change of rules within EU 
institutions by contributing to the gender training of policymakers? 
 
The last element identified in the process of adaptation and proactivism is the resources 
provided by funding programmes. Several interest groups – and all that will be examined 
in this research – depend more or less on EU funding to finance some of their projects 
or even, as in the case of several not-for-profit organisations working at the European 
level, their very existence. This funding can be used to pay for the daily running of an 
organisation (including staff salaries, office rent and expenses) and/or for specific 
projects closely related to EU’s goals in a certain policy area. In what concerns women’s 
groups, funding can be allocated for training of gender experts, development of gender 
mainstreaming measuring tools, etc. In the case of funding that goes towards the 
survival of an organisation, being successful in getting it might be the difference 
between having specialised staff able to maintain regular contacts with the EU 
institutions and capable of providing the expertise needed, or not. Therefore the 
existence of these funding programmes are in themselves a political opportunity for 
accessing the EU institutions that women’s groups adapt to. Funding for projects and 
organisation-subsistence is allocated on the basis of what the EU considers its priorities 
for a certain period of years. Therefore interest groups may be able to contribute to 
shaping the EU’s priorities on the short- or medium-term. Pressure can also be applied 
from interest groups for the continuation of specific funding programmes and/or for their 
expansion. This would constitute an example of women’s groups shaping future political 
opportunities available for themselves. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 sum up the theoretical framework that will guide the analysis of the case 
studies for this research. Table 3 sets out the dimensions to examine each policy field 
study case, in particular the institutional arena in the Commission responsible for said 
policies. It will also serve as a comparative tool to map out opportunities and constraints 
to gender mainstreaming and women’s rights advocacy and their relative intensity 
across policy fields and institutional settings in the Commission. Table 4 sums up the 
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strategies that I expect to see from women’s groups when reacting and adapting to 
these opportunities and constraints. It also includes some tentative expectations of 
processes of proactivism that reflect women’s groups’ potential ability to carve out 
opportunities for themselves by interacting with the EU political actors. Again, since I am 
looking at three women’s groups that develop their action in three different and specific 
policy areas it is expected that they will have different experiences in framing their 
discourse, teaming up with feminist allies and taking advantage of funding programmes. 
This is due to the different degrees that gender is incorporated in the chosen policy 
areas: environment, justice, and research, something which will be analysed through 
Table 3. Therefore the diverse women’s groups in analysis will have access to different 
political opportunities depending on their policy field, and also different capabilities to 




CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN 
 
4.1. Mapping out and selecting women’s organisations 
 
This research analyses the impact of the EU gender mainstreaming mechanism on 
women’s organisations that operate at the EU level. The main units of study are 
transnational women’s organisations that interact regularly with the EU. These are 
umbrella organisations that have other women’s organisations as members, usually 
national or regional groups. The focus on EU-level groups is meant to avoid broadening 
the scope and complexity of this research by including different national gender 
regimes, systems of interest representation, and levels of Europeanisation. Although 
with their own membership dynamics and different ways of aggregating their members’ 
interests, the transnational umbrella women’s groups can be considered as representing 
‘European’ interests - and are seen by the EU institutions as doing so. 
 
4.1.1. Defining women’s interest groups 
 
These organisations are also seen as representing ‘women’s’ interests. Although it is 
complex to define women’s interests – do all women share the same interests? 4  How 
do these differ from men’s? – and potentially even troublesome, since it risks reinforcing 
gender differences as natural5 (Squires 2007, p. 9), it remains useful to categorise 
interest groups that fight for women’s rights. These organisations have in common a 
specific attention to issues that disproportionately affect women, such as gender-based 
violence, or the goal of correcting an imbalance in a sector, such as the under-presence 
of women in scientific careers.  In this sense, they are striving for equality of 
opportunities and fighting for the respect of women’s human rights. Far from 
contributing to essentialism, this categorisation is useful for activism as it helps to define 
a problem that affects a specific group of people. Furthermore, their focus on women is 
crucial for this research and for gender mainstreaming since the mandate of the latter is 
                                                      
4 There is some debate on whether objective interests for all women regardless of class, race, sexuality, religion exist. 
Most feminist researchers and activists work on the basis that there is at least a common denominator in terms of 
women's interests, what Anna Jónasdóttir defined as 'the interest in not allowing oneself to be oppressed as a woman’ 
(Jónasdóttir 1988, p. 38). 
5 This thesis understands gender as ‘the structure of social relations that centres on the reproductive arena, and the set 
of practices (governed by this structure) that bring reproductive distinctions between bodies into social processes’ 
(Connell 2002, p. 10). It is a practice centred in ‘the reproductive division of people into male and female’ (Connell 1987, 
p. 140) and this is why the dichotomy of women and men is such an important part of any gender order and therefore of 
any analysis of it. 
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to disrupt the male-as-norm ethos of the policymaking process. These organisations are 
thus well positioned to push forward an alternative perspective. Even though not all 
these organisations describe themselves as feminists, they all strive for gender equality 
in their fields. Nevertheless, the most important characteristics of these organisations is 
1) they are about women, and 2) they are interest groups, with a clear purpose of 
engaging with the EU and influencing policy. The preferred method of describing is 
therefore women’s interest groups or women’s groups, for a shorter version. Women’s 
rights’ organisations or simply women’s organisations are sometimes used for the sake 
of avoiding repetition.     
 
4.1.2. The comparative case study approach 
 
Since one of the aims of this research is to understand where political opportunities are 
located in the EU and what has been the role of gender mainstreaming implementation 
in shaping those, a comparative case study approach was chosen to best map out the 
differences in receptiveness to gender equality and women’s groups across policy fields. 
Different European Commission DGs and parliamentary committees have diverse 
organisational cultures, also as a consequence of the different types of competences of 
the EU in each policy field. Therefore, comparing policy fields and respective 
organisational contexts regarding the opportunities for engagement that they provide for 
women’s groups forms part of the core of the research analysis.  
 
Contrary to quantitative studies that usually use large-N samples, choosing the few 
cases for analysis in a qualitative study randomly is not recommended. In fact, when we 
are dealing with small-N samples ‘randomized case selection procedures will often 
produce a sample that is substantially unrepresentative of the population.’ (Seawright & 
Gerring 2008, p. 295). Thus, for this research organisations were chosen through 
purposive sampling (Bryman 2008, p. 414), with the intention that they shared most of 
their characteristics and that they varied in the dimensions of theoretical interest.6 
Moreover, it was important that the groups chosen were relevant in their subfields of 
advocacy. So, in this case, the organisations chosen have the following characteristics 
                                                      
6 This choice follows the logic of the ‘most similar case’ approach (Berg-Schlosser & De Meur 1994; Ebbinghaus 2005; 
Meckstroth 1975; Seawright & Gerring 2008; Teune & Przeworski 1970) that can be traced back to John Stuart Mill’s 
‘method of difference’.  This is when the cases chosen share all or most of their characteristics except the one that we are 
trying to explain (in the case of present research, it is the different opportunities women’s groups encountered in the 
diverse EU institutions they engage with). 
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in common: their advocacy for gender equality and women’s interests; their importance 
in their field; their transnationality; and their regular interaction with the EU institutions. In 
order to fully explore the paradox of gender mainstreaming to women’s organisations 
(i.e. the opening of opportunities in new areas but the lack of opportunities in other 
areas for women’s groups), organisations that advocate gender equality in different 
policy fields were included. Apart from their policy field, they differ in their financial 
capacity and the location of their headquarters. The following three organisations were 
thus identified:7 
 
Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE) - advocates for the elimination of violence 
against women. Based in Vienna. 
 
European Platform for Women Scientists (EPWS) - advocates for gender equality in 
science and research policy. Based in Brussels. 
 
Women in Europe for a Common Future (WECF)8 - advocates for a consideration of 
gender in environmental issues. Based in Utrecht, Munich and Annemasse. 
 
In an attempt to maximise the usefulness of the comparative case study approach, an 
effort was made to include both organisations advocating within a traditionally gender-
aware policy field (e.g. WAVE and violence against women) and also organisations 
focusing on traditionally gender-blind policies (e.g. WECF and environment issues). The 
goal was to see whether new opportunities indeed opened for the latter.  
 
The goal of this research by analysing these three case studies is not strictly to 
generalise the findings to all other women’s groups that interact with the European 
institutions, nor to all policy fields in which the EU has a degree of responsibility and their 
approaches to gender mainstreaming. The intention is rather to understand the impact 
of the gender mainstreaming approach on the organisational and discursive adaptation 
of these particular three organisations, and also to contribute in a broader sense to the 
understanding of the interaction of groups’ characteristics and institutions’ 
characteristics to the emergence and take up of political opportunities for interest 
                                                      
 
8 In 2017, WECF changed its name to Women Engage for a Common Future. For the sake of clarity and recognisability, 
this thesis uses the former name, Women in Europe for a Common Future, throughout. 
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groups. This means that I use a case study research design not only for the intrinsic 
value of the cases chosen (Baxter & Jack 2008, p. 549), since I am interested in these 
three organisations specifically, but also for their instrumental value (Ibid.) in contributing 
to knowledge on the political opportunity structures for interest groups in the European 
Union. Thus I am seeking to come up with findings that may help explain similar 
phenomena, rather than insist that this will be how all cases will behave in the same 
circumstances. Notwithstanding the absence of an intention to generalise, the 
organisations chosen represent some of the main women’s groups interacting with the 
European Union in the present and recent decades, and so the results of the research 
analysis will be relevant to understand the general interaction of transnational groups 
advocating for women’s rights in Europe and the EU institutions. 
 
4.2. Research design and data collection methods 
 
4.2.1. Revisiting theory and data 
 
The idea for this research came up during my literature review of the role of women’s 
interest groups in the making of EU gender equality policy. During research for my 
Master’s dissertation on the topic, I had already come across the extraordinary 
characteristics of gender equality policy in the EU in terms of its breadth and 
considerable binding acquis for an issue in a policy field that the EU has only limited 
shared competence (social policy). The capacity of women’s groups to access and 
sometimes to influence policymakers at the EU level was also impressive considering 
the limited policy competence of the EU and their relatively scarce human and financial 
resources. When I started to read on the history of gender mainstreaming in Europe, it 
seemed to reveal a broader range of policies and venues that were now open to 
women’s rights’ advocacy. However, some critiques of its implementation told a more 
complex and contradictory story: gender mainstreaming, as it had been implemented 
(or non-implemented) in certain policy areas was more damaging to the existing EU 
gender equality project than constructive. The use of gender mainstreaming to 
simultaneously open new opportunities for gender change in the EU institutions but also 
to dismantle existing women-specific provisions due to its virtually ubiquitous mandate 
became the paradox at the heart of my analysis. My ultimate goal was to gauge the 





Initially, the paradox was the guiding nexus of the research and the theoretical 
framework was designed to respond to it. I knew that resistances to gender 
mainstreaming were a key explanation for the opening of new opportunities not having 
boosted receptiveness to women’s groups in all policy areas, so I employed feminist 
institutionalism to explain those resistances through differences in organisational culture 
in EU institutions. Through political opportunity structures literature, in particular EU 
interest representation theories, I developed a framework that could guide my analysis 
of women’s groups’ processes of adaptation to political opportunities and constraints. 
 
After data collection and analysis, however, a pattern of repeated resistances and 
frames of gender equality started to appear that could not be sufficiently understood 
through my theoretical framework. There seemed to exist struggles that were common 
for women’s groups across disparate policy fields, while a few where locally specific. The 
need to revisit and revise my theoretical framework became paramount and I sharpened 
the feminist institutionalist approach to resistance by giving it a multi-level structure. This 
allowed for a more fine-grained analysis of my data and for comparisons to be more 
firmly grounded in the theory. A dynamic combination of reflection and iteration was 
taken as the approach to theory-building, an approach that was informed by ‘grounded 
theory’ (Charmaz 2006; Silverman 2000; Strauss & Corbin 1994). As opposed to 
starting out with a set of hypotheses to be tested, I based my data collection on an 
intellectual puzzle that required coming back to after initial results were captured.  
 
Due to the nature of the research question a qualitative multi-method approach was 
employed. The main goal of using multiple methods is twofold: to triangulate data in 
order to arrive at robust findings, and to mitigate the weaknesses of each method with 
the strengths of the others. This allows for an increase in the internal and external 
validity of the research (Bryman 2008, p. 376). The methods used were document 
analysis, semi-structured interviews and direct observation. Disadvantages sometimes 
identified for interviews are the fact that they can be too rigid and oblivious to context 
(Ibid., p. 465-6), and referring not to an event but how a person recalls and interprets 
that event. These disadvantages can be mitigated by a close and prolonged contact 
with the context in which the actors move, through direct observation of it. Direct 
observation also allows for flexibility and for encountering the unexpected (Ibid., p. 466), 
valuable for proving or disproving the researcher’s preconceptions and allowing for a 
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revision of those, and particularly congruent with a grounded theory approach. On the 
other hand, interviews allow for the discussion of issues that are resistant to observation 
and for an in-depth reconstruction of events that have happened outside the scope of 
observation (Ibid.). Interviews with a broad range of actors who participated in a specific 
policy process can also mitigate the problems of memory and personal bias. 
 
4.2.2. Document content analysis – preliminary stage    
                                                                    
One of the methods applied in the methodological approach was the analysis of 
documents produced by the civil society organisations and by the European Union 
institutions regarding gender equality. For analysing these written documents, two 
different sub-methods were applied: document content analysis and critical frame 
analysis.  
 
Besides reviewing the literature, written primary documents were the first point of 
collection of information regarding the women’s groups and the EU institutions that I 
wanted to focus on. Indeed, in a preliminary stage, written (online) documents provided 
the basic information about the groups’ goals, mission, positions on varied issues, and 
organisational structure that informed my choice of case studies for this research. This 
preliminary document content analysis was thus crucial in shaping the direction of my 
study. At this stage the goal was to simply gather general basic information about the 
groups, so the documents were read and analysed based on their literal content with no 
in-depth attention to meanings or frames utilised. Attention was given to the groups’ 
objectives, their establishment and history, their location and organisational structure, 
their projects co-funded with the EU, their participation in open consultations of the 
European Commission, and their general positions on the gender equality issues they 
specialise in. A similar analysis was undertaken on the DGs’ and European Parliament 
committees’ official websites for general information of specific units that dealt with 
gender equality or gender mainstreaming. I looked for sub-units that signalled that 
gender equality was an issue at least formally acknowledged by that institution 
(therefore their absence was also telling). This was important not just to gather general 
information about how gender was incorporated in the diverse policy fields in study – 
particularly to see whether gender equality was formally singled out in the organisational 
structure – but also to identify potential interviewees that would be knowledgeable of 
how gender mainstreaming was implemented in that DG. A preliminary document 
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analysis of gender in these institutions was also important to choose relevant sub-case 
studies that would be illustrative of the interaction of women’s groups and EU institutions 
in each policy field. 
 
Scott (1990) identifies four criteria to evaluate the worth of documents as information 
sources for social research: authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning. 
The use of official documents produced by the European Union institutions and by 
formally established civil society organisations means that they fulfil the criteria above. 
They are authentic and the source they come from is credible. These documents 
represent either the official position of the EU institutions that crafted them or the 
standing of the civil society organisation that produced them, and their intention and 
meaning is also clear. Therefore, the reliability of the utilised documents is sufficiently 
guaranteed.   
 
In a (feminist) institutionalist approach to institutional rules of organisation and 
behaviour, official documents provide the most striking clues for formal rules that 
regulate a particular unit (Loosemore et al. 2015, p. 1272-3). Therefore, a document 
content analysis of the EU institutions relevant for my research reveals how gender is 
formally incorporated both in their organisational structure and in the policy documents 
produced by them. Uncovering the informal expectations, guidelines and norms of 
behaviour of institutions is much trickier, since by their very definition they are not official 
and very seldom written down in authoritative and public-accessible documents. 
Nevertheless, their analysis is also important since they can determine the successful 
application of the formal rules or instead undermine them if the informal rules run 
contrary to the formal. Due to their slippery nature, two different methods are particularly 
useful to uncover informal rules: semi-structured elite interviews and direct observation. 
Through interviews and observation, the actual ways of doing things on the ground can 
be enquired and observed, as well as the expectations placed upon individuals, job 
positions and institutions. Their usefulness and application in this research is further 
explained in the next sections of this chapter.  
 
4.2.3. Critical frame analysis – policy case studies 
 
Moving on from the preliminary stage of document analysis, there is another type of 
document analysis conducted to specific written sources that is crucial for answering my 
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research question. To find out how women’s groups adapted to the gender 
mainstreaming approach to gender equality I need to look into the discursive frames 
used by the EU institutions and by women’s groups and see whether they are 
compatible or contrasting. As pointed out in the theory chapter, discourse and framing 
are an important part of an interest group’s lobbying strategy and overall existence. In 
order to take a position on any issue a group has to choose among different and often 
opposing interpretations of it that include how the problem is portrayed and what is its 
solution (Bacchi 1999; 2005; 2009). On the other hand, the discourse used by 
institutions constrains or offers political opportunities to interest groups to participate in 
the policy debate, to be listened to, and to potentially influence it (Krook & Mackay 
2010). Therefore, an in-depth critical frame analysis is used in EU documents and 
groups’ position papers in order to see the terms in which gender equality issues are 
defined by different actors. This more in-depth and systematic approach is applied only 
to documents related to the sub-cases chosen for each main case study, in order to limit 
the scope of the research and allow for an in-depth and detail-rich analysis of a few 
illustrative sub-cases. 
 
For these policy sub-cases I chose pieces of legislation that had two main 
characteristics: 1) they considered gender explicitly to some extent, and 2) they were 
important targets of relevant lobbying by the policy-specific women’s group I am 
analysing. I use policy-tracing, to analyse in depth the journey that each piece of 
legislation undertook, the actors involved and, more importantly, the multiple and 
competing perspectives that were negotiated and contested to find out which ones were 
fixed in the final text. This follows an interpretative policy analysis approach, which sees 
policy not as a rational or top-down process, connecting policy intentions and outcomes 
perfectly, but rather as a process of negotiation and contestation of different 
perspectives of the same issues (Benford & Snow 2000; Cavaghan 2017a). The policy 
process understood in this way makes room for the possibility of windows of opportunity 
opening up for the inclusion of new frames (and thus potentially positive to gender 
equality) (Cavaghan 2017a; Lombardo & Meier 2009, p. 150). 
 
Parallel to policy-tracing, I use critical frame analysis to extract the different 
understandings of gender equality that were used throughout the life of each policy 
piece. Critical frame analysis was created through the MAGEEQ project, a transnational 
research endeavour whose goal was to map out gender equality meanings in different 
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political systems in Europe (Verloo 2005). The goal was to look specifically into how 
gender mainstreaming was being implemented in diverse European countries and the 
power dynamics connected to policy making. It considers policy documents to pick up 
how the diagnosis and prognosis of problems were designed, and which roles and 
voices were attributed to which actors (Verloo 2005). By looking at several documents 
related to the process of policymaking of each piece – Commission’s draft proposals, 
EP’s amendments reports, Council’s press releases, I highlight not only the differences 
in gender equality meaning in each EU institution, but also which ones were closer to the 
ones used by women’s groups. With appropriate contextualisation through interviews to 
both women’s groups’ staff and EU policymakers that were directly involved in the 
legislative process of these policies, I can discern which venues were more welcoming 
and where women’s groups were more successful in their lobbying efforts. 
 
In the present research, the documents selected for critical frame analysis are ones that 
already contain an interpretation of gender equality. In the case of the women’s groups’ 
position papers or reports, documents by default include a consideration of gender 
equality and/or women’s interests since advocating for this issue forms the core of the 
strategy of these organisations. For the EU institutions, I selected documents in the 
policies under study – science and research, justice, and environment and international 
development – that specifically included a mention of gender equality. The aim of using 
critical frame analysis in these two sets of documents is twofold: 
 
a) To analyse how gender was mainstreamed into a specific issue through GE 
meaning analysis: for this I analysed selected EU policy documents and looked 
for the meaning of gender equality included in that document according to the 
criteria of Lombardo et al. (2009) for analysing changes in the meaning of 
gender equality: 
 
- Fixing (when a particular meaning of gender equality becomes enshrined in 
official documents); 
- Shrinking (narrowing down gender equality to one particular interpretation of 
it or to a specific policy issue); 
- Stretching (expands to encompass more meanings and interpretations or 
issues of gender equality); 
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- Bending (when gender equality becomes a means to achieving another 
goal). 
 
b) To identify the frames used to talk about gender equality issues: for this purpose, 
I analysed women’s groups’ position papers and reports, as well as EU policy 
documents on those same issues, to find out which frames the different actors 
used. Specifically, I looked for how the problem was portrayed, the prescribed 
solution, the actors referred to as part of the problem and/or the solution, and 
the voices that were included in the making of these frames. The aim of this 
analysis of frames is to compare both sets of documents – women’s groups’ 
positions and EU policy documents – and see whether the frames used are 
compatible or contrasting. For the EU policy documents, the progression of the 
frames is also traced by comparing the position of different institutions as the 
policymaking process moved along.  These comparisons, properly 
contextualised through interviews with both sets of actors, will give a good 
indication of the political opportunities for women’s groups in each policy field. 
 
The following table gives an overview of the type of document analysis conducted for 
each set of documents: 
 
Type of sources Type of documents Type of document analysis 
Women’s groups 
History, goals, structure Content analysis 
Position papers 
Critical frame analysis  
(frames) 
Reports 
Critical frame analysis 
(frames) 
EU institutions 
Goals, structure, description of 
policy field 
Content analysis 
Gender sub-unit/group Content analysis 
Policy documents 
Critical frame analysis 
(GE meaning analysis + 
frames) 
 
Table 5. Overview of document analysis 
 





Table 6. Elements to look for in critical frame analysis 
 
In Appendix 1 is a list of the documents that were subjected to critical frame analysis. 
Documents were grouped by policy issue and analysed according to the same template 
(see Appendix 2), to make it easier to trace how the definition of the problem/solution 
and the frames used changed throughout the policymaking process. Table 7 is an 
example of how the template was used to pick up the frames and their progression 
throughout the policymaking process, along with the gender equality meanings, in the 
victims’ rights directive. 
 
Two documents are shown in Table 7: the proposal for the directive originally submitted 
by the European Commission, and the joint report by the FEMM and LIBE committees 
on the Commission’s proposal. Both construct the problem as a breach of individual 
rights of victims that comes to be due to member states’ non-prioritisation of victims in 
criminal proceedings and lack of training of practitioners. Both point to prescription of 
minimum binding standards for victim support and protection through legislation at EU 
level as the solution. In this example we can clearly see how gender equality is being 
used differently in the two documents: the Commission bends the EU’s commitment to 
ending gender-based violence to justify acting for all victims of crime, while the two 
parliamentary committees stretch the concept of gender equality by stressing the need 
to understand the gender dynamics of violence and victimisation.  For the ‘participants’ 
column, information was often scarce in the documents analysed, so interviews were 
particularly helpful in providing more information here. 
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4.2.4. Interviews        
                                                                                                                             
In order to contextualise the analysis of EU policy documents and women’s groups’ 
position papers by policy-tracing their history, as well as to complement the findings 
gathered from direct observation, I conducted semi-structured elite interviews. In this 
case, the ‘elite’ are the actors that are seen as experts in gender equality policy in the 
European Union by virtue of their experience (EU policymakers) or their knowledge and 
representative clout (staff from transnational women’s groups). Interviews have slightly 
different purposes in this research according to the type of actor interviewed: for 
women’s groups staff my intention was mostly to understand the specific ways used to 
interact with the EU institutions and the constraints they felt when doing so. It was also 
to find out the policy frames used in their advocacy work and who defined them. 
Regarding EU policymakers, my intention was to understand how gender was 
mainstreamed into their unit and specific work, as well as their own accounts of their 
interaction with civil society organisations dealing with gender equality. Below is a more 
detailed description of objectives for the different sets of actors.  
 
Exploratory interviews  
 
In the early stages of the research, interviews were conducted with staff from the 
women’s groups to identify, based on the research question and propositions, the most 
relevant policy issues and actors in the EU institutions. These exploratory interviews 
were crucial in narrowing down the focus of the research, as it was not possible to 
assess each policy that has been gender mainstreamed since the mechanism was 
implemented 20 years ago. The exploratory interviews were also important to establish a 
first contact with the organisations and explore their availability and willingness to grant 
me access as an observer researcher of their daily work for a few months (see 
participant observation section below). Alternative groups with similar characteristics 
were identified in case some were unwilling to participate in the research project. At this 
stage, the main aim was to identify other actors involved and open the way for further 
interviews (Pierce 2008, p. 118). 
 




After a preliminary interview with a representative from the organisation and after some 
document content analysis, in-depth interviews were conducted with women’s groups’ 
members of staff in order to focus on relevant topics in more depth. This was particularly 
relevant for the sub-cases within each case study where an effort was made to interview 
individuals who had been involved in those specific policies and could therefore recall 
how it unfolded. Other aims of these interviews were to identify the areas and the issues 
the organisations find easier to advocate for, the issues that are met with resistance 
from the part of the EU institutions, the strategies that the women’s groups use to 
circumvent this resistance, and the overall organisational, discursive and institutional 
constraints they feel when interacting with the EU institutions. These interviews were 
also used to identify actors in the EU institutions with whom the organisations had 
contacts (successful or unsuccessful) through the method of ‘snowballing sampling’ 
(Bryman 2008, p. 459), to then be interviewed for this research as well. Besides 
identifying other actors involved, these interviews attempted to corroborate information 
obtained through documentary sources and direct observation, clarify grey areas and fill 
in gaps of knowledge, and identify networks (Pierce 2008, p. 118). In total, 9 interviews 
– exploratory and in-depth – were conducted with staff from women’s groups operating 
at the EU level. 
 
In-depth interviews (staff of EU institutions) 
 
The interviews with EU civil servants from relevant DGs and from relevant parliamentary 
committees were conducted with two related but distinct purposes. On one hand, I 
wanted to assess the awareness and commitment to gender mainstreaming in these 
institutions through uncovering the informal rules that permeate those particular units 
and how those can relate to how gender mainstreaming is received and implemented. 
This information helped me to start identifying political opportunities for women’s groups 
in each policy field. On the other hand, it was important to have their point of view on 
their interaction with women’s groups, which would signal whether they consider them 
to be relevant actors, potential allies, providers of services (i.e. knowledge, reports on 
implementation of policies, benchmarking, etc.). Interviews were conducted with people 
responsible for gender mainstreaming in the relevant DGs and also with policymakers 
that were directly involved in the policy cases analysed in greater detail for each case 
study. With these interviews, the intention was again to fill in gaps of knowledge left by 
my documentary analysis, to confirm information from documentary sources, to 
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corroborate findings from other interviews (i.e. triangulate data) (Pierce 2008, p. 118), 
and to trace the legislative process of each policy case. In total, 14 interviews were 
conducted with EU policymakers.  
 
4.2.5. Participant observation      
                                                                                                 
In order to have a close contact with the organisational culture and characteristics of the 
women’s groups I use as case studies, direct observation proved to be a very useful 
tool. The aim was to understand the dynamics involved both within the organisations’ 
daily work, and between the organisations and the EU institutions. In practice this meant 
observing meetings within the organisations and relevant events organised on the issues 
I focus on. The observation was participative insofar as questions were asked 
throughout the observation in order to make sense of it when appropriate.  
 
Conventional ethnography is a time-consuming method that generates a very large 
amount of data. Due to the time and resource limits of a PhD research project, I decided 
to undertake participant observation in five specific meetings and events organised by 
the organisations I was analysing. Instead of open-ended interviews and explorative 
observations, the goal was to conduct interviews and observations that are more 
focused on specific propositions or topics of interest previously identified in the 
literature. Meetings within the organisations and events about relevant policy issues 
were particular settings chosen to conduct the observations. Appendix 3 is a list of 
events where I conducted participant observation. 
 
4.3. Reflection on challenges and solutions 
 
The data collection process presented a few challenges that slightly changed the course 
of my research from what I had originally designed. The most significant modification 
was the reduction of the case studies from four to three. Initially I had included the 
European Women’s Lobby as one of the organisations to study. As the most prominent 
women’s organisation that works with the EU it seemed a foregone conclusion that it 
should feature in a thesis about the impact of gender mainstreaming in transnational 
women’s rights’ organisations. As I progressed with the exploratory interviews and the 
document analysis in order to choose the specific cases of policy I would research in 
depth, it became clear that I would either have to cut down the number of organisations 
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I was studying or the number of policy cases to focus on. Neither was appealing: all 
three single-policy organisations were quite salient in their areas and the EWL was a 
clear case of an insider in the EU policymaking process, and featuring three policy cases 
for each seemed like the least to cover a broad range of successful and unsuccessful 
examples of gender mainstreaming. In the end the generalist and over-prominent nature 
of EWL meant that it was a clear outlier in my case study set so it was cut from my 
research. The choice seemed easier considering the fair amount of research that had 
targeted EWL compared to the other organisations. Nevertheless, this meant reducing 
the policy fields I focused on; in order to maintain the coherence of organisations and 
EU policies, I had to abandon employment and macroeconomics. 
 
Originally one of the aims of this research was to analyse gender mainstreaming 
implementation in several policy areas as a whole, which meant looking at respective 
DGs, European committees and Council configurations. It would also provide me with a 
way of comparing the receptiveness of the Commission, Parliament and Council to 
women’s groups’ lobbying efforts. However, again limited time and resources that are a 
staple of doctoral research meant that I had to circumscribe my analysis if I wanted to 
investigate different policy areas and maintain a good level of detail that makes 
qualitative research worthwhile. For logistical reasons that mostly had to do with 
responsiveness to my initial contacts I decided to limit my analysis to Commission DGs 
responsible for the policies each women’s group advocates for: DG Environment, DG 
Development and Cooperation, DG Research and Innovation, and DG Justice. A full list 
of interviews is given in Appendix 3. 
 
As data collection progressed, I noticed a pattern of longer and more detail-rich 
interviews whenever the encounter was face-to-face rather than over the phone or by 
Skype. Therefore, and despite these organisations being based in diverse European 
cities, an effort was made to conduct them in presence as much as possible. 23 
interviews were conducted in total from June 2015 until October 2016 and they were 
recorded and fully transcribed when participants consented to this. In the case of the 6 
interviews whose participants did not consent to recording, notes were taken during the 
interview and added on straight after. I aimed for a good balance of interviews with each 
of the three organisations I focused on. In the end I was able to interview members of 
staff from WECF and EPWS three times for each organisation but for WAVE I only 
managed to conduct one interview. Nevertheless, I conducted extensive participant 
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observation for WAVE, having met several of staff members and having had the 
opportunity of speaking to them informally about the issues I was focusing on. This 
offsets the reduced number of interviews compared to the other organisations.  
 
Initially, the intention was to use participant observation to witness women’s groups’ 
daily work, their interactions with EU policymakers, and to uncover hidden rules and 
expectations in a few units that were specifically responsible for mainstreaming gender 
into their DG’s work. Due to logistical challenges of time and money resources to spend 
relevant amounts of time in Brussels observing several settings, and the difficulty in 
getting access to them in the first place (Bryman 2008, p. 405; Chappell & Waylen 
2013, p. 600; Kenny 2014, p. 681) meant that participant observation was used entirely 
to witness two of the groups’ general meetings and discussions about the topics they 
covered. This proved very useful to complement information on interviews and 
documents on their policy positions and organisational structure. On the other hand, 
direct observation of informal rules and daily working in the EU institutions was not 
possible.   
 
The next chapter will open the empirical section of this thesis with a comprehensive 
overview of the EU’s current priorities for gender equality and institutional apparatus for 
this policy area. It will then describe and analyse how gender mainstreaming is 
incorporated in the institutional arenas under scrutiny in this research: DG Justice, DG 
Research, DG Environment and DG Development and International Cooperation. Three 
chapters will follow on each of the three women’s organisations that are the focus of this 
thesis: Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE), European Platform of Women 
Scientists (EPWS), and Women in Europe for a Common Future (WECF).  
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CHAPTER 5. GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN THE EU: 
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS, IMPLEMENTATION AND 
FRAMES 
 
This chapter opens the empirical section of this thesis. To understand political 
opportunity structures, we need to analyse the characteristics of political institutions on 
one hand and the characteristics of interest groups on the other. This chapter focuses 
on the former. Receptiveness to gender mainstreaming and consequent implementation 
of the mechanism is expected to be an important indicator of an institution’s 
receptiveness to women’s groups. Institutional venues that take the equality mechanism 
seriously are ones that are expected to welcome gender equality data and best 
practices as valuable information to improve their policymaking efforts and produce 
robust and equality-oriented policies. Access criteria in these institutional settings are 
expected to be favourable to women’s groups.  
 
The present chapter will open with an exposition of the overall gender equality strategy 
in the EU: the documents that guide it, the established political priorities and the frames 
used to justify them. It will also analyse the priority issues of the funding programmes 
designed for organisations working towards gender equality to draw inferences on the 
types of issues that are acceptable at the supranational level. The following sections will 
focus on the three specific policy areas that correspond to the policy issues that the 
three women’s groups under scrutiny in this thesis most lobby for: justice, science and 
research, and sustainable development. For each of these policy domains one 
directorate-general of the Commission is chosen – or two, in the case of sustainable 
development – to be looked at in detail in terms of their institutional structure, the 
strategies and instruments used to promote gender equality, and the results of gender 
mainstreaming implementation. These dimensions follow loosely Abels and Mushaben’s 
set of questions with which to analyse gender in EU policy domains (Abels & Mushaben 
2012b, p. 16). 
 
The goal is to ascertain the different institutional cultures of these policy domains in 
order to understand the circumstances under which gender mainstreaming is taken 
seriously. This exploration corresponds to the analysis of the meso level in the multi-level 
 
 97 
framework of analysis of opportunities and obstacles to gender change and advocacy: 
the institutional level (see Chapter 3). The first section on the overall EU strategy for 
gender equality will also be an attempt to build on our comprehension of the structural 
opportunities and obstacles for gender equality in the EU, in what corresponds to the 
macro level (see Chapter 3).      
 
5.1. Gender equality strategy in the EU 
 
This section will provide an overview of the documents orienting the strategy for gender 
equality in the EU in the current period until 2020. The priority areas for action that were 
politically designed are analysed, along with the way that they are framed and how they 
relate with other EU political projects and priorities. This section will also analyse one of 
the most important political opportunities for women’s groups in the EU – its funding 
programmes for gender equality – to see what the priorities, frames and conditions for 
the application to these funding streams say about acceptable gender equality issues at 
the supranational level. 
  
5.1.1. Goals and frames 
                                                                                                                            
The general strategy for gender equality in the European Union is currently guided by 
two main documents: the European Pact for Gender Equality 2011-2020, adopted by 
the Council (Council 2011), and the Strategic engagement for gender equality 2016-
2019, adopted by the Commission (EC 2015c). 
 
In the European Pact, the Council states three main goals for achieving gender equality 
in the EU: 1) ‘close the gender gaps in employment and social protection’; 2) ‘promote 
better work-life balance for women and men’, and 3) ‘combat all forms of violence 
against women’ (Council 2011). These three goals, which constitute the highest political 
commitment to gender equality at the EU level, denote a strictly economic-based 
rationale of gender equality, not just because two of the three goals relate directly to 
employment matters and social protection (e.g. welfare benefits and pensions) but also 
regarding the frames used to justify this commitment. The document repeatedly brings 
up the connection between achievement of gender equality and the Europe 2020 
Strategy, the economic blueprint of the Union for the period. Gender gaps in 
employment and in pay are meant to be closed ‘with a view to meeting the objectives of 
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the Europe 2020 Strategy’, while the promotion of work-life balance is meant to 
‘increase women's participation in the labour market and contribute to meeting the 
demographic challenges’ (Ibid.). Even the goal of combating violence against women, 
the only non-economic-related goal in the document, is bent to serve the purpose of 
growth: ‘combat all forms of violence against women in order to ensure the full 
enjoyment by women of their human rights and to achieve gender equality, including 
with a view to inclusive growth’ (Ibid.). Notably, in the introductory paragraph of the 
Pact, the Council justifies its commitment to equality between women and men due to its 
status as a fundamental value of the Union and also because ‘gender equality policies 
are vital to economic growth, prosperity and competitiveness’. It states that ‘a new 
impetus is needed, particularly in order to reaffirm and support the close link between 
the Commission’s Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015 and 
“Europe 2020: the European Union’s Strategy for jobs and smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth”’. Following the classifications of Lombardo et al. (2009) set out in 
Chapter 4, the concept of gender equality suffered a process of shrinking to mean 
mostly equality in employment terms, and also bending to serve the higher purpose of 
economic growth and competitiveness, even when the gender equality goal is not 
directly related to economic terms, as is the case of violence against women.  
 
The wording of the European Pact for Gender Equality is in line with the bending of 
gender equality to economic growth that has been identified by several authors in recent 
years: recently the EU has justified gender equality in terms of the economic benefits it 
brings, regardless of the policy issue in question (Allwood 2017; Elomäki 2015; Reis 
2017). Elomäki argues that the EU has intensified ‘the explicit development and 
propagation of a market-oriented gender equality discourse’ in recent years, which is 
part of a global tendency by international organisations to move away from rights-based 
approaches of gender equality towards arguments based on the economic growth and 
efficiency that it brings (Elomäki 2015, p. 289). This shift in the gender equality rhetoric 
is part of the need to translate gender equality policies into financial calculations as part 
of good and efficient governance, and by preference of evidence-based policymaking 
(Elomäki 2015). It is therefore a way of selling gender equality in a neoliberal context 
where economic growth is increasingly prioritised. Recent examples of gender equality 
policies beyond strict employment issues, such as the Commission’s proposal for 
gender quotas on corporate boards (EC 2012b), reflect this shift of discourse. For this 
directive, a topic that can be constructed as an issue of (economic) decision-making 
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parity, the European Commission actively argued for it on the basis of the benefits of 
gender parity for business and economic health (Ibid., p. 3; EC 2012a). So, although 
there is nothing new about gender equality policies being narrowed down to 
employment considerations, using Lombardo et al.’s typology of gender equality 
meanings (see Chapter 4), the novelty is that gender equality is now bent to the EU’s 
economic growth and competitiveness goals in a systematic way (Elomäki 2015; 
Lombardo et al. 2009; Lombardo et al. 2010).   
 
The Strategic engagement for gender equality 2016-2019 produced by the European 
Commission is a working document that goes into much more detail on the specific 
goals for equality for the period stated, concrete activities to achieve them, and the lines 
of funding available to finance said activities. Contrary to the 2010-2015 Strategy for 
Equality Between Women and Men that preceded it, the strategic engagement is a 
Commission working document, and therefore does not carry a binding weight for the 
whole Union, politically or policy-wise. This demotion in document hierarchy was 
criticised as a reflection of a lack of political will towards the EU’s commitment to gender 
equality (EWL A interview), despite the Parliament’s call for a ‘practical action plan’ 
reinforced with ‘legislative inputs in order to strengthen the legal framework for gender 
equality’ (EP 2015). 
 
In this working document five goals are identified as ‘key areas of action’ for the EU to 
achieve gender equality: 
  
• ‘equal economic independence for women and men; 
• equal pay for work of equal value; 
• equality in decision-making; 
• dignity, integrity and ending gender-based violence; and 
• promoting gender equality beyond the EU.’ (EC 2015c, p. 2) 
  
Beyond these goals, which relate mostly to employment matters, representation, justice 
and external affairs, there is also reference to the need of ‘integrating a gender-equality 
perspective into all EU activities and policies’ i.e. gender mainstreaming (Ibid., p. 12). 
 




The Strategic engagement estimates an allocation of EUR 5.85 billion to gender equality 
under the European Social Fund and the Regional and Development Fund, with issues 
relating exclusively to employment matters: ‘access to employment, career progression, 
reconciliation of work and private life, equal pay for equal work, the labour-market 
integration of migrant women and investment in the provision of childcare infrastructure’ 
(EC 2015c, p. 12). This is by far the greatest bulk of funding reserved for achieving the 
EU’s strategy for gender equality. Other funding instruments include the Development 
Cooperation Instrument, with EUR 100 million allocated to improve the lives of women 
and girls in third-countries (empowerment and child well-being, including tackling FGM 
and child marriage); the Horizon 2020, with EUR 40 million allocated to ‘projects 
promoting awareness and implementation of gender equality in the research system and 
research organisations’ (Ibid., p. 33); and the Rights, Equality and Citizenship 
programme, with EUR 150 million allocated to gender-equality specific objectives 





Figure 1. Money allocated to gender equality (EU budget 2014-2020) (source: EC 2015c) 
 
From the frames employed to set out the commitment of the EU towards achieving 
gender equality, and the proportion of funding allocated to specific topics, it becomes 
clear that equality between women and men in the EU still has a very strong narrow 
economic rationale attached to it. For stakeholders willing to work on gender equality 
Money allocated to gender equality (EU budget 2014-2020)
European Social Fund & European Regional Development Fund
Development and Cooperation Instrument
Horizon 2020
Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme
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this limits the choice of activities and topics they can both advocate for and undertake 
projects on. EU funding can be obtained more easily for activities connected with 
equality in employment-related matters and, to a lesser extent, with research and 
science, with projects in developing countries, and with combating violence against 
women. Coherently, these are the areas that the EU has chosen as its priorities in 
achieving equality between women and men. This might be a constraint on topic-
specific women’s groups that are working on bringing gender notions into other policy 
fields, such as the case of WECF and the environment, but also poses important limits 
on what a general women’s group such as the European Women’s Lobby can advocate 
for and work on.  
 
The EWL is substantially funded by the Rights, Equality and Citizenship programme of 
DG Justice, and is the only European network to be awarded a medium-term grant (for 
2015-2017) under the heading of ‘equality between women and men’ of the same 
programme. This reinforces its status as the main stop-shop for the European 
Commission whenever it needs to consult civil society on gender equality matters but is 
also telling of the obstacles women’s groups face when trying to access EU funding. 
Beyond the limited topics that the EU prioritises, the activities eligible for financing are 
also quite specific: 
   
• informing national members about gender equality developments at EU level; 
• implementing EU Strategy for gender equality and identification of remaining 
challenges for future; 
• 'promoting the economic and business case for gender equality across the EU' 
(European Commission’s DG Justice 2014, p.15); 
• contributing to gender mainstreaming in EU and national contexts; 
• knowledge production about discrimination (intersectional as well) and public 
awareness raising; 
• legal protection against discrimination (but strictly forbidden the financing of 
legal actions before national or international courts). 
  
So, in a few words, networks must have the following responsibilities (and it is important 
to note that they do have to conduct several types of activities to have a chance of 
being awarded the grant as the Commission evaluates the priorities, the quality of the 
plan, the European added value, the dissemination and the cost-
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effectiveness): intermediation between national and EU levels, policy and knowledge 
production, and public awareness raising. These activities reflect a demand for 
quantifiable knowledge; they require the use of what Judith Squires calls the language of 
‘rational empiricism’ (Squires 2007, p. 143). Coupled with an incentive for networks to 
actively inform their national members of EU developments and vice-versa, in a role of 
monitoring intermediary, these groups ultimately suffer a loss of political edge. There is a 
bureaucratisation of their work and a potential disengagement from the publics they 
claim to represent (Silliman 1999, p. 25). 
 
5.2. Gender mainstreaming in DG Justice: coordination efforts and 
combatting violence against women 
 
The first policy domain analysed is justice. One of the constant priorities of gender 
equality in the EU and one of the five specific priority issues for the 2015-2019 period is 
combatting violence against women. This field of action is mostly under the responsibility 
of DG Justice, although DGs such as Home Affairs (for migrant and refugee women and 
issues of trafficking) and Development and Cooperation (for third countries) also share 
responsibility for this policy domain. It is within DG Justice that the Gender Equality unit 
of the European Commission is also located, a unit whose tasks include the coordination 
of the Commission’s mainstreaming efforts. 
 
5.2.1. The role of DG Justice’s Gender Equality unit in the coordination of gender 
mainstreaming efforts 
 
The specific DG in the European Commission responsible for gender equality legislation 
has changed over the decades that the policy has been in place at the EU level. Gender 
equality was previously overseen by the directorate-general responsible for social affairs 
and employment and several pieces of legislation directly relevant for equality have been 
argued for within this work remit. For instance, when revising the provisions afforded to 
pregnant women and recent mothers in the EU, including maternity leave provisions, the 
proposal for the revising directive was included under the legal heading of ‘health and 
safety’, something which was criticised by the FEMM committee and by the EWL as 
weakening the real purpose of the legislation, which was to improve gender equality in 
the field of reconciliation of work and family life (Reis 2011). This encroachment of the 
unit for gender equality within employment and social affairs also attests to the 
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predominant economic rationale attached to EU gender equality policy for most of its 
existence (Kantola 2010; Lewis 2006; Ostner 2000; Stratigaki 2004; Young 2000); 
measures to achieve gender equality were measures to improve women’s employability 
and their capacity to participate in the labourmarket on a par with their male 
counterparts (Elomäki 2015). ECJ case law from 1989 – the Achterberg ruling – made 
this extremely explicit by stating that Community competences consisted in ‘[realising] 
equal treatment between men and women, not in a general fashion, but only as workers’ 
(quoted in Jacquot 2010, p. 128).   
 
GE unit’s migration to DG Justice: consequences and new work remit 
 
In 2011, however, the Equality Between Men and Women Unit moved from DG 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities to the newly-created DG Justice, 
Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, where it was re-baptised as the Gender Equality 
Unit (GE unit). According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993), radical policy change is 
sometimes instigated by a shift in the institutional venue that is responsible for an issue. 
The change of policy area that deals specifically with gender equality policy in the 
European Commission might have been a corollary of the fact that gender equality at 
the EU level had for quite some time transcended the employment-related provisions 
that it was initially bound to. In fact, the moved GE unit now has a broader policy remit: it 
became in charge of the Daphne file, which has been the funding programme for 
actions on combatting violence against women since 1997, while it kept the EU 2020 
Strategy priorities it already had under DG EMPL (JUST D interview). Moving the GE 
unit to a directorate-general responsible for justice, fundamental rights and EU 
citizenship signals a recognition of gender equality as a matter of human rights, rather 
than simply a means to improve economic performance of the EU’s single market. In this 
line of thought, Markus Thiel (2014) argues that the creation of a directorate-general 
specifically dealing with questions of justice and fundamental rights in itself signals a 
need to counterbalance the suspicion for an ‘economically oriented integration 
preference’ (Thiel 2014, p. 439). This new individualised portfolio can represent an 
opportunity for civil society groups advocating for human rights (Ibid.). The same could 
be argued for women’s rights organisations about the shift of policy area to which the 




Having said this, it is important to note that in 2015, with the new Commission led by 
Juncker, the directorate-general responsible for justice, fundamental rights and 
citizenship changed its formal name to ‘Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers’. 
This reveals a tendency to see the work of this EU institution as mostly concerned with 
justice affairs, as Markus Thiel had argued about the previous ‘Justice Commissioner’ 
Viviane Reding, and only secondarily about fundamental rights and gender equality 
(Thiel 2014, p. 439). Moreover, some authors have pointed to the seriously negative 
impact that the shift of GE unit to DG Justice has had in old gender equality networks: 
pushing the gender equality team out of employment affairs has further removed gender 
experts from economic governance, with new macroeconomic mechanisms such as the 
European Semester impervious to civil society involvement (Jacquot 2017; O’Dwyer 
2017). The potential benefits of symbolically recognising gender equality as a 
fundamental rights issue might thus not offset the loss of power of this unit in economic 
governance. 
 
The Gender Equality unit coordinates work on gender equality in the European 
Commission. In the current Juncker Commission, this unit is nested under Directorate D 
– Equality and is staffed by 15 civil servants, including head of unit, policy officers and 
administrative staff. The gender mainstreaming mechanism in the Commission is also 
formally coordinated by this unit. The GE unit coordinates an Inter-Service Group for 
Gender Equality that gathers together members from all DGs and services that are 
responsible for coordinating the actions for equality between women and men in each of 
their respective policy areas. These gender focal points are meant to serve as 
ambassadors of gender equality in their own DGs, and as monitors and reporters back 
to the Inter-Service Group on what is being done to promote gender equality in their 
own fields. The effectiveness of this process very much depends on the position that a 
particular gender focal point occupies in their own DG: some focal points have gender 
equality responsibilities back in their DGs (e.g. DG Research or DG DEVCO) and 
therefore it is easier for them to both make the case for gender equality and to monitor 
developments on it. However, others just accumulate gender mainstreaming on top of 
other often competing responsibilities. These focal points are usually part of DGs that 
find it harder to understand the relevance of gender mainstreaming to their own work, 
meaning that most of their efforts are spent trying to make the case for gender equality 




To mitigate the lack of awareness on gender mainstreaming, the Gender Equality unit of 
DG Justice, in cooperation with DG Human Resources, provides training for 
Commission personnel on gender mainstreaming. This training consists of basic 
information about gender mainstreaming as well as specific applicability of gender in 
different policy areas. It is open to all interested staff and has been considered 
successful by the GE unit’s staff, since it is usually attended by staff from different 
hierarchy levels and with different responsibilities (JUST C interview). Finally, the GE unit 
is also responsible for the elaboration of the gender equality strategy of the Commission 
every five years, after consultation of every other policy area for specific input on gender 
equality priorities of each DG.    
 
Gender mainstreaming coordination at the policy proposal stage 
 
The fact that the implementation of gender mainstreaming does not follow a uniform and 
prescribed procedure means that each policy area chooses how to consider gender in 
their own terms. As far back as 1998, the European Commission published guidelines 
on how to produce impact assessments that are mindful of gender in order to help the 
diverse policy areas to be more aware of how their proposed policies impact women and 
men’s lives differently. The latest strategic engagement for equality between women and 
men incorporates gender mainstreaming as a stand-alone goal for gender equality in the 
Commission, reiterating once more the importance of including gender in impact 
assessments and evaluations throughout all policy areas, and the monitoring role of the 
Inter-Service Group on equality between women and men of the integration of gender 
equality in all Commission work (policy, legal and spending activities across all areas) 
(EC 2015c).  
 
However, research has shown that the strategy of combining impact assessment with 
monitoring and evaluation has not helped to mainstream gender in all EC programmes in 
the past (Smismans & Minto 2017). Nevertheless, there are two novelties in the period 
2015-2019 on gender mainstreaming general commitments. First, the strategic 
engagement commits the European Commission to publish in 2017 the first ever report 
on how gender mainstreaming has been implemented in each policy area of the 
Commission’s responsibility (EC 2015c, p. 12). Secondly, the interservice consultations 
within the Commission, whereby each DG is invited to add comments and suggestions 
to any piece of legislation before it is formally proposed, requires that input by other DGs 
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is now given at a much earlier stage, with more potential for significant improvement of 
proposals before they are drafted. Previously, the GE unit used to comment on the 
gender dimension of certain Commission proposals through the interservice 
consultations, although a significant obstacle for the effectiveness of this as a gender 
mainstreaming mechanism was that input was sought only when proposals were already 
drafted. By moving this consultation a few steps back in the proposal process, chances 
for improvement in the gender dimension of important pieces of legislation are 
heightened. However, due to the relative reduced number of staff within the GE unit, this 
remains a limited mechanism and very much up to the initiative and willingness of 
individual members of staff to undertake this work (JUST C interview). 
  
5.2.2. Mainstreaming gender into justice policies: the issue of violence against women 
 
Gender mainstreaming in justice affairs has led to successful results. In 2012 the 
victims’ rights directive (EP and Council 2012a) was adopted by the European 
Parliament and the Council and was hailed as an example of a piece of legislation that 
took the gender dimension seriously and accounted for it in its provisions (DG IPOL 
2014). This piece of legislation recognised the special needs of victims of gender-based 
violence (overwhelmingly female) and provided specific mechanisms for the protection 
of this type of victims. The role of the FEMM committee of the European Parliament, as a 
joint committee responsible for this piece of legislation along with the civil liberties, 
justice and home affairs (LIBE) committee, was crucial to force the latter to include a 
gender approach from the start in the amendments for this directive (Ibid., p. 17). This 
piece of legislation, and the specific frames used to incorporate gender equality, is 
analysed in depth in Chapter 6. 
 
There is no one stop-shop institution in the EU responsible for the issue of violence 
against women nor any piece of binding legislation specifically addressing it. Rather, the 
EU has engaged with the issue in a myriad of ways: (1) through binding pieces of 
legislation meant to protect and support victims of crime, (2) funding of projects, 
campaigns and organisations working with victims of gender-based violence through the 
Daphne programme, (3) by organising and encouraging good practice exchange, (4) 
through a commitment to end female genital mutilation, and (5) by pushing for the 




The EU has adopted several directives that aim to protect and support general victims of 
crime and victims of a number of specific types of crime. The most important one is the 
2012 directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of 
victims of crime (EP and Council 2012a) (for a detailed analysis of the gender dimension 
of this directive see Chapter 6). This piece of legislation has just recently (2015) entered 
into force and is a considerable effort to ensure that all victims of crime have the same 
minimum level of protection and support throughout the EU. Although it establishes 
rights for victims of all types of crime, this directive has important considerations on 
victims of gender-based violence and it is the first legally binding text at the EU level to 
include a definition of gender-based violence: 
 
Violence that is directed against a person because of that person's gender, gender 
identity or gender expression or that affects persons of a particular gender 
disproportionately, is understood as gender-based violence. (EP and Council 2012a, 
preamble) 
 
and a definition of violence in close relationships: 
 
Where violence is committed in a close relationship, it is committed by a person who is a 
current or former spouse, or partner or other family member of the victim, whether or 
not the offender shares or has shared the same household with the victim. (Ibid.). 
 
Importantly, the victims’ rights directive also refers back to the EU’s commitment to 
eliminate violence against women, specifically to the EP’s resolution on a new EU policy 
framework to fight violence against women of 2011 (EP 2011), as well as to international 
regulations on the matter such as the Council of Europe’s 2011 Istanbul Convention and 
the United Nations’ 1979 CEDAW (EP and Council 2012a, preamble). The EU has also 
adopted binding measures to prevent specific forms of violence that affect women 
disproportionately and protect its victims, such as the ones stipulated in the trafficking in 
human being’s directive (EP and Council 2011a), the directive on fighting child sexual 
abuse and pornography (EP and Council 2012b), and the European protection order 
directive (EP and Council 2011c) (for a detailed analysis of the gender dimension of the 
European protection order directive see Chapter 6). In the directives concerning the 
granting of international protection (EP and Council 2013a) and the reception of 
applicants for international protection (EP and Council 2013b) there are also important 
 
 108 
measures stipulating the protection and interviewing procedures of women and girls 
victims of violence that are seeking asylum, and their safety from sexual harassment and 
assault within accommodation centres. 
 
Violence against women, or gender-based violence, has been one of the top priorities in 
the current (2015-2019) and previous (2010-2015) EU strategies for gender equality. 
This has been matched with the allocation of funding for transnational NGO projects and 
national government campaigns to prevent this type of violence and protect and support 
its victims. The specific funding programme to end violence against women and 
children, Daphne, was created in 2000 and underwent three funding cycles before 
being incorporated into the Rights, Equality and Citizenship programme of DG Justice. 
This programme has EUR 150 million allocated to gender-equality specific objectives for 
the period of 2014-2020, including:   
 
to prevent and combat all forms of violence against children, young people and women, 
as well as violence against other groups at risk, in particular groups at risk of violence in 
close relationships, and to protect victims of such violence (EP and Council 2013d)  
 
The EU also encourages and sometimes sets up networks for the exchange of good 
practices on preventing, collecting information, and supporting victims of gender-based 
violence. An example of this soft-measure approach is the Mutual Learning Programme 
on gender equality, a series of seminars organised once or twice every year on different 
topics of gender equality that bring together national government representatives, 
experts and other stakeholders to share actions that worked and learn from each other. 
In 2016, for instance, the seminar topic was on discussing good practices to tackle 
female genital mutilation, forced marriage and other harmful practices, and in 2013 the 
seminar participants discussed measures to fight violence against women (DG JUST 
2013). The European Institute for Gender Equality’s (EIGE) website has also a collection 
of good practices, literature and legislation, administrative data sources, and 
organisations working on the field for consultation by stakeholders. 
 
In recent years, the EU has made a series of commitments to end female genital 
mutilation both within and outside EU countries (EC 2013; EP 2012a; EP 2014a). In 
2013 the European Commission released a communication towards eliminating female 
genital mutilation detailing practical actions that the institution pledged to undertake to 
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this end (EC 2013). The actions included getting more and better data and 
understanding about the problem, encouraging both EIGE and the member states to 
collect data on this phenomenon within Europe, recognising that cooperation among 
practitioners from several fields is needed to better combat this (health practitioners, 
border and immigration officers, child protection and education services), and ensuring 
the protection of victims and potential victims of FGM (Ibid.). The communication also 
includes a commitment to promote the elimination of female genital mutilation in non-EU 
countries, by raising the issue in international fora such as the United Nations and the 
African Union, by supporting local projects to end this practice, and by providing training 
to staff in EU delegations on the issue (Ibid.).  
 
Similar to the case of female genital mutilation, one of the core preoccupations of the EU 
in terms of gender-based violence is to improve the understanding of the phenomenon 
in order to more efficiently combat it. Data on the prevalence of gender-based violence 
is often patchy, not comparable between member states and underestimated due to a 
lack of reporting and no recording of the relationship between victim and perpetrator 
(Walby et al. 2017). EIGE is the main EU institution concerned with encouraging the 
improvement of the collection of data on gender-based violence and it does so by 
divulging good practice methods and tools, by informing about data sources in each 
member state, and by conducting its own reports and studies on the issue. The 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) also conducts its own research on the phenomenon, 
with the most important report released in 2014, an EU-wide survey across the 28 
member states with 42,000 women on their experience of gender-based violence (FRA 
2014).  
 
In March 2016 the European Commission launched a formal proposal for the European 
Union to access the 2011 Istanbul Convention (EC 2016e), a comprehensive Council of 
Europe treaty to combat violence against women. All of the EU’s member states have 
signed the convention, and although it is unlikely that the EU’s own accession would 
create new obligations to those member states, the EU’s signing of the Istanbul 
Convention would signal a strong political commitment to eradicating violence against 




5.3.  Gender mainstreaming in DG Research: ‘research by, for and 
on women’ 
 
DG Research has been considered a pioneer in gender mainstreaming within the EU 
institutions (Abels 2012; Cavaghan 2010) and one of the policy areas where the gender 
mainstreaming apparatus is more developed (Mergaert & Lombardo 2017; Rees 2005). 
Nevertheless, the optimism is often taken with a pinch of salt when authors describe the 
practical challenges that gender mainstreaming in DG Research still faces. There is a 
series of resistances, both institutional and individual (Mergaert & Lombardo 2017), 
including gender blindness and incomprehension (Cavaghan 2013), that result in a gap 
between strong rhetoric supporting gender mainstreaming in science and research and 
its actual implementation in everyday policy practice. The awareness of how gender 
imbalance plays out in science both as a problem of lack of presence of women and as 
a problem of the gender bias of research content is thus very uneven across the policy 
disciplines that EU research policy spans (Cavaghan 2012). In the next two sections I 
briefly describe the institutional apparatus for mainstreaming gender within DG 





The creation of the Women in Science Unit within DG Research in the mid-1990s 
reflected the significant focus on gender balance in science and research that the 
Commission initiated around that period. In the preceding decades, research policy in 
the EU did not include any considerations on the issue of women in science and there 
was a consensual understanding that science was a gender-neutral and predominantly 
technical subject (Abels 2012). However, in the mid-90s a set of circumstances created 
a window of opportunity for the issue of women in science to be brought to the political 
agenda in research (Abels 2012, Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000). In the mid-90s the EU 
formally adopted gender mainstreaming as an instrument to shape all its policies, and 
the new research Commissioner Edith Cresson took the idea of a more socially-
responsive science very seriously (Abels 2012). Moreover, the goal of transforming the 
EU into a competitive knowledge-based society created the need to increase the 
number of qualified researchers and scientists and therefore to encourage more women 
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into science and retaining them, tapping into what was viewed as a pool of wasted talent 
(Abels 2012; Cavaghan 2012).  
 
The Women in Science Unit (currently the Gender Team) attempted to create 
institutional structures that could insert this new perception of gender inequality into 
different areas and multiple levels of policymaking process of science and research 
policy (Cavaghan 2012). It remains ‘the key actor holding together top-down and 
bottom-up networking’ on the issue of women and science, although it had its name and 
location within DG Research changed throughout the successive Commission cycles 
(Abels 2012, p. 194). Currently, the team responsible for gender mainstreaming in DG 
Research, the Gender Team, is nested under the Science with and for Society Unit, 
under the Open Innovation and Open Science Directorate. The team is composed of 
seven staff members, and their broad remit is to promote structural change and to bring 
about gender balance in research institutions in Europe (RTD A interview). The Gender 
Team is in charge of a set of instruments designed to encourage staff within DG 
Research to mainstream gender into their own work. These include designing and 
delivering training programmes to educate staff on gender provisions in the current 
funding science programme, Horizon 2020, and training on the importance of the 
gender dimension in the knowledge produced through funded projects (RTD A 
interview). By the instigation of the current Commissioner, the briefing given to 
evaluators of funded projects will soon include gender guidelines to help them to be 
attentive to whether projects have gender-balanced teams and to evaluate whether the 
research proposed includes a gender dimension as well (RTD A interview). This is 
something that the Gender Team had pushed for years and to which they held on to 
when a window of opportunity was opened (RTD A interview). 
 
There is no binding legislation on the issue of women and science; no directive and no 
European Court of Justice case law on the matter. Therefore, the Gender Team must 
rely on soft measures to try to incorporate understandings of gender into research 
policy, like the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) (Abels 2012). To this end, several 
advisory groups have been established throughout the last two decades as a way of 
giving expert input into the EU’s science and research policy, and to exchange best 
practices between member states on women and science. Some of these platforms 
include the Horizon 2020 Advisory Group on Gender, the Helsinki Group, the Working 
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Group on Women and Science, the COST Action, the GenderSTE, and the GenPort. I 
briefly explore the first two groups. 
 
The Helsinki Group was created in 1998, to work as an advisory group of national 
experts and civil servants to the European Commission on matters of women and 
science. The purpose of the Helsinki Group is to work as an advisory board to the 
Commission and to monitor the progress of gender equality and gender dimension in 
science within the member states, particularly through the collection of data for the She 
Figures, a report published every three years on the situation of women in science in 
Europe (HG A interview). Member states are responsible for appointing their 
representatives to the Helsinki Group and there is a mixture of university-based 
practitioners and researchers, along with civil servants representing their own 
governments. Different levels of practical knowledge about the problems faced by 
women in science and different expectations about the role of the Helsinki Group exist 
between members with the two different backgrounds (HG A interview): often, the remit 
of a representative is understood as restricted to reporting between the national and the 
European level, whereas for other representatives the role is understood as about 
providing recommendations at the EU level and making decisions on what is desirable to 
implement nationally (HG A interview). Indeed, the place of the Helsinki Group within the 
EU’s women in science policy machinery is often not clear to its members and therefore 
doubts arise about the efficacy of the group’s influence (HG A interview). However, 
some authors have been more optimistic about the kind of soft influence that the group 
has had on the women in science agenda on member states: Rees concludes that the 
Helsinki Group’s sharing of information, benchmarks and best practices have impelled 
national changes more easily than what might have happened otherwise (Rees 2007). 
 
The Horizon 2020 Advisory Group on Gender (AGG) is part of a collection of advisory 
groups established at the beginning of the current funding programme for science and 
research, Horizon 2020 (2014-2020), for each of the disciplinary areas covered by the 
programme. These groups are composed of experts on their fields appointed by the 
Commission to work as advisors to policymakers on the research priorities for each field. 
The AGG is unique in terms of its cross-cutting nature. Its experts are members of other 
Horizon 2020 advisory groups as well, therefore being simultaneously experts in women 
in science and in a particular scientific field such as the environment, space engineering, 
robotics, and so forth. The aim with the double membership is that these experts 
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function as ambassadors for gender equality within their own fields (RTD A interview). 
The overall responsibility of the AGG is to mainstream gender into Horizon 2020. The 
Gender Team works closely with the AGG to facilitate gender mainstreaming, namely by 
producing guidelines to avoid gender bias on candidate selection and on checklists to 
find out whether projects have a gender dimension (not just a gender balanced team) 
(RTD A interview). 
 
Commission’s frames on research and gender in research 
 
The history and progress of EU research and science policy has been closely tied to 
economic integration efforts of the Union throughout the decades. Although the EU has 
funded research projects since its earliest decades, research and science policy gained 
significant momentum in the mid-80s with the creation of the Single Market. With the 
Single European Act in 1986 that effectively established the Single Market research and 
science were given a legal basis as an instrument to increase the competitiveness of 
Europe’s industries (Abels 2012). Thus, the driving force behind EU research and 
science policy has largely been to secure the competitiveness of the European 
industries and subsequently the European economy (Ibid.). Science policy in the EU is 
first and foremost represented as an instrument to secure economic competitiveness 
(Cavaghan 2012). 
 
Originally, science and research policy in Europe did not engage with the issue of 
gender equality at all since science was constructed as a gender-neutral and technical 
domain (Abels 2012). Things began to change at the end of the century when the EU 
started to reconceptualise the link between science and society and to view the 
integration of different social actors and their user perspectives as essential for scientific 
and technological innovation (Ibid.). Additionally, in 2000 the EU created the European 
Research Area (ERA) with the aim to transform the EU into the world’s most competitive 
knowledge-based economy by 2010. ERA was one of the central pillars of the 2000 
Lisbon Strategy for Economic Growth and Jobs, reflecting again the instrumentalisation 
of science and research to the purpose of increasing Europe’s economic 
competitiveness. But the new understanding of the nexus of science and society 
combined with the goal of creating a knowledge-based society directed attention to the 




Before the implementation of gender mainstreaming at the end of the 1990s, several 
studies were conducted to assert whether there was in fact a problem of gender 
inequality in the field of science, since the perception was that there was not (Cavaghan 
2013). These studies relied mostly on quantitative data and methods to determine the 
number of women working in scientific fields and the positions they occupied. Once the 
perception of gender imbalance in science was established, the argument to engage 
with gender in science was framed around the 'waste of talent' problem. This was the 
frame most congruent with the economic competitiveness frame that dominated science 
and research policy at the EU level. ‘Including women in science, therefore, is seen as 
improving efficiency and the EU’s economic competitiveness’ (Abels 2012, p. 188). 
 
The new understanding of the need to make sure science was responsive to societal 
problems that arose at the end of the century, along with the pressure to include a 
broad range of stakeholders, meant that there were additional dimensions to the 
Commission’s discourse on the need to engage with gender in research. In 1999 the 
Women and Science document was published in which DG Research explicitly commits 
to gender mainstreaming. It included the phrase: ‘research by, for and on women’ that 
remains the motto of gender equality in science policy in the Commission (EC 1999, p. 
10, bold and italic original). This illustrates the need to not just attract more women into 
scientific and research careers and allow them to progress, but also of making sure that 
science decision-making is gender-balanced, and, more elusively, to ensure that 
research includes the interests of both women and men and considerations of how it will 
affect both sexes. Nevertheless, the main frame continues to be one of human 
resources and this is reflected in the amount of resources that the Commission devotes 
to the development of indicators, statistics, benchmarks and reports on the presence of 
women in scientific and research careers and education (Abels 2012). 
 
In the current funding programme for science and research, Horizon 2020, gender is a 
cross-cutting issue in the sense that there is no budget line allocated to projects working 
specifically in the women and science topic. Instead it is referred that all projects under 
Horizon 2020 should contribute to gender equality: 
 
The activities developed under Horizon 2020 should promote equality between women 




Horizon 2020 should have due consideration for equal treatment and non-discrimination 
in research and innovation content throughout all stages of the research cycle. (Ibid., p. 
30) 
 
Horizon 2020 stresses two dimensions where gender should be taken into account in 
relation to science and research: presence and content. Presence refers to gender 
balance in decision-making (where the goal of 40% of women in expert groups and 
panels and 50% in advisory groups is established) and gender balance in teams 
throughout the whole research cycle: advisory groups, general introduction of the 2016-
2017 work programme, proposal template, expert evaluators, evaluation process, grant 
agreement and negotiations, monitoring (DG RTD 2016, p. 2). Content, often referred to 
as the gender dimension, is about the priorities of the projects and whether they take 
into account the interests and impacts on both sexes. This has been the hardest topic to 
implement and to see significant changes on throughout the funding programmes (HG A 
interview; RTD A interview), although assessments of the last two bi-annual working 
programmes have shown a tentative increase in the number of projects that have 
gender considerations (RTD A interview). A novelty in Horizon 2020 has been the 
possibility to include costs of training on gender expertise on the application for the 
projects, which reflects a desire from the part of the Commission to see gender being 
properly mainstreamed into funded projects by giving applicants the tools to do so. 
 
Nevertheless, challenges for gender equality that were noted in previous funding 
programmes remain in Horizon 2020. The budget priorities in Horizon 2020, as in the 
previous programmes, are dominated by natural sciences and engineering, ‘disciplines 
that traditionally engage fewer female researchers and present less gender awareness’ 
(Abels 2012, p. 201). There are disparate levels of gender-awareness across 
disciplinary areas, as noted by both academics and policymakers (Abels 2012; 
Cavaghan 2012; HG A interview; RTD A interview). In addition, scarce human resources 
in the Gender Team means that there are not enough staff members with expertise on 
all the topics covered by Horizon 2020 that are able to monitor and convince experts 
about the relevance of gender in their fields (RTD A interview). Therefore, and 
notwithstanding the ‘science for, with and on women’ slogan, there is a preponderance 
of the presence dimension of gender balance, since it is easier to understand, 
implement and quantify. The lack of proper leverage from the part of the Commission to 
ensure that gender considerations are taken into account is considerable since gender 
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mainstreaming is not a prerequisite for a project to receive funding (HG A interview). 
Change is therefore slow and reliant upon the good-will of the stakeholders involved.    
 
In sum, gender equality in science is an issue that in the last two decades entered the 
EU research and science agenda which is heavily geared towards concerns of 
economic growth and competitiveness. Although there is some acknowledgement by 
the Commission of the gendered nature of research and science’s various components 
such as the peer-review system, empirical indicators and assessment criteria (Abels, 
2012), the gender equality problem in science is seen first and foremost as one of 
women's under-representation (Cavaghan 2012). The lack of women in science is 
framed as a problem of inefficiency (a human resource problem) within a neoliberal 
discourse (Abels 2012). Congruently, the heavy focus is placed on presence, so the 
vast majority of actions, resources and reports are geared towards gender balance in 
teams, decision-making processes, and careers. The attention on the gendered content 
of science, through instruments like gender budgeting, could have significant 
redistributive effects since research is the third largest chunk of funding in the EU 
budget (Ibid.). In addition, the issue of gender equality in science is reliant on soft 
measures such as the OMC, since there are no directives or ECJ court rulings on the 
matter. This makes progress on the topic dependent on the good-will of governments 
and private stakeholders. Indeed, progress on gender mainstreaming has often been 
subject to the action of particularly powerful individuals who have taken interest in the 
issue of gender equality in science and thus created a window of opportunity for gender 
advocates to act on, such as the recent case of Commissioner Moedas’s desire to 
develop gender guidelines for evaluators (RTD A interview), or Commissioner Cresson’s 
interest in the nexus science-society in the 1990s (Abels 2012).   
 
5.4. Gender mainstreaming in sustainable development: gender 
frames in DG ENV and DG DEVCO 
 
This section will analyse the two main DGs in the Commission that are responsible for 
the broad sustainable development policy remit: DG for Environment (ENV) and DG 
International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO). The two institutional venues are 
quite disparate concerning their traditional consideration of gender equality and in their 
institutional cultures. Both are important points of engagement for Women in Europe for 
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a Common Future (WECF), one of the women’s groups analysed as a case study in 
Chapter 8. 
 
5.4.1. Gender mainstreaming in DG ENV – frames and institutional context 
 
The Directorate-General for Environment is the leading institution of the EU’s action and 
efforts to protect, preserve and improve the environment, as well as the quality of life of 
EU citizens, and it is also the institution that represents the EU in international meetings 
on environmental matters. Gender equality is supposed to be mainstreamed into 
environmental policy proposals, as it is mandatory in all EU policies. However, the 
environmental discourse, as attested in analyses of the main documents produced in 
the context of EU environmental policy, is gender-blind (Allwood 2017; Locher & Prügl 
2009; Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000; Reis 2017). For instance, any reference to gender, 
gender equality, women or men is absent from the annual activity report of 2014 (DG 
ENV 2015a), as well as the management plan for 2015 (that sets out the priorities for 
the year) (DG ENV 2015b). In what concerns impact assessments conducted by DG 
ENV, there is a gap between guidance and practice: even though gender is included in 
the impact assessments guidelines it then evaporates when impact assessments are 
actually conducted. This mismatch reveals informal institutional rules at play. Interviews 
conducted for this research with staff from DG ENV reveal that gender impacts are not 
considered relevant to the policy issues at stake nor to the level at which legislation is 
proposed (i.e. the EU level) due to the principle of subsidiarity (ENV A interview). 
However, existing research reveals that gender is not being considered at all in the first 
place to assess whether it might be relevant or not (Mergaert & Minto 2015, p. 11). 
 
There is strong evidence that DGs that are more market-oriented, including DG ENV, 
are less likely to take into account gender mainstreaming and other market-correcting 
objectives (Locher 2012; Locher & Prügl 2009; Mergaert & Minto 2015; Pollack & 
Hafner-Burton 2000). The logic of appropriateness in DG ENV, an institution with a 
strong regulatory penchant, determines the type of frames through which environmental 
policy and climate change can be envisaged: these are mostly about competitiveness, 
as attested by the ubiquitous presence of economic costs and the regulatory burden in 
impact assessments overall (Mergaert & Minto 2015). The problem definition in 
economic terms means that the solutions proposed exclude people from the equation, 
which means that gender is not seen as a relevant dimension of the problem or the 
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solution (Allwood 2017). The logic of appropriateness in this policy area thus impels that 
personal characteristics such as gender are not seen relevant as a dimension to be 
considered in the formulation stage of policies or in impact assessments. Overall, the 
logic of appropriateness of DG ENV is permeated by gender-blindness. 
 
One exception is the policy on chemicals. The document that guides the EU’s 
environmental policy until 2020 contains no mention of gender or gender equality, but it 
mentions (pregnant) women in the context of protecting especially vulnerable groups 
from chemical hazards (ENVI 2013). This exception on the inclusion of differentiated 
impacts of a policy on women is confirmed in the European Parliament as well. Between 
2011 and 2013, only 7.7% of the work of the EP ENVI (environment, public health and 
food safety) committee included a gender dimension, and the work that did refers only 
to public health.9 Indeed, often when environmental policies have a perceived direct 
impact on individuals and/or on different social and economic groups, the gender 
variable enters the equation, as is the case of endocrine disruptors. In the environmental 
field, it is not necessarily a division between gender-blind and gender-aware policies, but 
one between technical-oriented targets and people-impacting measures that seems to 
permeate the logic of appropriateness of thinking about environmental problems and 
solutions.  
 
5.4.2. Gender mainstreaming in DG DEVCO – frames and institutional context 
            
EU development policy is often lauded as a good example of strong institutionalised 
gender mainstreaming in the EU (Allwood 2017; Debusscher 2017; Locher & Prügl 
2009; Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000), although the same research often mentions 
lingering obstacles in its effective implementation in practice (Debusscher 2017; Pollack 
& Hafner-Burton 2000). Notwithstanding these obstacles, commitment is reflected in the 
frames used to discuss development and gender equality and, increasingly, in the 
resources allocated to gender mainstreaming. DG DEVCO has a sub-unit responsible 
for gender. The DG devotes time and money to training staff on how to include a gender 
dimension into their own work, spreading the responsibility of mainstreaming to virtually 
all staff members. Interviews conducted for this research with staff from DG DEVCO and 
                                                      
9 One example of the reports that included a gender dimension was the European Parliament’s Committee on Environment, 
Public Health and Food Safety (2013) “Report on the Protection of Public Health from Endocrine Disrupters.”  
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its sister DG ECHO (Humanitarian Action) reveal that they are well informed, aware and 
committed to gender equality, in contrast with some staff from other DGs.  
 
An analysis of recent guiding documents on EU development and cooperation policy 
conducted for this research reveals that documents produced in the context of this EU 
policy contain impeccable understandings of gender equality and women’s 
empowerment. The Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 (EC and FASP 2015), for instance, 
is a high-level political commitment to promoting gender equality in the EU’s external 
relations and the gender equality actions laid out in this document have been allocated 
specific lines of funding from a variety of EU external action instruments and aid lines, 
suggesting that resources are being allocated towards gender mainstreaming in this 
policy area (EC 2010a, p.12-16). The document that guided EU actions on gender 
equality within development and cooperation policy between 2010-2015 refers to 
gender equality as ‘a core value of development policy’ and frames it as a matter of 
human rights and social justice (Council 2010a, p. 3). Objectives laid out in the Gender 
Action Plan (GAP) 2010-2015 mainly involve obtaining gender-sensitive indicators for 
funding and sex-disaggregated statistics, including on issues traditionally considered 
gender-neutral (energy, climate change, infrastructure), and also gender expertise 
training for staff on EU delegations. This reveals, above all, an effort to monitor the 
situation and progress on women’s status in partner countries by increasing the level of 
information and expertise available.  
 
However, there is a considerable gap between political commitment and implementation 
in practice, as the annual reports on the implementation of the GAP attest: gender-
sensitive indicators remain mostly in traditional areas such as education and health, and 
gender mainstreaming, although included in an increasing number of projects, is still far 
off target (EC 2015b). Explanations for this mismatch can be found in research that 
suggest that gender concerns are often instrumentalised towards economic goals 
(Debusscher 2017), due to the overall orientation in the EU to free market economic 
goals. Power asymmetries in EU delegations, the sites responsible for the execution and 
supervision of local development projects, means that gender mainstreaming is often 
the responsibility of low-ranking female staff, who lack decision-making power (Ibid.). 
However, interviews conducted for this research with staff from DG DEVCO also denote 
awareness of and an effort to close the capacity gap on gender that previous research 






Gender equality priorities in the EU remain, for the most part, tied with Single Market 
concerns. This is due both to the EU’s policy competences and to the preponderance of 
the language of benefits to economic growth and competitiveness frames as justification 
to pursue gender equality. Violence against women is an exception as it is an issue that 
has received considerable and constant attention for the last decades. In recent years, it 
received renewed legislative attention and it is in the criminal justice policy field that we 
can observe some of the most serious attempts to mainstreaming gender into binding 
legislation. Outside of DG Justice, gender mainstreaming implementation has generally 
been fickler. Science and research is often lauded as one of the policy pioneers in 
gender mainstreaming in the EU and DG Research has an institutional apparatus that 
reflects a long-standing commitment to gender equality. DG DEVCO is also an example 
of political commitment and resources allocated to this goal. Nevertheless, in both 
institutions mainstreaming efforts are often optional and, in the case of DG Research, 
not a requirement for funding projects to be successfully financed. Gender 
mainstreaming remains the job of specialised and small units and not a structural part of 
the policymaking process in those DGs. In environmental policy gender equality does 
not appear at all as a political commitment and gender is simply ignored throughout, 
with the exception of a few issues such as endocrine disrupting chemicals. Even in 
institutional arenas where gender equality is fairly familiar and somewhat considered, it 
has to compete with other goals such as efficiency or economic competitiveness.  
 
The next chapter inaugurates the case study analysis with the Women Against Violence 
Europe (WAVE) organisation and its interaction with the EU institutions, including a 





CHAPTER 6. WOMEN AGAINST VIOLENCE EUROPE 
(WAVE) 
 
This chapter launches the case study part of the thesis. Chapter 5 investigated the 
characteristics of different policy fields in the Commission that were more or less 
conducive to a proper integration of gender considerations into their policymaking 
process and, in tandem, to the receptiveness of women’s groups’ expertise on gender 
equality in their specific fields. Chapters 6-8 focus on the three single-topic women’s 
groups that were chosen as case studies: Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE), for 
fighting violence against women, European Platform of Women Scientists (EPWS), a 
group working on the status of women in science and gendered research, and Women 
in Europe for a Common Future (WECF), an environmental organisation that seeks to 
put gender equality at the core of sustainable development.  
 
The next three chapters follow an identical structure; a useful organisational method for 
extracting comparisons that will be laid out in Chapter 9. They are structured according 
to the theoretical framework that guides the empirical research of this thesis. Each 
chapter opens with the organisational context section that describes the history and 
structure of each women’s group and lays out key considerations about their 
relationship with the EU institutions. This is important because, as explained in Chapter 
3, the characteristics of an interest group are key in determining that group’s ability – 
and willingness – to take up political opportunities as they appear. A data-rich section 
follows on specific political opportunities: it looks closely at a few illustrative examples of 
specific policymaking moments in which these groups lobbied the EU institutions. These 
policymaking moments can be pieces of legislation to which the groups presented their 
position and tried to influence policymakers, public consultations in which they 
participated, or projects led by these organisations that were co-funded by the 
Commission. Policy tracing, critical frame analysis and in-depth interviews with women’s 
groups and EU civil servants were the methods utilised to trace the negotiations of these 
policies and ascertain the influence of women’s groups. In other words, to assess the 
extent to which each women’s group was able to take up these political opportunities. 
Following that is a section that reflects on the policy cases presented and on the 
characteristics of the organisations and that describes challenges, opportunities and 
adaptation strategies that the women’s groups use in their engagement with the EU. 
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This section is guided by Table 4, making a distinction between women’s groups’ 
processes of adaptation to EU preferences in terms of discourse and policy priorities, 
and women’s groups’ processes of proactivism in shaping political opportunities for 
themselves within the EU institutions (see Chapter 3, Table 4). The chapters close with 
a synthesis of the opportunities and obstacles for gender equality advocacy and a 
reflection on the approach to gender mainstreaming that was used for the policy cases 
analysed in each chapter.   
 
6.1. Organisational context 
 
For the first part of this chapter, I analyse the characteristics of WAVE, an umbrella 
organisation that fights violence against women, to ascertain how they facilitate or 
hinder the organisation’s interaction with the EU institutions.  
 
6.1.1. History and goals 
 
The organisation Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE) is a network of national 
organisations that works to eliminate violence against women and to support its victims. 
It is the only transnational Europe-wide network that focuses specifically on combatting 
violence against women and it has considerable experience of engaging with the 
European Union institutions on the topic in multiple ways. The organisation’s 
headquarters is located in Vienna. WAVE’s goal is stated in its website as ‘to promote 
and strengthen the human rights of women and children in general and to prevent 
violence against women and children in particular’ (WAVE 2015). 
 
WAVE was created in 1994 as an informal network and its first workshop was organised 
in the background of the preparation for the UN Fourth Conference of Women, which 
became known as the Beijing Platform for Action. The informality of the network was 
maintained for twenty years, but in 2014 WAVE became a European legal entity with 
formalised and defined structures. This was driven in great part by the EU funding rules 
for civil society organisations that require that applying candidates be legal entities 
according to the laws of the countries where they are established.   
 
The WAVE network has an explicit feminist understanding of its work (Lang 2013), in 
contrast with other women’s organisations analysed here, like WECF, for instance, 
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which does not (see Chapter 8). The feminist element is at once apparent on the subtitle 
that the organisation appends to its name: 'Feminist network promoting human rights of 
women and children'. Gender equality is stated as one of its fundamental aims: ‘It aims 
at establishing gender equality by eliminating all forms of violence against women’ 
(WAVE 2015). The organisation links its vision and values to the United Nations and 
related conventions, such as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), 
the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1994), and the Beijing 
Platform for Action (1995), reinstating its own understanding of violence against women 
as a holistic phenomenon, to be tackled in its public and private spheres’ manifestations 
(WAVE 2015). 
 
There is some evidence of intersectionality in WAVE’s work. Several of its national 
member organisations are specialists in providing support to disabled, ethnic minority or 
migrant women who are victims of gender-based violence. One of WAVE’s most 
prominent and recent campaigns, Step Up!, focuses specifically on addressing the 
disadvantages of victims of violence who face multiple discrimination. The campaign 
strives to make victim services accessible for disabled women, minority women and 
undocumented women (WAVE 2015).   
 
6.1.2. Membership and functioning 
 
As noted above, WAVE was an informal network established in Vienna for the first 
twenty years of its existence, up until 2014. This meant that the organisation’s structures 
were more fluid and casual than is currently the case, following WAVE’s establishment 
as an Austrian legal entity. Previously, the informality of the organisation also meant that 
it had more difficulty getting access to funding grants, since often applications had to be 
submitted by a member organisation on behalf of the network (WAVE 1 observation). 
Currently, and similarly to other umbrella organisations, the WAVE network is 
constituted by the Advisory Board, the Board, and the Office. The WAVE Advisory Board 
is the broadest structure of the organisation and its intent is to represent on an equal 
footing the different European countries where WAVE has members. The Advisory 
Board meets twice a year and is the formal connection between WAVE and its 
members. It has a delegate per country that is chosen among the member organisations 
of each country, thus attempting to ensure equal regional representation in the bi-annual 
meetings. The meetings of the Advisory Board are meant to support the work of the 
 
 124 
WAVE’s Board, a smaller organ comprising eight members elected every two years by 
the Advisory Board. The WAVE Office is the administrative organ of the network that 
undertakes most of the activities that the Advisory Board and the Board tasks WAVE 
with.   
 
The organisations that are members of WAVE include national NGOs, networks, and 
individual members from across 46 European countries. One of WAVE’s main stated 
aims is ‘to empower women’s organizations that also fight for women’s rights and 
especially organizations that directly provide services to women survivors of violence’ 
(WAVE 2015). This reflects the network’s position that services that have a gender-
specific approach, ones that focus on empowering women, are best suited to assist 
women and children victims of violence (WAVE A interview; WAVE 2015). The members 
of WAVE are crucial in providing the network with information about violence against 
women in their countries and in functioning as expert sources in events such as the 
annual WAVE Conference.  
 
Information gathering and dissemination is thus one of the activities of the network. This 
is done by providing statistics, drafting country-based reports and by hosting an 
information centre on the issue of violence against women in Europe. Since one of the 
goals of WAVE is to assist organisations that provide gender-specific services to women 
victims of violence, there are also training manuals available for staff and volunteers of 
these organisations. The network also engages in advocacy and lobbying activities 
towards national governments and international organisations such as the European 
Union and the Council of Europe, with the aim to raise the issue of sustainability of 
women-specialist victim support providers and ensure that victims of violence receive 
quality support (WAVE 2015). Finally, WAVE also organises campaigns whose goal is to 
educate the public and raise continued awareness on the problem of violence against 
women.    
 
6.1.3. Involvement in EU policymaking process 
 
One of the main tasks that WAVE undertakes is lobbying national governments and 
international organisations to secure victim’s rights, support and legislation that protect 
women and children victim of violence. The circumstances of the network’s origins very 
much reflect this. WAVE was formed during the preparation talks for the 4th UN World 
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Conference on Women in 1994, and the aim was for civil society organisations working 
to combat violence against women to get their voices heard and have the problem 
raised in the international stage. One of the raisons d’être of WAVE from the start was 
thus advocating on behalf of women-specific victim support providers and for the victims 
themselves. As a European transnational network, and considering the EU’s increasing 
competences in home and justice affairs, particularly since the Lisbon Treaty, the 
European Union institutions are an obvious and inescapable site for WAVE to target its 
lobbying efforts. The European Union is often seen by women’s organisations as a way 
of escaping constraints of the nation-state; as a policymaking stage where more respect 
for human rights and better standards of support and protection could be granted to 
victims of violence against women (WAVE A interview). There is thus an expectation by 
organisations such as WAVE that the ‘boomerang pattern’ of lobbying the supranational 
level will strengthen the situation of victims in the member states via imposition from the 
EU level, bypassing national governments’ reluctance in acting on their own (Keck & 
Sikkink 1998). 
 
One of the characteristics of the EU’s action on violence against women is its scattering 
across different policy fields and institutions. There is no institutional unit solely 
responsible for EU policy on violence against women; DGs such as Home Affairs and 
Migration, Justice, Development and Cooperation, all deal with a dimension of violence 
against women and a specific type of victim. This means that WAVE’s advocacy is 
potentially spread across different sectors. In reality, by virtue of the recent spurt of EU 
legislation on victims’ rights and support, the main points of engagement for WAVE in 
the EU is DG Justice in the European Commission, along with the FEMM and LIBE 
committees in the European Parliament. These different institutions also display different 
levels of position-mirroring of WAVE, based on their slightly different understandings of 
the legal basis for the EU to act on violence against women: the FEMM committee is 
seen as a stronger ally of WAVE in its calls for binding and specific legislation on 
violence against women to be proposed at the EU level, whereas DG Justice is more 
cautious on the legal pertinence of EU-level directives or regulations on violence against 
women (WAVE A interview). This caution is also a consequence of the lack of political 
will from the part of member states to have strong legislation on the issue at the EU 
level. The Council is seen as harder to access for its lack of formal civil society 
engagement mechanisms and due to its nature as the representative structure of 28 
member states (WAVE A interview). Lobbying 28 different governments is thus seen as 
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much more time- and resource-consuming than other EU institutions and therefore not 
as easy to focus efforts on (WAVE A interview). EIGE is another EU institution with which 
the WAVE network engages frequently, although its location in Vilnius is seen by the 
women’s organisation as severely hindering its ability to put pressure on policy and 
decision-makers in Brussels to consider gender equality seriously (WAVE A interview).  
 
In the beginning of 2010s, WAVE was involved in lobbying efforts for two legislative 
initiatives in the field of criminal law: the victims’ rights directive (EP and Council 2012a) 
and the European Protection Order directive (EP and Council 2011c). In both legislative 
proposals, the network was engaged with the rapporteurs in the FEMM and LIBE 
committees, as well as, to a smaller extent, with staff from the Commission responsible 
for the legislative pieces. Especially in the case of the victims’ rights directive, due to its 
wide-ranging application to different areas of the criminal justice system (police, courts, 
prosecutors) and auxiliary practitioners (victim support providers, health staff, legal 
advisors), there was a wide range of stakeholders involved in the policymaking process 
of this directive. There were some tensions between WAVE and general victim support 
organisations due to their different understandings of the needs of gender-based 
violence victims – women, in their great majority – which hindered the presentation of a 
united front of victim support organisations, mainstream and gender specific, to the 
discussions around the legislation proposals (WAVE A interview). However, WAVE 
works frequently with other women’s transnational organisations, particularly the 
European Women’s Lobby, in advocating for the rights of women victims of violence, as 
was the case of the concerted lobbying efforts of 25 organisations10 to make 2017 the 
European Year to eliminate violence against women (WAVE A interview; WAVE 1 
observation), and the current joint advocacy to make the EU accede the Council of 
Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic 
violence (i.e. Istanbul Convention: CoE 2011).   
 
One of the key goals of WAVE is to lobby national and international decision-makers to 
guarantee the sustainability of gender-specific victim support services. Funding, through 
application for operating grants and project grants, is thus another area of engagement 
for WAVE with the EU, specifically with DG Justice. The network ran several projects co-
                                                      
10 These 25 civil society organisations included trade unions, organisations working with migrant women, organisations 
working with LGBTQ people, with families, and organisations working on human rights in general. The initiative was entitled 
‘The European Coalition to End Violence Against Women and Girls’. 
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funded by the Daphne programme, the Commission’s specific funding stream for 
actions related to combatting violence against women and children (see Chapter 5). In 
the first years of the network’s existence, WAVE ran a EU co-funded project a year (from 
1997 until 2000) and with less frequency in subsequent years (2003, 2004, 2008, 2010) 
(EC 2016c). These projects were mostly about exchanging good practices and raising 
the capacity of women victim support organisations in Europe by strengthening an 
aspect of their operation. In 2014, WAVE was successful in its application for a 
framework partnership agreement for 2015-2017 under the strand RDAP-Daphne-
Combating violence & RCHI-Rights of the Child, both belonging to the programme 
Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme of DG Justice. The framework partnership 
agreements are specifically meant ‘to support European networks’ active in certain 
areas, including violence against women (DG JUST 2015). Their longer duration in 
comparison with the yearly operating grants allow NGOs to plan their activities for the 
medium term with a higher degree of financial certainty.  
 
6.2. Advocating for the end of gender-based violence 
 
Aspects of gender-based violence or violence against women (both terms are used 
interchangeably by the EU institutions) are dealt with at the EU level in different 
directives and within different policy areas (for more details see Chapter 5). There is no 
comprehensive piece of binding legislation that addresses the issue although two salient 
directives were proposed and adopted in 2011-2012 that are highly relevant for victims 
of gender-based violence in Europe. Both the European Protection Order (EPO) 
directive and the victims’ rights directive were negotiated within the criminal justice 
policy field and gender was an aspect present and discussed in both pieces of 
legislation to a considerable extent. Both were possible due to new dispositions 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty: the EPO was a Council proposal under a new 
mechanism foreseen in Article 76 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), and the victims’ rights directive was a result of increased EU 
competences in justice. WAVE lobbied EU policymakers intensively during the 
negotiation of both directives from proposal to implementation, so these were chosen as 
sub-case studies for a more detailed analysis in this section. The proposal for the EU’s 
accession to the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention is currently being discussed 
within the EU institutions and it is a curious and extraordinary case of an international 
organisation ratifying an international law convention under its own legal identity. This 
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presents interesting reflections on the EU’s political will to tackle the issue of violence 
against women and its understanding of the problem and solution. Since this was also 
something that WAVE advocated for, it will be analysed as the third sub-case study in 
this section.     
 




The victims’ rights directive was the product of extended competences granted to the 
EU by the Lisbon Treaty in the field of criminal justice. The proposal for a directive was 
based on Article 82 of TFEU, which refers that the Commission and the Parliament may 
establish minimum standards on matters of the rights of victims of crime ‘[t]o the extent 
necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgements and judicial decisions and 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension’ (EU 
2007, Art. 82(2)). The proposal for a directive on victims’ rights was thus an effort of 
‘Lisbonising’ the 2001 Council Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal 
proceedings (Council 2001), a non-binding document that made recommendations to 
member states on best practices for the status of victims of crime within the judicial 
system.  
 
One of the two most frequently used frames to justify EU action on this issue is to realise 
freedom of movement through judicial cooperation: ‘to facilitate the establishment of a 
European area of freedom, security and justice and the development of mutual trust 
between criminal justice authorities.’ (EC 2011b, p. 4). Common minimum rules lead to 
increased trust and confidence in member states’ justice systems, which leads to 
increased cooperation between the countries, which in turn reduces obstacles to 
freedom of movement (EC 2011a). The other frame used to justify EU intervention on 
the rights of victims of crime is the fundamental rights frame: ‘Crime is an offence 
against society as well as a violation of the individual rights of victims.’ (Ibid., art. 14(5)) 
Victims’ rights are understood as fundamental rights, hence victims need and deserve a 
certain level of respect, protection and support. The disparate levels of support and 
protection that victims receive throughout Europe, despite previous EU 
recommendations, and the cross-border dimension of many crimes, justifies the action 




The directive covers several dimensions of the ordeal that victims of crime face: 
information rights, participation in the proceedings, support services and protection 
rights. Granting minimum standards on all of these dimensions involves a wide range of 
stakeholders, from the police and judiciary system to auxiliary stakeholders such as 
translators, legal advisors, victim support practitioners, etc. An omnipresent 
preoccupation of the Commission team that proposed this comprehensive piece of 
legislation was to strike the right balance between being ambitious in getting sufficient 
standards for victims of crime and the financial and logistical burden that would be 
imposed on the member states (JUST E interview). The new proposal had to respect the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality while still adding value. This means that the 
new directive had to establish minimum standards, as opposed to more ambitious 
golden rules. These were drafted after a process of public consultation, informal 
meetings with experts and stakeholders, desk-research and an impact assessment 
exercise. The impact assessment included a quantification of costs of victimisation as 
well as financial costs for member states of proposed measures. This quantification of 
costs, albeit a required institutional practice to justify legislative action by the EU, proved 
challenging for the Commission’s team due to the nature of the issue (i.e. justice and 
fundamental rights) (JUST E interview). The cost and administrative burden was indeed 
the main point of contention between the Council, on one hand, and the Commission 
and the Parliament on the other (FEMM A interview; JUST A interview). The main 
feature of the directive, the fact that it covered all victims of crime with no a priori 
identification of special categories of victims, was an important point of discussion 
among the different EU institutions involved and between generic and women-specific 




In the proposal for the directive, the goal of the Commission was to establish minimum 
standards for all victims of crime, regardless of the type of crime they suffered, and their 
personal characteristics and circumstances. The idea was that if all victims were 
covered then specific groups of victims would be well served as well (JUST E interview). 
The Commission’s proposal took this approach based on the idea that the impact of 
victimisation is a very personal and individual process, so the best way to ensure that 
every victim gets the support and protection necessary is to conduct an individual needs 
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assessment for each person victimised. There was therefore no hierarchizing of groups 
of victims a priori. However, at the same time, the proposal recognised that some 
crimes are very prevalent (e.g. violence against women) and that these victims might 
need specific support and protection. This proved a difficult balance to strike and a 
contentious issue during negotiations between the Parliament and the Council (JUST E 
interview). The Council rejected any identification of vulnerabilities and categorisation of 
victims whatsoever on the directive, something which struck some policymakers as odd 
because categorising victims a priori might facilitate the work of the member states' 
authorities (JUST A interview). Instead, individual impact assessments would have to be 
conducted for all victims. The Parliament, through the FEMM committee, had a different 
mind and wanted recognition of specific categories of victims that would need special 
measures. The compromise between the Council’s and the Parliament’s positions came 
back to the Commission’s original proposal (JUST A interview): no special measures but 
assumption that certain types of victims may have 'considerable needs'. The result was 
no special rights for specific types of victims but a reference to certain groups of victims 
(e.g. gender-based violence victims, victims of sexual exploitation, victims of terrorism) 
was included in the preamble section of the directive.  
 
This was a discussion that matters when assessing the gender-sensitivity of the directive 
because it reveals the different perspectives of the EU institutions on how gender should 
be mainstreamed into the legislation: the Commission’s approach was that ‘if you get it 
right for all victims, you get it right for specific victims’, while the FEMM committee’s 
desire was to have a stronger focus on gender-based violence victims (JUST E 
interview). This disagreement also stems from the differing understandings of the 
Commission and the Parliament on the EU’s legal base to act on violence against 
women. While the Commission is wary of acting with binding legislation on the issue, 
stating that combatting violence against women is a shared competence between the 
EU and member states and therefore that the principle of subsidiarity should be 
respected, the Parliament, through the FEMM committee, argues that there are enough 
grounds for legal action (JUST A interview; WAVE A interview). The Commission’s 
strategy in this case was to wait for the Parliament’s help in pushing for more ambitious 
provisions: ‘the original directive adopted by the Commission did not necessarily go as 
far as we wanted it to go ... But we were also conscious that the European Parliament 
had new powers under the Lisbon Treaty’ (JUST E interview). The Commission knew 
that the Parliament, through FEMM, would have a hard stance on women's rights so 
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they knew that the issue would be pushed forward, even if it was not present in the 
proposal from the beginning.  
 
The desk research conducted by the Commission’s team prior to the proposal involved 
looking at research on different groups of victims, including types of gender-based 
violence, and consulting the Council of Europe and UN instruments. Interestingly, 
existing research and data on violence against women and the needs of its victims, 
along with costs and benefits of action and inaction, which was more available and 
developed than information on other types of crimes, was used as a starting point by the 
Commission to justify what to choose as minimum standards for all victims. This 
extrapolation of existing evidence-based research on violence against women to other 
types of crimes did not result in a particular article for gender-based violence victims but 
inspired a much stronger directive for victims overall (JUST E interview). 
 
The unusual attribution of the victims’ rights directive to two parliamentary committees, 
LIBE and FEMM, is credited with the significant provisions on gender-based violence 
that the directive gained (FEMM A interview; JUST A interview; WAVE A interview; DG 
IPOL 2014). Both rapporteurs were gender-sensitive, as both were members of the 
FEMM committee, and both were very clear about the need to have a stronger focus on 
VAW issues on the directive (JUST E interview). Their belonging to different political 
groups secured wide support within the Parliament for the directive (FEMM A interview). 
A considerable amount of the EP amendments were on gender-based violence – 
including on the definition of concepts, on specialised support services and special 
needs, and on the training of practitioners and public-awareness raising (LIBE and 
FEMM 2012). Nevertheless, most of these amendments were considerably watered 
down from the FEMM’s original proposals and the plenary vote of the Parliament. This 
period included the multiple trilogue meetings where the Parliament negotiated with the 
Council its position and agreed on a final text (JUST A interview). Concessions were 
made by the Commission on the obligation to report data on gender-based violence 
victims and specialist services in the implementation phase of the directive, the need for 
victims of certain crimes (sexual abuse and gender-based violence) to deal with same-
sex practitioners if they chose so, and the need of member states to collect gender-
disaggregated data on crimes and victims (EP and Council 2012a). These were 
parliamentary suggestions that were included in the final text. Interestingly, the victims’ 
rights directive became the first binding piece of EU legislation to include a definition of 
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gender-based violence and of violence in close relationships, although these were 
included in the recital section, rather than in the body of the directive as the initial FEMM 
amendment proposed, and thus legal compliance during implementation is not required 




The involvement of civil society was considerable during the proposal and negotiation 
stages of the victims’ rights directive. The perceived strength of the final adopted 
provisions was credited by interviewees at least in part to this strong civil society 
engagement: ‘without the civil society organisations ... I don't think there would have 
been many amendments from the Parliament’ (JUST A interview). Women's groups 
targeted mostly the FEMM committee, while generic victim support organisations and 
fair trial organisations were clustered around LIBE. Civil society groups were viewed by 
interviewees as ‘absolutely key to shape EU legislation. I don't think it can be done 
without having civil society organisations - especially in these areas where it involves 
citizens' rights’ (JUST A interview). Women’s groups were quite committed and involved 
in this legislative piece: they distributed statements and public positions to committees, 
there were meetings with MEPs and hearings with experts. WAVE was involved from the 
very beginning, even before the Commission launched its proposal: they were involved 
in informal discussions with the responsible Commission team (JUST E interview), 
present at conferences, and issued their formal position. 
 
The Commission’s approach of not recognising specific groups of victims was a point of 
contention with WAVE and other women’s organisations from the start. It also proved an 
obstacle in forming alliances with general victim support organisations that shared the 
Commission’s non-prioritisation approach (WAVE A interview). In their preoccupation 
with getting a stronger recognition of the specific needs of gender-based violence 
victims, the FEMM committee proved a closer ally to WAVE. Indeed, one of the first 
actions that WAVE undertook regarding the victims’ rights directive was to lobby for 
FEMM to have joint committee responsibility for the directive for there to be a higher 
chance of the legislation having a strong gender perspective (WAVE 2011). The 
rationale for this action was validated as the FEMM committee took up many of WAVE’s 
proposals as amendments; although most of them were watered down in the trilogue 
negotiations with the Council (WAVE A interview; JUST A interview; LIBE and FEMM 
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2012). In this sense, even though WAVE concedes that the adopted text has some 
provisions that reflect a gender perspective, overall the gender mainstreaming outcome 
was not enough (WAVE A interview).  
 
The main problem for the network is the absence of recognition of violence against 
women as a structural problem, as a reflection of gender inequality (WAVE A interview). 
This is revealed in the scope of the directive itself, which only covers victims of crime. 
This means that rights foreseen in the directive are only granted when the violence is 
considered a crime in the country where it was committed. The criminalisation of certain 
types of gender-based violence, such as sexual harassment and stalking, varies greatly 
across the 28 member states, which leaves many victims of gender-based violence 
unprotected. The protection of victims is understood in a narrow way, only when the 
victim participates in legal proceedings, which does not consider the dynamics of 
violence in close relationships. But the strongest point of contention for WAVE was the 
lack of recognition of women’s victim support services in the directive and the absence 
of a proper recognition of the specificity of gender-based violence victims and their need 
for specialist services (WAVE A interview).  
 
In sum, the women’s organisation was not satisfied with the final text of the directive, 
although it recognised that the Commission had launched a good implementation 
guidance paper with guidelines on how to ensure that the needs of victims of gender-
based violence were considered, as well as creating important awareness-raising 
workshops on the topic (WAVE A interview).    
 




The European Protection Order directive (EP and Council 2011c) is an instrument of 
mutual recognition of national protection orders among member states that was 
proposed in 2010 by the Council. This was done through an unusual mechanism 
introduced for the first time by the Lisbon Treaty, which provides that a quarter of the 
Member States may initiate legislation in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters and police cooperation (under article 76 of TFEU). It is an exception to the 
Commission's sole right to initiate legislation and as such it introduces a different 
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dynamic and balance of power to the negotiation process of this type of legislation. A 
pertinent and important difference from the other legislative cases is the role of the 
Commission, which is reduced to that of advisor only, and the lack of formal civil society 
engagement mechanisms as a consequence. For this initiative, there was no launching 
of a public consultation by the Commission before the proposal of the legislation. 
Nevertheless, the European Protection Order is a unique example of a binding legislative 
mechanism that from the start had at its core the protection of victims of violence 
against women. 
 
This directive was initially proposed by a group of 12 member states11 in January 2010 
under the initiative of Spain, the country that held the Council’s presidency at the time. 
Both rapporteurs from the LIBE and FEMM committees at the European Parliament 
were also Spanish, and there was political will from the Council and rapporteurs to get 
this piece of legislation discussed and adopted swiftly, as tackling gender-based 
violence was one of the priorities of the Spanish presidency (JUST B interview; 
Lambermont 2012). As mentioned above, the Commission’s role in legislation proposed 
under Article 76 of TFEU is very limited, but doubts emerged over the scope of the 
Council’s proposal: European Protection Orders could also apply to protective measures 
made by civil courts and, in that case, the directive would go beyond criminal matters 
into civil justice ones too. Since article 76 of TFEU only allowed proposals that covered 
cooperation in criminal justice matters, the Commission intervened as the ‘guardian of 
the treaties’, threatening to take the Council to the ECJ over its intention to go beyond 
the legal scope of Article 76 in this initiative.  
 
The turf war between the Commission and the Council took several months and 
absorbed much of the political effort put into this piece of legislation (JUST B interview). 
In the meantime, the victims’ rights directive had been proposed by the Commission and 
this diverted much of the political attention in this policy field (JUST B interview). These 
circumstances led to a rather confusing legislative text, which contains a few 
contradictions and repetitions in legal terms (JUST B interview). The general idea is that 
victims who have received a national protection order in a member state (MS A) can 
apply for a European Protection Order, which will then be taken to the member state to 
which the victim has moved (MS B). Upon receipt of this European Protection Order, 
                                                      
11 Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Spain, France, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Finland and Sweden 
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MS B has then to search for an equivalent protective measure under its national 
legislation to put in place for the victim. One of the main objections to the adopted 
directive is the limited number of cases to which it applies (lack of research evidence on 
the number of victims who would be in a position where the EPO would apply), as well 
as its limited added value over applying directly for a new national protection order in the 
country to which the victim has moved (Van der Aaa & Ouwerkerk 2011). However, the 
strongest objection is the very nature of the instrument, which is meant to be based on 
recognition instead of harmonisation. This has important consequences for the effective 
protection of victims since the EPO can only be applied if two conditions are met: the 
crime for which the victim received the protection order in the first place is also a crime 
in MS B, and whether the law in MS B foresees protection measures for victims of that 
crime. However, and interestingly, there has been anecdotal accounts by the 
Commission’s team responsible for monitoring implementation of member states 
upgrading their national legislation to extend the pool of crimes to which protective 
measures are available for victims, as a result of the adoption of the European 




A gender dimension was included in the EPO directive from the very start. The very 
raison d’être of this instrument is to protect victims of violence against women, the 
overwhelming majority of victims that have applied for protection measures. This is 
reflected in the frames used to justify such a proposal by the Spanish presidency: ‘The 
Union's capacity to eradicate gender-based violence should be improved. The creation 
of a European Observatory ... as well as the adoption of a European Protection Order for 
the victims, will be two essential initiatives that will be advanced by the Spanish 
Presidency to achieve concrete progress on this matter.’ (Council Spanish Presidency 
2010) 
 
Furthermore, the proposal for the directive’s strong focus on gender-based violence is 
reflected in the several violence against women international conventions mentioned in 
the Council’s explanatory statement. This includes the UN Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence against Women of 1993 (Article 4 of which states that countries should take 
measures to protect women against any form of violence and ensure that re-
victimisation does not occur); UN CEDAW of 1979 stating that gender-based violence is 
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a breach of several fundamental rights; and a reference to the UNiTE to End Violence 
against Women campaign (2008-2015). The explanatory statement also mentions the 
Council of Europe's repeated calls for states to commit to end violence against women, 
the European Parliament resolution of 1997 to establish a European-wide campaign for 
zero tolerance against violence against women, and the European Parliament resolution 
of 2006 to the same effect (Council 2010b). 
 
The right to free movement of people once again appears as the main frame justifying 
EU action on the protection of victims of crime; the aim is to ensure that the right to 
movement and to reside freely in another member state does not result in a loss of 
security to citizens (Council 2010b). There is a recognition that victims of gender-based 
violence are particularly at risk of repeated victimisation by the same offender (along 
with victims of human trafficking and sexual exploitation of minors) and therefore 
establishing a European Protection Order is a practical action contributing towards the 
elimination of violence against women (Ibid.). Once again, this was a directive allocated 
to joint committees in the European Parliament – LIBE and FEMM – and to rapporteurs 
who shared gender-sensitive concerns, as both were members of FEMM (FEMM A 
interview). Interestingly, in this case, it was the European Parliament that amended the 
text to reiterate that the European Protection Order was an instrument meant for all 
victims of crime, thereby extending the scope of the directive from its violence against 
women original concerns. 
 
Albeit with a limited formal role in the negotiations for the EPO directive, the 
Commission’s position was crucial in one aspect. There was a need to coordinate the 
different pieces of legislation that were being negotiated at the same time on the issue of 
victims of crime (the victims’ rights directive, the EPO criminal and civil) and to ensure 
that all victims were covered, while also recognising the prevalence of gender-based 




The exceptional circumstances of the proposal of this directive meant that there was no 
formal public consultation launched by the Commission. This in turn determined a 
reduced engagement of civil society overall, compared to the one prior and during the 
negotiations of the victims’ rights directive. However, WAVE staff members indicated 
 
 137 
that the network was much more involved in the policymaking process of the European 
Protection Order than in the victims’ rights directive one (WAVE A interview). This is due 
to the focus of the former in victims of violence against women from the start. The 
involvement of WAVE was for the most part through close work with the MEP 
rapporteurs, who sought and welcomed the information and expertise of the women’s 
network on the issue of victims of violence against women (WAVE A interview). WAVE’s 
main goal in its lobbying was to ensure that the process of applying for and obtaining a 
European Protection Order was as simple and accessible as possible, while making it 
free for the victim money-wise (WAVE A interview). The frame used by WAVE to justify 
EU intervention on this matter was very similar to the one used by the EU institutions: 
freedom of movement without a loss of security. WAVE’s construction of the necessity 
for the EPO instrument is the geography of Europe: the EU has many small states and 
therefore women can be in and out of their country very quickly. The European 
Protection Order is thus necessary to protect women’s freedom of movement (WAVE A 
interview). 
 
In terms of WAVE’s interaction with the European Commission regarding the EPO 
directive, it happened mostly after adoption and during implementation monitoring. 
Commissioner Reding’s turf war with the Council was met with some level of dismay on 
the part of WAVE. This was seen by the women’s organisation as diverting the political 
will and efforts of negotiators into petty discussions over the legal basis instead of 
focusing on establishing a strong instrument to serve victims (WAVE A interview). In the 
implementation stage, WAVE’s work on educating and raising awareness on the new 
instrument to judges and victims is mentioned as very important by Commission staff 
(JUST B interview). The Commission also recognises the importance of WAVE’s efforts 
on the European Protection Order to keep it on the political agenda of member states 
(JUST B interview). Nevertheless, the Commission staff members also mention the 
mismatch that sometimes was notorious between women’s organisations’ high 
expectations for this new instrument and the limited feats that an instrument of mutual 
recognition could achieve in practice (JUST B interview).   
 





The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against 
Women (i.e. Istanbul Convention) is the first comprehensive international document that 
legally binds its signatories to take action in fighting types of violence that 
disproportionately affect women – rape, stalking and domestic violence – to take 
measures to effectively protect its victims and to punish the perpetrators (CoE 2011). It 
came into force in 2014. All 28 member states have signed the Convention and, as of 
September 2017, it had been ratified by 1412 (EP 2017a). Innovatively, this convention 
makes for the possibility of the EU to accede to it under its own legal identity and 




From the very start of the Convention’s mandate there was pressure from the European 
Parliament and from women’s groups for the EU to accede to the Istanbul Convention 
and to ratify it. In 2014, the European Parliament issued the Parvanova report, 
nicknamed after its FEMM MEP rapporteur, where it urged the Commission to initiate 
the legal steps for the EU to accede to the Istanbul Convention (EP 2014b). The report 
also called on the Commission to issue a legislative proposal on violence against women 
that would step up efforts to combat this type of violence and harmonise assurances for 
its victims in all member states (by harmonising rape definitions, for instance) (MEP in 
WAVE 1 observation). As a justification for the legal competence of the EU to accede to 
this international convention, comparisons were made to the UN Convention on People 
with Disabilities, the first and only international convention to which the EU had acceded 
under its own legal identity (JUST B interview). Nevertheless, the Istanbul Convention is 
a much broader and ambitious legal document, and there were uncertainties regarding 
the EU’s competences on the topic, which are shared with the member states, and the 
new obligations that would be created upon the EU’s accession and ratification of this 
convention (JUST B interview).  
 
Since all 28 member states had signed the Istanbul Convention, the EU’s own accession 
would not create new legal obligations on the member states. The added value of the 
EU accession would mostly be political in nature: it would send a stronger message of 
the EU’s commitment to the issue. It would also strengthen the EU’s efforts on 
                                                      
12 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Spain and Sweden 
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monitoring, funding, coordination and data collection. More importantly perhaps, it 
would add a new parameter with which to interpret EU law (EWL in WAVE 1 
observation).  
 
In 2016 the Commission launched two proposals for the accession and conclusion (i.e. 
ratification) of the Istanbul Convention by the EU (EC 2016d; EC 2016e). The main topic 
of discussion, both prior to the proposal and during negotiations in the Council, was one 
of the technical legal details of accession (JUST B interview; WAVE A interview): the 
majority of member states only wanted the EU to act on its exclusive competences (data 
collection and asylum) and not on shared ones (non-discrimination) (MEP in WAVE 1 
observation). This reluctance had two consequences: there was no appetite whatsoever 
at the Council for a violence against women specific piece of legislation at the EU level, 
and the political effort of negotiating EU accession to the Istanbul Convention went 
exclusively to discussions of the nature of the EU’s legal competences on the issue of 
gender-based violence (MEP in WAVE 1 observation; JUST B interview). The main fear 
in the Council was that EU accession to the Convention would result in strengthening 
the Commission’s hand in an area of shared competence (JUST B interview). 
 
The result was that in May 2017 the Council adopted two decisions regarding the EU’s 
accession to the Istanbul Convention: one on the accession related to cooperation in 
criminal matters (Council 2017a) and another on the accession concerning matters of 
asylum and non-refoulement (Council 2017b). This limited any legal obligations that 
might arise from the EU’s accession to the Convention to these two areas of action: 
 
This applies, in particular, to certain provisions of the Convention relating to judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and to the provisions of the Convention relating to 
asylum and non-refoulement. The Member States retain their competence insofar as the 




The Council’s decisions justified the EU’s signature of the Istanbul Convention on frames 
of fundamental rights and on a recognition that violence against women stems from 




Violence against women is a violation of their human rights and an extreme form of 
discrimination, entrenched in gender inequalities and contributing to maintaining and 
reinforcing them. By committing to the implementation of the Convention, the Union 
confirms its engagement in combating violence against women within its territory and 
globally, and reinforces its current political action and existing substantial legal 
framework in the area of criminal procedural law, which is of particular relevance for 
women and girls. (Council 2017b) 
 
These are progressive frames that mirror WAVE’s own discourse and that take into 
account, at least rhetorically, what had been one of the strongest critiques of WAVE to 
the gender dimension of the victims’ rights directive: no recognition of the structural 
dimension of gender inequality and its links to gender-based violence. In 13 June 2017 
the EU Commissioner for Justice, Vera Jourova, signed the Istanbul Convention on 
behalf of the EU, opening the path to its ratification and adoption at the EU level. 
Nevertheless, the potential of the EU’s signing was severely restricted by its 
circumscription to asylum and judicial cooperation matters. This was something 
criticised by the European Parliament in a parliamentary resolution launched in 
September 2017:   
 
[The European Parliament w]elcomes the signing of the EU’s accession to the Istanbul 
Convention on 13 June 2017; regrets, however, that the limitation to two areas, i.e. 
matters related to judicial cooperation in criminal matters and asylum and non-
refoulement, raises legal uncertainties as to the scope of the EU’s accession, as well as 




WAVE’s efforts to instigate the EU to accede to the Istanbul Convention date back from 
the 2014 Parvanova report and were usually made in concertation with other civil 
society organisations, including the European Women’s Lobby (EWL 2017). WAVE 
members of staff identified several challenges in their communication with the EU 
institutions on this matter: they mentioned that it was not easy to get in touch with 
officials, as the working group responsible for elaborating the Commission’s proposal for 
accession worked behind closed doors, and there were no invitations from the part of 
the EU policymakers to external stakeholders to express their views (WAVE A interview). 
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The women’s groups expressed doubts about the political will for the EU’s accession, 
propelled by fears that the discussion of the technical and legal details would go on 
indefinitely but that it be used as proof that something was being done about it (WAVE A 
interview). 
 
To strengthen their case and influence – and because the organisation knew that the 
genuine opposition would be found in the Council – WAVE’s efforts included spurring its 
national organisations to put pressure on their own member state governments to 
approve the decision, since it was in the Council that member states would have to 
agree (Domestic Violence Intervention Centre, Vienna at WAVE 1 observation). 
 
The next step, as of November 2017, is the ratification of the Convention by the EU, so 
that it can enter into force in the areas specified in the Council’s decisions. This is 
something that has been pushed for by the European Parliament, specifically through 
the adoption of the 2017 resolution on the Council’s decision on the conclusion by the 
EU of the Istanbul Convention (EP 2017b).    
 
6.3. WAVE and gender mainstreaming: organisational and discourse 
adaptation 
 
6.3.1. Organisational adaptation 
 
WAVE’s origins during the UN Beijing Platform negotiations determined the 
organisation’s penchant for advocacy work. Since the very beginning WAVE has 
interacted with the EU institutions in one form or another. Lobbying has always been an 
important activity for WAVE, increasing in relevance as the EU has seen its 
competences on criminal justice and home affairs expand. The EU has legislated 
recently on minimum standards for the treatment of victims of crime and on the 
recognition of protection measures transnationally, and this has important 
consequences for women victims of domestic violence in each member state. The EU is 
therefore a significant actor currently shaping the protection, support and rights of 
WAVE’s target group. WAVE thus directs a considerable amount of lobbying and 
advocacy efforts towards this supranational political organisation. Interestingly, the 
network’s advocacy strategies are shaped by the multi-level nature of the EU’s 
policymaking process. WAVE relies on its national member organisations to put 
 
 142 
pressure on their own national governments, while the network’s administrative team 
based in Vienna is responsible for liaising with the Commission and the MEPs. WAVE’s 
advocacy strategy is thus a consequence of the EU’s complex and multi-level nature. 
 
It is not just because the EU legislates on the rights of citizens that WAVE has a stake in 
EU policy. The development and often long-term survival of WAVE’s member 
organisations - organisations that for the most part provide specialist support to victims 
of violence against women and children - depend to an extent on the EU’s provision of 
funding and hence on its policy priorities. When it comes to building the capacity of 
WAVE and its member organisations, either through the training of staff or through the 
provision of particular mechanisms of support, or when it comes to information sharing 
and networking, WAVE has relied substantially on EU funding. Several of WAVE’s 
projects have been co-funded by the EU throughout the years, such as the 2000 project 
to create a European Information Centre on Violence Against Women (EC 2000), or the 
2003 project to publish guidelines for setting up a women’s refuge (EC 2016c). This 
means that virtually all of WAVE’s activities are shaped to some extent by the EU. 
 
The most glaring example of organisational adaptation undertaken by WAVE as a direct 
consequence of the EU was the transformation of the network into a legal entity in 
Austria in 2014 (see section 6.1.). Up until then WAVE had been an informal network 
with looser hierarchical structures and rules, and it was usually one of its member 
organisations that applied formally to EU funding programmes as leader of a grant 
project in WAVE’s name. In 2014, the network decided to establish itself as a legal entity 
to be able to apply to the Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme of DG Justice, for 
a framework partnership agreement. This type of funding would run for three years and 
intended to support the operational costs of European networks working in specific 
fundamental rights areas, including combatting violence against women (for details see 
DG JUST 2015). The ability to get such a framework partnership agreement with the EU 
therefore impacts directly on the financial viability of the network. 
 
6.3.2. Frames and discourse adaptation 
 
Violence against women is a unique sub-field of gender equality in that it features as a 
stand-alone goal of the EU gender equality strategy (Council 2010a; EC 2015c). In this 
sense, it has been explicitly a priority of the EU for several years, contrary to other 
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gender equality topics which are often subject to an ebb and flow of political interest. As 
a reflection of this prioritisation, specific funding for the issue of violence against women 
has been stable across the years, with the Daphne programme running uninterruptedly 
for 20 years.13 The current funding stream for the issue refers back to the EU’s priorities 
to combat violence against women and declares that organisations applying for it should 
address the EU’s priorities for that area, including ‘encouraging attitudinal and 
behavioural changes with regards to harmful practices’, ‘increasing the level of 
perpetrator programmes and of tailored and specialised support services for female 
victims of violence’, and ‘building the capacity of professionals in contact with victims of 
all forms of violence against women’ (DG JUST 2014). The EU’s priorities on capacity 
building of support services for victims of violence against women are aligned with 
WAVE’s own goal of improving the provision of violence against women specific victim 
support. In this regard, the network’s own discourse in terms of goals and mission is 
easily adaptable when applying for EU funding programmes. 
 
Despite the long-standing status of combatting violence against women as an EU 
priority in the field of gender equality, this is an issue dispersed across different DGs and 
pieces of legislation, dealt with through a piecemeal approach under various policy 
fields. Justice and fundamental rights, but also migration and home affairs, as well as 
development and cooperation, are three broad policy areas that deal with different 
dimensions of violence against women. This is perhaps a result of the question of the EU 
legal competence on the issue, which is shared with the member states. As a result, 
there has been no comprehensive piece of binding EU legislation addressing the 
problem of violence against women, something which WAVE laments (WAVE A 
interview). Nevertheless, the frames used by the EU and the women’s network to talk 
about the problem are quite similar. The fundamental rights frame is the predominant 
lens through which the EU sees violence against women. A very illustrative example is 
the survey conducted by FRA – the Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union 
– into the types of violence that women across the 28 member states suffer (FRA 2014). 
Documents pertaining to the legislative process of both the victims’ rights directive and 
the EPO directive are dotted with understandings of alleviating the ordeal of victims of 
crime as a matter of protecting their fundamental rights. Equally, WAVE’s own stated 
                                                      
13 The Daphne programme was incorporated into the Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme 2014-2020, 




goal is ‘to promote and strengthen the human rights of women and children in general 
and to prevent violence against women and children in particular’ (WAVE 2015). In the 
case of the victims’ rights and EPO directives, a justification for EU action given by both 
the EU institutions and WAVE, was the protection of the freedom of movement for 
victims of crime. 
 
Notwithstanding this almost seamless framing match, points of contention remain 
between the EU’s legislative approach to victims of violence against women and WAVE’s 
own understanding of what they need. Although the EU recognises violence against 
women as ‘a cause and consequence of gender inequalities, a form of discrimination 
and a violation of women's fundamental rights’ (Council 2010a), the steps it took in 
addressing it with binding legislation – most notably in the victims’ rights directive – has 
not, from WAVE’s point of view, been enough (WAVE A interview). For the women’s 
network, EU legislation does not consider and deal with violence against women from a 
holistic point of view nor does it sufficiently address the specificity of this type of crimes, 
and the specialist support and protection its victims need (WAVE A interview). This 
means that, although this is a promising area of cooperation due to the close match of 
frames used by the EU and WAVE, there are still considerable points of contention 
between the European institutions and the women’s network.    
 
6.3.3. Processes of proactivism 
 
The legal competence of the EU on matters of violence against women is also a point of 
discord between WAVE and the European Commission in particular. What this means in 
practice is the reluctance of the Commission to propose binding legislation that 
specifically and comprehensively addresses gender-based violence; something that 
WAVE and MEPs on the FEMM committee have been pushing for several years. WAVE’s 
alternative strategy – and arguably the Commission’s too – has been to push for gender 
to be mainstreamed into general legislation. This was the case of the victims’ rights 
directive, when one of the onset activities conducted by WAVE was to lobby the 
European Parliament to make FEMM a joint committee to deal with the directive 
proposal (WAVE 2011). The rare attribution of joint committees was denoted by several 
interviewees as the source of the victims’ rights directive considerable gender 




A recent lobbying endeavour for WAVE has been the EU’s proposed accession to the 
Istanbul Convention. This is a significant case of an attempt to change the EU’s legal 
ability to deal with the problem of violence against women since, as seen above, it is a 
constant struggle point between Commission, Parliament, and WAVE. The Istanbul 
Convention’s holistic approach towards tackling violence against women would provide 
the EU with a renovated political impetus to force member states to act on the issue and 
reinforce the EU’s competence to bindingly legislate on it. The EU accession to the 
Istanbul Convention was thus a clear window of opportunity for stronger efforts at EU 
level on violence against women, and consequently for WAVE’s engagement. However, 
the EU’s accession to the Council of Europe’s convention was limited to matters of 
judicial cooperation and asylum and re-foulement, as member states were reluctant to 
allow the EU to expand its competences on an issue that might involve adding an 
administrative and financial burden to public authorities. WAVE has lamented the 
closed-door negotiations and difficulty of accessing policymakers, something that, at the 
time of interview (2016), added to the uncertainty from the point of view of the women’s 
group of the accession ever happening (WAVE A interview).       
 
Table 8 is a synthesis of some of the processes of adaptation and processes of 
proactivism that WAVE undertook in justice policy. 
 
 Processes of adaptation Processes of proactivism 
Discourse 
(Framing) 
Using the frame of violence against 
women in Europe as a curtailment of 
women’s freedom of movement within EU, 
alongside the fundamental rights frame. 
Lobbying for the EU accession to 
the Istanbul Convention in order to 
strengthen the EU’s political and 
legal commitment to combat 
violence against women. 
Actors 
(Institutional allies) 
Lobbying for FEMM as joint committee for 
the victims’ rights directive. 
Keeping in touch with rapporteurs on EPO 
and victims’ rights directive. 
Organising workshops for judges 
and other judicial practitioners on 




Changing the organisation’s legal status to 






Table 8.WAVE’s strategies for take-up and creation of political opportunities in EU justice policy  
 
   
6.4. Conclusion 
 
The issue of violence against women enjoys a special status in the European Union in 
the sense that it has been a consistent priority for gender equality over the last two 
decades. Funding has been allocated for this priority through Daphne and now the 
Rights, Citizenship and Equal Rights Programme of DG Justice. Since the EU does not 
have an exclusive competence there is no binding piece of legislation specifically on 
violence against women; instead, it is dealt with by various DGs through a piecemeal 
approach. Criminal justice, in particular with the victims’ rights and the European 
Protection Order directives, is an extraordinary example of a policy field that took 
gender seriously and consistently into mainstream legislation. This use of gender 
mainstreaming can be seen as a solution to bridge the gap between the EU’s strong 
rhetoric on violence against women and its incapacity to legislate directly on it due to 
national reluctance. The frames used to justify EU action on this relate to the protection 
of fundamental rights and freedom of movement of people, and the EU’s commitment to 
gender equality is specifically alluded to in justifying policy action in criminal justice 
matters, even in pieces of legislation that are aimed at all victims of crime. Nevertheless, 
WAVE points to the limited protection that these pieces of legislation afford to victims of 
gender-based violence, since not all of this violence – stalking, for example – is 
considered a crime in all member states, and there is no sufficient recognition of the 
structural dimension of violence against women.  
 
Opportunities and resistance in justice policy 
 
Based on the multi-tiered approach developed in Chapter 3 and on the findings drawn 
from the present chapter, the following table summarises some of the opportunities and 
obstacles that the implementation of gender mainstreaming faces in the field of justice 
policy, along with opportunities and challenges for women’s groups’ engagement in this 
field.14  
                                                      
14 Determining whether an opportunity or obstacle is structural or institutional is often not clear-cut; they can 
straddle both tiers. Table 9 thus aims to be a simplified illustration of gender mainstreaming in EU justice 







 Opportunities Resistance/obstacles 
Structural Complex policymaking process, 
with multiple points of access and 
opportunities to influence 
institutions with different 
preferences. 
Subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles (minimum standards only). 
Limited EU competence on matters 
of violence against women. 
Institutional Long-standing commitment to 
ending VAW, with consistent 
funding streams for women’s 
service providers and women’s 
advocacy groups such as WAVE.  
Strong institutional opposition in 
Council for EU binding legislation on 
VAW. 
Commission’s reluctance to propose 
binding legislation on VAW. 
Individual Commissioner Viviane Reding 
prioritising victims’ rights and 
gender equality. 
LIBE and FEMM rapporteurs of 
victims’ rights and EPO directives 
with feminist preferences.  
n/a 
 
Table 9. Multi-tiered approach to opportunities and obstacles to gender change and gender equality 
advocacy in EU justice policy 
 
The greatest hurdle for advancement of a gendered approach to victims of violence, 
that is, tackling violence against women, is the limited competence of the EU to legislate 
on it: the EU shares it with member states and thus the subsidiarity principle applies. 
There is thus both a structural and an institutional resistance to pursuing gender change 
in justice policy reflected in the limited EU competence to legislate bindingly on the issue 
of violence against women and institutional averseness for this to happen. The EU 
accession to the Istanbul Convention was a case in point: after negotiation in the 
Council, member states limited the EU’s accession to this comprehensive international 
legal instrument to just two matters – criminal justice cooperation and asylum and re-
foulement. Yet due to the expressed and long-standing EU commitment to end violence 
against women, there are still opportunities for committed individuals to advance policy 
actions, as was the case with commissioner Viviane Reding and victims’ rights, and 
opportunities to involve institutions, such as the FEMM committee, that will push strongly 




Moreover, opposition and support to legally binding mechanisms with a gender 
component in justice cannot simply be drawn along institutional lines. The European 
Protection Order, an explicitly gender-specific instrument, was an initiative that 
originated entirely from the Council, through the priorities of Spain, the country holding 
the presidency at the time. This nuances the war over legal competence between 
member states on one side and Parliament and Commission on the other in this subject, 
although the rule continues to be of member states’ reluctance for EU legally binding 
action on violence against women. The main point is that justice is a policy field with 
considerable structural, institutional and individual opportunities for gender change and 
gender advocacy. 
 
What kind of gender mainstreaming approach? 
 
In Chapter 2 a distinction was made between one approach to gender mainstreaming 
that was participative and democratic in nature, seeking the input of a broad range of 
stakeholders into the process and in the re-definition of policy paradigms, and another 
that was more of a top-down process of using gender equality considerations in a 
narrow way or as a means to achieve other policy goals, such as economic growth or 
competitiveness (see section 2.4.1). The question was ultimately whether gender 
mainstreaming was a bureaucratic exercise or a democratic endeavour. Considering 
how gender mainstreaming was conducted in specific policy actions is more instructive 
and useful than starting with a sweeping generalisation, since the implementation of the 
mechanism is strongly uneven in different policy fields and institutional arenas. In fact, 
the process of mainstreaming gender can vary even between policy actions within the 
same sub-field, as was the case among the three pieces of legislation considered in this 
chapter.  
 
The openness of the policymaking process to civil society was different in these three 
cases. Opportunities to participate in the victims’ directive policymaking process were 
varied and abundant, at virtually every stage of the process, especially the pre-proposal 
stage through informal meetings and a public consultation, and the negotiation stage at 
the European Parliament through contacts with rapporteurs and other MEPs via 
amendment suggestions. The Council, on the other hand, proved much harder to 
access. In this case, a participative-democratic approach to gender mainstreaming can 
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be discerned, albeit one with limitations. However, when it comes to the European 
Protection Order and the negotiations for the accession of the EU to the Istanbul 
Convention, civil society was much more reduced, particularly at the pre-proposal 
stage. In the EPO case, it was due to the use of article 76 of TFEU that gives the Council 
powers of legislative proposal and thus limits the Commission’s role and consequently 
shuts down formal mechanisms of external stakeholder engagement. In the case of the 
Istanbul Convention accession, no public consultation was opened and talks were 
conducted behind closed doors without input from civil society. The gender 
mainstreaming method taken in these two cases resembles much more the expert-
bureaucratic approach. 
 
The next chapter will continue the analysis of the case study women’s organisations, 
with the focus switching to the European Platform of Women Scientists and EU science 




CHAPTER 7. EUROPEAN PLATFORM OF WOMEN 
SCIENTISTS (EPWS) 
 
7.1. Organisational context                                            
 
This section describes the history and the characteristics of the European Platform of 
Women Scientists (EPWS), an organisation that seeks to work as a representation group 
for women that work in science and research, and that lobbies the EU for policy on 
research and innovation to have a gender dimension and for the EU to promote the 
status of women in this career field. It also analyses the involvement of EPWS in the EU 
policymaking and its main contacts in the EU institutions. 
 
7.1.1. History and goals 
 
The European Platform of Women Scientists had its origins in a call for proposals 
published by the European Commission for the set-up of a European network of 
organisations supporting women scientists. This call was published in 2003 and reveals 
the interest of the Commission at the time to establish an organisation that would 
‘empower women scientists to participate in the research policy debate and to enhance 
their professional and career advancement’ (EC 2008). In other words, the Commission 
was looking to establish a one stop-shop for the representation of the interests of 
women in scientific careers in Europe, credible and representative enough to participate 
in the EU policymaking process in research and science. This is a practical example of 
the Commission’s penchant for setting up and supporting European networks 
representing public interests with a view of lending legitimacy to its policy proposals, 
particularly in topics where its competences might be more debatable (Bouwen 2009). 
This was the case in the area of gender equality, where the Commission encouraged the 
establishment of women’s networks partially to legitimise its going beyond employment-
related gender equality issues (Mazey 2012, p. 131 but see also Hoskyns 1996; Mazey 
1998; Zippel 2004). The European Platform of Women Scientists was formally signed 
into being at the end of 2005 and its secretariat, established in Brussels, started work at 
the beginning of 2006. The set-up of the organisation was funded under the 6th EU 




Representativeness was at the heart of EPWS’s concerns since the very beginning. The 
Centre of Excellence Women and Science (CEWS) in Bonn, Germany, the organisation 
that won the call and was responsible for setting up the platform for women in science at 
the EU level, contacted several high-ranking women scientists from all over Europe to 
support the establishment of the EPWS and to make sure that the different perspectives 
and needs of the diverse EU member states regarding women in science were 
represented (EPWS A interview). Care was also taken to ensure that different fields of 
science were represented within the organisation, with a fair balance between social 
science and humanities, and natural science and engineering representatives (EC 
2008). The mission of the organisation is ‘to give women scientists a voice in European 
research policy’ by ‘building a structural link between women scientists and European 
and national research policy-makers’ (EPWS 2015) The goal is to ensure that women 
participate equally and fully in science and that their voices are heard in science policy.  
 
7.1.2. Membership and functioning 
 
The organisation took inspiration from the European Women’s Lobby to establish its own 
structure and statutes (EPWS A interview; EPWS B interview; EPWS C interview). The 
organisation took the form of a network of national organisations – just like the EWL – 
that worked for the advancement of women in science and/or promoted the interests of 
women scientists. Its main goal is to serve as a link between these organisations and the 
EU-level policymaking process in what concerns women in science and research. As 
was mentioned above, there was a particular care to represent women scientists from 
across Europe and, from the beginning of its functioning, EPWS included a 
representative in its membership base from each member state (EC 2008). Currently 
(2017), EPWS has member organisations from more than 40 countries. These member 
organisations participate in the life of the platform by being a part of the General 
Assembly and engage proactively with the platform by participating in the policy debate, 
promoting women scientists, or by providing information and help with the promotion of 
the platform. The Board of Administration, composed of representatives elected by the 
General Assembly, is in charge of deciding the work programme with the approval of the 
General Assembly, and of adopting policy statements and position papers on behalf of 
the organisation. The Executive Committee is the body responsible for the daily 
management of the organisation and, among other responsibilities, is in charge of the 




During the first four years of its existence, EPWS had a secretariat in Brussels that was 
responsible for the daily workings of the organisation. There were six full-time staff 
members working in Brussels, each in charge of one aspect of the organisation’s work 
(i.e. policy research, networking, and information management). There was close 
engagement with the EU policymaking process during that period, with representatives 
from EPWS participating in conferences organised around the issue of women in 
science and meeting regularly with Commission officials and MEPs responsible for that 
topic. EPWS’s secretariat would issue policy positions and statements regarding the 
advancement of women’s presence in research policy and women’s careers in science. 
The team drafted reports taking stock of the situation of women in science and research 
in Europe and collected best practices among the member organisations. The regular 
and close engagement with the EU policymaking process suffered a setback when, in 
2009, the platform was forced to close down the secretariat due to an inability to secure 
a contribution from another source, as required by the Commission’s rules for attribution 
of co-funding projects. The double struggle of being a voluntary organisation with no 
working presence in Brussels means that it became much harder for the EPWS to 
maintain close contact with EU policymakers and other civil society organisations since 
it now involves scheduling and purposefully travelling to Brussels (EPWS A interview; 
EPWS B interview). Contacts are harder to establish and maintain, and keeping track of 
policy developments is also more difficult without a physical presence in the European 
capital (EPWS B interview).   
 
Nevertheless, the raison d’être of the platform continues to be to bring the voices of 
women scientists to the EU decision-making table on questions of science and research. 
Maria Cristina Antonucci (2014) argues that its mission, together with the 
circumstances of its creation, mean that the platform should be described as a 
purposeful European advocacy and lobbying group instead of being merely seen as a 
European civil society organisation participating in the EU policymaking process. The 
platform has a mixture of characteristics from different types of organisations. It is 
simultaneously a professional order, since it is a congregation of people working in a 
specific profession and represents their interests, but different in the sense that it seeks 
a much broader membership base. It is a public interest group since, although its goal is 
gender- and career-specific, achieving a more balanced integration of women and men 
in science could be argued to be beneficial to all. And it is a promotional group 
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(Salisbury 1975) since it works specifically for a cause and is open to anybody willing to 
fight for that cause (Antonucci 2014, p. 93).   
 
7.1.3. Involvement in EU policymaking process 
 
By virtue of its origins and its original funding, the EPWS had close links with the EU 
institutions from the start, particularly with the Women in Science Unit of DG Research. 
The situation of women in science was an issue already salient in several EU documents 
prior to EPWS’s birth in 2006. The topic was also fostered by a slew of other promotional 
groups such as the Helsinki Group, the European Centre for Women and Technology, 
and the European Association for Women in SET, so it can be argued that there was 
already a favourable institutional context for the promotion of the issue of women and 
science within the EU institutions (Antonucci 2014, p. 94). The proactiveness of the 
Commission in seeking the establishment and funding of an organisation representing 
the interests of women in science is also a reflection of the favourable institutional 
environment for this issue. 
 
A big portion of EPWS’s activities therefore relates to direct lobbying of the EU 
institutions (Antonucci 2014), particularly the European Commission and the European 
Parliament. This involves meeting with civil servants and policymakers to share the 
platform’s positions on specific issues, as well as issuing own-initiative policy positions 
and statements or as contributions to public consultations launched by the European 
Commission. DG Research is one of the main points of access of EPWS into the EU 
policymaking process, due to its responsibility for the science and research policy of the 
Union. The interdisciplinary nature of the issue of women in science is stated as a 
difficulty in presenting it to policymakers because the expertise is split across different 
units. In the European Commission, topics related to including a gender dimension into 
research were addressed to DG Research, while issues of increasing the presence of 
women in scientific careers were dealt with by DG Employment and Social Affairs, since 
it was there that gender equality policy of the Union was designed (since 2011 a policy 
field under DG Justice) (EPWS B interview). In the European Parliament, the work of 
EPWS is spread between two committees – FEMM (women’s interests and gender 
equality) and ITRE (science and research) – and MEPs are often knowledgeable about 
one part of the topic but not the whole issue: MEPs from the FEMM committee have 
expertise on gender equality but not on scientific careers and the research panorama, 
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whereas MEPs from ITRE have a good knowledge and interest in science and research 
but not necessarily on the need to bring a gendered perspective into these policies 
(EPWS B interview). 
 
Apart from direct lobbying activities, the platform also works on increasing the visibility of 
the issue of gender-balance in science by organising campaigns, events, workshops, 
conferences, etc. This grassroots technique can be seen as an indirect form of lobbying 
since the goal is to raise the public’s awareness of the issue and thus to force politicians 
to acknowledge it and include it in the political agenda (Antonucci 2014). The 
combination of direct lobbying and grassroots techniques, plus the relative salience of 
the issue of women in science in the EU agenda, accounts for the receptiveness of EU 
institutions towards EPWS. The ability to conduct constant dialogue with the European 
Parliament and Commission, at least in the first phase of its existence, coupled with the 
production of effective position papers that carefully employed the EU jargon and formal 
structure, meant that EPWS could successfully and effectively replicate what was ‘in 
many people’s brains at the same time’ and thus serve as a link between women 
scientists and the EU policymaking level (EPWS A interview; EPWS B interview). The EU 
institutions are often receptive to EPWS input and the Commission in particular is a 
willing interlocutor of the platform. This is in part due to the fact that participation of a 
civil society organisation with a broad geographical and a specific career-oriented base 
is perceived as closing the democratic gap in the European policymaking process 
(EPWS B interview but also Antonucci 2014, p. 92). Whether this receptiveness 
translates into influence is another matter (see section 7.2. and 7.3. for a more detailed 
analysis). 
 
7.2. Advocating for gender mainstreaming in science and 
research 
 
7.2.1. FEMM report and EP resolution Women and Science (2008) – an EPWS 
collection of best practices  
 
EPWS members suggest the struggle that the platform often faces is due to its working 
on an issue that spans two different policy areas (EPWS A interview; EPWS B interview). 
In the European Parliament, this is quite notorious, with expertise on gender equality and 
 
 156 
expertise on research and science divided between the FEMM and the ITRE 
committees, respectively. This means that the platform has often struggled to convince 
MEPs on both committees of the importance of the subject of women and science, since 
they lack expertise on one or the other side of the issue (EPWS B interview). There are 
exceptions and this section describes such a case. The exception below is justified by 
the individual interest of the MEP in question, Britta Thomsen, and her being a pioneer in 
the topic of women and science within the FEMM committee at the time (EPWS B 
interview). 
  
In 2008 EPWS was approached by Britta Thomsen MEP, a member of the FEMM 
committee at the time, for help with data and best practice collection on the status of 
women in science and research careers. The aim was to produce a FEMM report on the 
issue, which would include data as well as recommendations according to the best 
practices implemented on member states. Upon being contacted by the MEP, EPWS 
decided to turn its contribution into a membership exercise and invited all its member 
organisations to submit best practices from their countries (EPWS 2008; EPWS B 
interview). In March 2008, the women’s platform published its own document with the 
best practices gathered from members. The document consisted of examples of specific 
measures taken by research institutes, universities, and public authorities in several 
European countries that worked in attracting and retaining women in scientific careers. 
The best practices included: 
  
• Avoiding gender stereotypes in teaching and avoiding the propagation of career 
stereotypes; 
 
• Emphasis on the importance of measures to facilitate work-family balance 
('integration of the family perspective') (EPWS 2008, p. 1) such as flexible 
working hours, part-time work, childcare for employees, extra financial support 
for childcare costs during conference attendance, participation in training 
seminars while pregnant or working part-time; 
  
• Extra encouragement in hiring practices (e.g. adding sentence on female 




• Promotion of women's networks and networking events, as well as establishment 
of mentoring schemes and increasing the visibility of role models; 
   
• Research funds targeted specifically at women; 
  
• Reintroduction of Gender Action Plans in the 7th Funding Programme Framework 
(FP7) as they were an important good practice in the previous one, FP6; 
  
• Removal of age restrictions in applications for grants. 
    
In April 2008, the FEMM committee launched an own-initiative report (FEMM 2008) on 
the same topic, with Britta Thomsen MEP as rapporteur, that mirrored very much the 
best practices presented in EPWS’s own report. The FEMM report on women and 
science aimed to ‘identify social, cultural and other kind of barriers that account for the 
under-representation of women in science' and to ‘point to possible solutions and best 
practices for solving the situation’ (Ibid., p. 9). The report identifies two reasons that 
explain why gender segregation is problematic in science and research: one is about 
fields with higher status having less women (female scientists thus end up with lower 
status than men scientists) and the other is about a lack of scientific personnel (Ibid.). 
The last one ties in with the ‘waste of talent’ frame that is dominant in EU research and 
science policy and, in fact, the FEMM report opens with a statement of research as 
‘crucial sector’ for the economic development of the EU and the consequent need to 
find extra researchers in order to accomplish the Lisbon Strategy (FEMM 2008). Gender 
segregation in science fields and the leaky pipeline phenomenon are seen as the result 
of a complex interaction of reasons, and the report urges member states to consider 
these in their complexity and not as merely a reflection of women’s lack of interest in 
scientific fields (Ibid.). Gender stereotypes are identified in education, hiring and funding 
practices: they ‘support the continuity of specific gender roles and occupational gender 
segregation’ based on simplistic characteristics that are often attributed to the feminine 
and the masculine (Ibid., p. 10) and there is an understanding of certain academic 
institutions such as the evaluation of excellence and recruitment practices as gender-
biased. There is also repeated stressing of work-life balance measures as crucial to 
increasing women’s participation in science-related careers (EPWS 2008), including the 
need to end age restrictions on funding applications since women tend to follow different 
career trajectories to men. The Gender Action Plans are referred to as an important part 
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of EU research policy that should be given more prominence in FP7 and future EU 
funding frameworks. ITRE’s opinion on the report also stresses the importance of work-
life balance, as well as mentoring networks and even positive action to attract and keep 
women in scientific careers. ITRE also mentions the need to revise of concepts needed 
to ensure no gender bias. The justification of ITRE’s position is permeated by the ‘waste 
of talent’ frame, explicit in the reference that the Lisbon Strategy requires increasing by 
700,000 the number of researchers.  
 
The FEMM report of 2008 on women and science mirrors very closely the EPWS’s own 
best practice collection document; all the ideas are included in the FEMM report and it 
even praises EPWS’s work at the end:  
 
[The report] [w]elcomes the activities carried out by the European Platform of Women 
Scientists, which aim to enhance the participation of women in science and increase the 
number of women scientists in decision-making positions (FEMM 2008). 
 
The FEMM report included a motion for a resolution of the European Parliament, which 
is a statement that carries heavier weight due to being voted on and approved in plenary 
by all MEPs. A European Parliament resolution was then adopted in May 2008 with 
slight differences from the original motion within the FEMM report, including not 
mentioning EPWS anymore, suggesting instead: 
  
[The motion] [w]elcomes the activities carried out by NGOs and agencies at European 
and national level which aim to enhance the participation of women in science and 
increase the number of female scientists in decision-making positions; (EP 2008, italic 
mine) 
 
Nevertheless, the spirit of the FEMM report did not change and for EPWS it remained a 
ground-breaking moment to be singled out for a contribution to an EU report on the 
issue of women and science (EPWS B interview) and an opportunity to have its position 
almost ipsis verbis amplified by one of the EU institutions. 
 




Every six years, with the new budgetary cycle, the European Commission launches a 
new funding programme that is aimed at supporting research and scientific projects 
across the EU. In order to establish the research priorities and funding requirements for 
applicants, the Commission launches public consultations to receive input from external 
stakeholders. Every two years there is a work programme that further specifies the 
funding priorities for the following bi-annual period, and a consultation is also launched 
to gather stakeholders’ opinions on what these should be. Investing in the production of 
innovative research has been one of the key overall goals of the EU in the last decades 
as a way of increasing the competitiveness and efficiency of the European economy. 
Therefore, the revision of the EU’s strategy until 2020 and the public consultations to 
that end were also an important point of engagement for EPWS. 
  
Public consultation on the EU 2020 Strategy (January 2010) 
 
At the end of 2009 the European Commission launched a public consultation for 
stakeholders to give their input into what they consider should be Europe’s priorities for 
the next decade. The aim was to replace the Lisbon Strategy 2000 that expired in 2010. 
Even though it does not relate directly and specifically to research and science policy, 
the intended grand-strategic-nature of the consultation meant that potentially every 
single stakeholder could have something to add. EPWS responded to the consultation in 
January 2010. The women’s platform was very critical of the dominance of economic 
growth in the consultation text, stressing rather that economic growth should be 
embedded in other goals such as political coherence, equal opportunities and social 
integration (EPWS 2010).  EPWS talks about the need for quality science and good 
scientists to be taken into account by policymakers in order to guarantee ‘a better 
predictability of their consequences’ (Ibid., p. 1). EPWS also stresses the need to invest 
in science and research to achieve the goal of a ‘smarter and greener social market’ 
and to realise the objective of turning Europe into a knowledge-based society (Ibid.). 
This is where women come in: to achieve these ambitious goals Europe needs to 
maximise the contribution of all its potential talents, particularly by ending the gender 
imbalance in research and scientific careers (EPWS 2010). Work-life balance is cited as 
a specific issue for the EU to focus on to tackle this imbalance.  
 
The frames so far are congruent with the EU’s own framing of the lack of women in 
science as a problem of waste of talent and inefficiency. However, correcting the issue 
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of gender imbalance in research careers is only part of the proposals advanced by 
EPWS in its consultation response. The women’s platform also criticises the fact that 
‘[t]raditionally, research agendas have not taken the specific needs of women into 
account’, and is highly critical of the gendered scientific institutional culture, focusing 
particularly on the concept of excellence and the subjective and often gender-biased 
criteria used to assess it (EPWS 2010, p. 2). Gender diversity is mentioned as 
conducive to more creative and innovative research, and considering the gender 
dimension in research ensures that knowledge production matches the interests of all 
EU citizens (Ibid.). Again, economic growth is not mentioned nor taken as an implicit 
goal for achieving gender equality in science and research, contrary to the dominant 
frame in EU policy in this field. 
 
Public consultation on Horizon 2020 (May 2011) 
 
In 2011 the Commission opened a consultation to gather input on priorities for the next 
multi-annual programme of research funding (2014-2020). EPWS was one of the 
stakeholders that provided input for the ‘Public Consultation on the Green Paper “From 
Challenges to Opportunities: Towards a Common Strategic Framework for EU Research 
and Innovation Funding”’ in May 2011. Bearing in mind that the Council had already 
published the Europe 2020 strategy by then with the EU’s priorities for growth for the 
next 10 years, EPWS acknowledges in its response to the consultation on the future of 
research that science is part of the EU’s growth strategy and therefore there is a need to 
maximise the contribution of women to it (EPWS 2011). Once again, work-life balance 
measures are mentioned as the key to ensuring that the gender imbalance in research 
careers is corrected and to ensure that mobility of researchers happens across 
academic institutions and countries within the European Research Area (Ibid.).  
 
As in its response to the consultation on Europe’s 2020 strategy, EPWS takes the issue 
of women and science in its double meaning, focusing also on the gender dimension of 
science and proposing measures to ensure that it is taken into consideration. Again, the 
concept of excellence is heavily criticised as incomplete and gender biased, since it 
does not take into account the different career trajectories that women take and which 
often include career gaps due to caring responsibilities (EPWS 2011). After the new 
funding framework programme was proposed, EPWS again stresses in a position paper 
in 2012 that the gender dimension should be considered a key component of excellent 
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research, particularly crucial in scientific research where humans are subjects or end-
users, such as drug tests, but also in business-driven activities where the output is a 
commercial product (Ibid.). This is part of the need to make sure that research and 
science are responsive to the needs of all citizens.   
 
One of the recurring stances of EPWS in the consultation that led to Horizon 2020 is 
penalisation and sanctions for projects that do not consider gender at all. The idea is 
that gender indicators should be clearly set, both for women participation in research 
teams and for the gender dimension in the project content, and that the absence of a 
strategy to achieve those should drive down the overall evaluation mark and therefore 
the chances of that project to be funded. This requires also that evaluators are given 
clear gender guidelines to properly assess whether the indicators are met. There is also 
a proposal for the results of the gender indicators to be published, in the hopes that 
peer-pressure encourages member states and institutions to move forwards.  
 
Finally, the women’s platform voices its concern about the challenges that NGOs face 
when trying to participate in EU projects. The rule that all funding from the EU should be 
matched to a certain extent by co-funding from other sources (often in an 80%-20% 
share) means that EU funding is geared towards big institutions with a long and stable 
financial history. In addition, the fact that the vast majority of funding is provided through 
action projects, means that applicants have to have their daily running costs secured 
from other sources, something which non-profit organisations, particularly smaller and 
newer ones, find hard to achieve. This severely hinders the participation of these civil 
society organisations in EU projects, even though they often possess a high level of 
European expertise on the issue at hand. There is also the recurrent complaint, both in 
the consultation of 2011 and in a position paper of 2012 in reaction to the recently 
adopted Horizon 2020 programme, that the EU is very often unresponsive to the input 
mechanisms that it creates for civil society. The women’s platform mentions that 
interaction should be improved for stakeholders to feel that their contributions are 
valued (EPWS 2011; EPWS 2012). 
 
Work programmes of Horizon 2020 
 
Horizon 2020 is the funding framework programme for research and science in the EU 
for the period of 2014 to 2020. Every two years the Commission launches a work 
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programme that includes the specific priorities for the following two years in terms of 
research funding. A public consultation is usually launched to gather input from 
stakeholders and each work programme is debated in the responsible European 
Parliament committee, ITRE. Therefore, the involvement of EPWS in the Horizon 2020 
programme did not stop when the programme framework was adopted; there is a 
constant engagement of the women’s platform with each work programme proposal out 
of fear that gender drops out of the agenda (EPWS A interview; EPWS B interview; 
EPWS C interview). A great amount of effort is thus spent on arguing for the 
maintenance of basic gender equality considerations in Horizon 2020 since they have 
not achieved an obvious and guaranteed place in it. This is very much the feeling 
expressed by members of the Gender Team: the need to constantly try to convince 
colleagues of the importance and relevance of a gender perspective in science and 
research, a work described as almost like ‘lobbying’ (RTD A interview). 
 
One example of EPWS’s monitoring and action on the priorities of the bi-annual work 
programmes was their efforts to pressure the Commission into acknowledging and 
mentioning concrete actions to take on the issue of gender equality in science in the 
work programme 2016-2017. Concretely, the problem was that the Research and 
Innovation part of Horizon 2020, where social science aspects that could be horizontally 
integrated are listed, there was no mention of gender in early versions of the Work 
Programme (EPWS C interview; Tarabella 2015). Here the chosen course of action by 
EPWS was to write to MEPs asking them to pressure the Commission on this. This 
reflects EPWS’s understanding of the European Parliament as the gate into the 
negotiations around Horizon 2020 and its work programmes (EPWS C interview). A few 
MEPs replied positively and Marc Tarabella took the initiative of submitting a formal 
parliamentary question to the European Commission flagging the superficial mention of 
gender in earlier versions of the work programme and asking about their plans for 
inclusion of more research topics focusing closely on gender issues (Tarabella 2015). 
For EPWS this was a significant achievement since parliamentary questions posed by 
MEPs to the Commission have to be given a reply by a high-level politician – in this case, 
by the Commissioner Moedas himself – since they are taken as an accountability 
mechanism of the Commission to the European Parliament. In the end, the work 
programme did contain two sections devoted specifically to projects on gender issues. 
One section was on the ERA-NET Co-Fund, aimed at promoting gender equality in 
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Horizon 2020 and ERA, and the other was on projects to support research institutions to 
implement gender equality plans (EC 2017). 
 
7.2.3. Failed campaigns and unresponsiveness from Commission 
 
One of the goals of EU’s research and science policy in its endeavour to reduce the 
gender imbalance of women in scientific careers is to attract more girls into this type of 
education pathway (EP 2008). This is also one of the recommendations that EPWS 
makes in their position papers and consultation responses (EPWS 2008; EPWS 2011). 
In 2012 the research Commissioner Máire Geoghegan-Quinn launched a campaign 
entitled ‘Science: it’s a girl thing!’ as part of the Commission’s initiative on Women in 
Research and Innovation. The campaign ran from 2012 until 2015 and consisted mostly 
of a website with sections showcasing several female scientists and their work through 
short videos, curiosities and facts about science, information on jobs with a scientific 
nature, and videos displaying inventions made by women. The campaign also included 
the organisation of several events throughout Europe aimed at encouraging girls to 
pursue scientific courses in university and attracting them to scientific careers later on.  
 
However, the campaign started off on a wrong footing and was badly criticised by 
several civil society organisations and female scientists for its stereotypical outlook. The 
event in the European Parliament where the campaign was officially presented and 
launched included the presence of many teenage girls and they were given lipsticks, 
facial creams and other beauty products with the campaign logo, reinforcing the 
stereotype that girls only care about beauty-related products. The very campaign logo 
added to the stereotype that girls only care about things insofar as they are connected 
to make up and beauty, since one of the ‘i’s was a lipstick and the campaign title gave 
off the effect of having been written with a pink lipstick.  
 
The launching video of the campaign was what attracted the heaviest criticism, since it 
depicted girls and their interests in a highly sexist and stereotypical way, sexualising 
women scientists in a lab context. There was a civil society outcry against the campaign 
and several organisations contacted the Commission in a formal way to express their 
anger about the depiction of female scientists and girls in the campaign launching video. 
EPWS sent a letter to the commissioner immediately after the video was released 
expressing its strong disagreement, referring that they were ‘upset by the spirit' of the 
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campaign (EPWS C interview). This was exacerbated by the fact that EPWS knew that 
the Commission was planning an action on this topic and so members of the board had 
offered to help, an offer that was rejected by the Commission. Other gender experts had 
offered their help on ways to attract young people to science, to no avail (EPWS C 
interview). This meant that the backlash came from several organisations and people 
from different backgrounds, which reinforced the idea that the essence of the video was 
wrong, and which led the Commission to quickly react by taking it down from the 
campaign’s website within three days of its launching. There was no response from the 
Commission or public statement on the matter, the reaction was ‘to suppress the reason 
for the complaints’ (EPWS C interview). The ‘Science: it’s a girl thing!’ campaign 
continued its course since attracting girls to science was one of the EU’s goals in the 
issue of women and science. Nonetheless the website layout was modified and its most 
stereotypical features were abandoned, including the pink layout, the lipstick-drawn logo 
and the criticised video. 
 
This episode reflects some interesting dynamics between EU research and science 
decision-making institutions, namely DG Research, and civil society organisations 
involved in the issue of gender equality in science. There are repeated complaints from 
the part of civil society stakeholders, and from the part of members of advisory groups 
on the topic, both in the interviews for this research (EPWS A interview; EPWS C 
interview; HG A interview) and through more formal channels such as public 
consultations on the topic (EPWS 2011; EPWS 2012). These complaints refer to the 
unresponsiveness of the EU that makes it hard for organisations and advisory groups to 
understand whether their input is valued or even listened to at all. The general feeling of 
these organisations is that they are often impotent to influence the Commission’s 
decisions on the priorities on the issue and the course of action to take to achieve them. 
Much like Lut Mergaert and Emanuela Lombardo noted in their study of gender 
mainstreaming in DG research, ‘gender-expert voices were not allowed to influence the 
policy process’ (Mergaert & Lombardo 2017, p. 116) and EPWS’s expertise on the topic 
of attracting girls into science was rejected when offered (EPWS C interview). In this 
context, very well illustrated by the ‘Science: it’s a girl thing!’ debacle, the only option left 




7.3. EPWS and gender mainstreaming: organisational and 
discourse adaptation 
 
7.3.1. Organisational adaptation 
 
The European Platform of Women Scientists is an interesting organisation to categorise. 
It was created by instigation of the European Commission to represent the voices of 
women scientists in Europe to the EU institutions (EC 1999; EC 2003a). In this sense 
the platform was created with the purpose of lobbying at heart, and getting its voice 
heard in the form of position papers, consultation responses, recommendations and the 
organisation of conferences on the topic is still a core occupation and one of the raisons 
d’être of the organisation. But apart from its advocacy work, the platform is also an 
important site of networking, functioning in some ways as a professional order to 
forward the status of women scientists and to connect women working in scientific and 
research careers who share a particular concern of improving gender balance in 
science (Antonucci 2014). At the same time, its heavy focus not only on achieving 
greater numbers of female scientists and improving the career prospects of women 
working in science, but also on the gender dimension of research content, means that 
the organisation also has characteristics of a public interest group, since one of its main 
goals is to ensure that research and scientific innovation takes into account the needs 
and interests of women as well as men. Its concern is not restricted to female 
researchers but focuses also on the responsiveness of science to society and aiming to 
spread the benefits of science and research to all citizens, a defining characteristic of a 
public interest group. 
 
The organisational development of EPWS has been closely linked to the EU institutions 
since its very start. The women’s platform was born in response to a call from the 
Commission whose goal was to create a one-stop shop transnational organisation 
capable of providing expertise and representative input on the topic of gender balance 
in science (EC 2003a). Representativeness was a strong preoccupation from the 
beginning and so the women’s platform took the form of a European umbrella of existing 
national organisations that worked on the topic (EPWS A interview). This is in line with 
both the EC's objectives laid out in the 2001 Action Plan in Science and Society and 
with its overall aim of including civil society voices in the policymaking process in general 
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(Antonucci 2014, p. 92). The European Commission, therefore, had an interest in the 
existence of the organisation and, for the first phase of its existence, was its main 
funder. At this stage, between 2006 and 2009, EPWS worked closely with the EU 
institutions from its office in Brussels, presenting its positions and recommendations on 
the topic of women and science through meetings with policymakers, organisation of 
conferences on the issue, liaison with other civil society organisations, and through 
responses to formal public consultations (EPWS A interview; EPWS B interview). The 
close cooperation of this time was clearly illustrated by the EP resolution on women and 
science adopted in May 2008 (EP 2008), which mirrored very closely EPWS’s best 
practice collection on attracting and retaining women to scientific careers (EPWS 2008), 
which was drafted at the request of a FEMM committee member, Britta Thomsen MEP 
(EPWS A interview; EPWS B interview).       
 
However, the women platform was not able to secure the percentage of funding from 
other sources required by EU co-funding rules, which meant that EPWS could not apply 
for EU funding programmes anymore. The organisation became voluntary-based, had to 
forgo its working office in Brussels and had to significantly scale back its activities 
(EPWS A interview; EPWS B interview). Establishing and maintaining contacts and 
working relationships with other stakeholders in Brussels and with the EU institutions is 
now significantly harder, as is keeping up with policy developments and responding to 
them. This was due to the double hurdle of no longer being based in Brussels and no 
longer having full-time dedicated staff for this work (EPWS A interview; EPWS B 
interview). The EU co-funding rules have been criticised by EPWS multiple times (EPWS 
2011; EPWS 2012) as disadvantaging recently-established non-profit organisations that, 
although possessing important representative expertise on the topics the EU legislates 
on, are unable to contribute to the policymaking discussion and to projects and 
campaigns funded by the EU often due to their inability to secure private-sourced 
funding (EPWS 2011; EPWS 2012). The nonchalance of the EU to these NGO struggles, 
and in particular to the survival struggle of an organisation whose origin was fomented 
by the Commission in the first place, raises doubts about the seriousness of the EU’s 
commitment to the inclusion of civil society voices in its policymaking process.     
 




EPWS’s characteristics as a professional order, namely its representation of women 
scientists’ voices, concerns and interests in Europe, make it clear that one of its strong 
preoccupations is with improving the status, career opportunities and visibility of women 
working in science and research. This was indeed one of the reasons for the 
Commission to assign funding for the creation of such an organisation:  
 
to establish the European Platform of Women Scientists as a structural link between 
women scientists and policymakers … in order to - represent with democratic legitimacy 
and transparent decision-making structures the concerns, needs, aspirations and 
interests of European women scientists in dialogue with national, European and 
international institutions and … to make them better understand the role they can play in 
the policy debate. (EC 2003a, p. 1) 
 
In this sense, one of the strongest goals of the platform is to work for the achievement of 
gender balance in research and scientific institutions in terms of women and men 
scientists, decision-makers, project evaluators and supporting staff. Representation is 
therefore a key concern of the women platform, as it is to the EU institutions working on 
the issue of women and science. However, EPWS justifies the importance of increasing 
the number of women in science and research careers not quite in the same way as the 
EU. As it was detailed in Chapter 5, the dominant frame that the European Commission 
uses to justify the need to attract and retain women in science is the ‘waste of 
resources’ frame in a context where EU research and science policy is geared towards 
improving the competitiveness of the European economy (Abels 2012; Cavaghan 
2012). Increasing the number of women scientists is thus a necessary precondition to 
reach the estimated number of researchers and scientists necessary to achieve the 
economic growth goals that the EU established for itself. The discourse of EPWS, 
although congruent with the ‘waste of resources’ frame, is essentially different. EPWS 
does suggest that maximising the contribution of women to science is paramount to 
improving European research, but, for the women’s platform, the goal is not and should 
not be economic growth for its sake. Indeed, EPWS is quite critical of the dominance of 
economic growth in the EU’s priorities beyond 2010, and urges the Union to consider 
the importance of innovative science in informing policymaking decisions, achieving 
sustainable development, and transforming Europe into a knowledge-based economy as 




Perhaps more significantly, the women’s platform heavily highlights the contribution for 
science creativity and innovation that more women bring, and a potential for broadening 
science’s responsiveness to the problems and interests of all citizens, women and men. 
This is why EPWS repeatedly refers to the importance of the gender dimension of the 
content of research: so as to make sure that science addresses the interests and 
concerns of men and women equally (EPWS 2011; EPWS 2012). Additionally, the 
organisation is highly critical of institutions within scientific culture such as the concept 
of excellence and the recruitment process as gender-biased since they do not take into 
consideration the different career trajectories that women often take due to caring 
responsibilities (EPWS 2008; EPWS 2010; EPWS 2011). Increasing the number of 
women in science careers is to increase gender diversity and consequently the creativity 
and the innovative nature of the science produced. It is also a matter of non-
discrimination, ensuring that career opportunities for women exist and that they have a 
fair chance of progressing. The contribution of this to economic growth can sometimes 
be inferred although it is never the ultimate goal in EPWS’s discourse on the topic 
(EPWS 2010). In sum, the ‘waste of resources’ frame is sometimes implicit but not 
instrumental to economic growth, as recurrently happens in the EU’s own discourse.     
 
EPWS has repeatedly mentioned that the cross-disciplinary nature of the topic of women 
and science is a challenge when it comes to liaising with politicians and policymakers 
due to their often partial expertise or interest on the issue (EPWS A interview; EPWS B 
interview). This is understood as a difficulty, rather than an opportunity to get more 
potential allies and venues to liaise with. Venue shopping is done mostly between EU 
institutions: from Commission to Parliament, but not so much across fields. This is in 
great measure due to the current circumstances of the organisation, voluntary and 
without a working office in Brussels, which hinder its flexibility and quickness of response 
to policy developments. The European Parliament is generally seen as more amenable 
to EPWS’s demands – and, in fact, both tangible advocacy successes explored in the 
previous section relate to the action of MEPs. However, this amenability is very 
dependent on the gender-awareness of an MEP – and their assistants – and therefore 
the personal agendas of each politician (EPWS C interview). The Gender Team at DG 
Research is also the venue with which the EPWS has the closest connection, in part due 
to its origins and evidently due to the remit of their work.  
 




The current status of the organisation, voluntary-based and without a working office in 
Brussels, is a challenge for EPWS’s ability to regularly and promptly engage with EU 
policy developments on gender equality in science (EPWS A interview; EPWS B 
interview). Meetings with policymakers and other civil society stakeholders are much 
more difficult to arrange as they now involve long-distance travelling and therefore more 
time and costs than before. Presence at conferences and workshops is now also costlier 
and thus rarer. Its capacity to shape the debate is therefore significantly limited due to 
the circumstances of the women platform. But opportunities to do so are also limited on 
the part of the EU institutions. It is true that EPWS has had some successes when it 
comes to shaping the way the EU institutions justify the problem of gender imbalance in 
research careers and the solutions proposed. The EP resolution, to which the expertise 
of the women’s platform was actively and enthusiastically sought by the rapporteur, is 
the most relevant example (EP 2008). The 2014 parliamentary question of Marc 
Tarabella MEP on the Commission’s plans to incorporate gender in the 2016-17 work 
programme of Horizon 2020 was also a successful pressure to DG Research on the 
issue and contributed to make sure that gender did not slip off the EU research agenda 
for a couple more years. EPWS members are nonetheless careful to see these 
successes as illustrative of their own influence on the EU discourse, suggesting that 
EPWS merely articulated what was on many people’s minds at the time on this issue 
(EPWS A interview). The distinction between having their voice heard and having 
influence is therefore important, but a difficult one to make.  
 
Notwithstanding the EPWS’s few successes in getting its voice heard with tangible 
consequences, there were also instances where the EU institutions, most notably the 
Commission, were significantly inattentive to civil society and even national 
representative’s expertise. The ‘Science: it’s a girl thing!’ launching fiasco was such an 
example of a campaign designed without taking into account recommendations from 
experts on the field. This also illustrated that, since there are limited opportunities to 
shape things as they are being thought of and prepared, often the only possible course 
of action is to react when things are already done. In the case of this campaign, the 
barrage of negative reactions from female scientists, gender experts and civil society 
stakeholders from diverse backgrounds led to the embarrassing backtrack on several 




For the most part, opportunities to change the terms of the debate or to even shape 
them are restricted to public consultations launched by the Commission. But these have 
often been criticised in general as seeking too restrictive replies on very specific topics, 
hindering the ability of stakeholders to introduce new priorities to the Commission’s 
agenda (see for example WECF 2016a). EPWS has also complained about the lack of 
responsiveness on the part of the Commission to the input received by stakeholders that 
leaves contributors unaware of whether their expertise was valued or even taken into 
consideration by the relevant DG when proposing a new policy activity (EPWS 2011; 
EPWS 2012). These concerns mirror the sentiment of members of advisory groups, 
such as the Helsinki Group, that often feel that the Commission is unresponsive to their 
recommendations and input (HG A interview), as was the case when the Helsinki 
Group’s criticism of plans to shrink gender equality activities in FP7 was ignored, as 
were recommendations not to drop Gender Action Plans in FP7 (Mergaert & Lombardo 
2017), and the Helsinki Group’s participation in the design of the ‘Science: it’s a girl 
thing!’ campaign (HG A interview).      
 
Table 10 is a synthesis of some of the processes of adaptation that EPWS undertook in 
research and science policy. Instances of proactivism were very much absent or 
unsuccessful in this case study, which is in part a reflection of the reduced resources of 





 Processes of adaptation Processes of proactivism 
Discourse 
(Framing) 
Using the frame of waste of resources to 
justify EU action to attract more women 
into science and research careers, while 
criticising its narrowing down to the goal of 





Switching between FEMM and ITRE MEPs 
to try to find the ones whose 
expertise/interests bridges the fields of 
science and women’s interests. 
Linking up with feminist allies MEPs 
in FEMM at the Parliament to put 
pressure on the Commission to 
mainstream gender into work 




Trying to find private sponsors to be able 
to fulfil the co-funding rule of EU funding 
application (unsuccessfully). 
Criticising formally the co-funding 
rule of 80-20% to apply for EU 
funding programmes to influence 
Commission into changing it 
(unsuccessfully). 
 






Although EPWS was the product of a Commission initiative, the continued support that 
the organisation received was lacklustre and it resulted in the women’s platform losing 
its Brussels-based secretariat and its full-time employed staff. These circumstances 
severely hindered the ability of the organisation to interact with EU policymakers, 
monitor the process and produce responses with the speed that is required for it to 
exercise greater influence. Nevertheless, a few successful instances of advocacy were 
analysed, both in relation to the European Parliament and the FEMM committee 
specifically. The Gender Team in DG Research is identified by the group as their closest 
contact within the EU institutions, although the often powerlessness of the unit within DG 
Research means that, although access is easy for EPWS, influence is another level of 
engagement that is significantly harder to achieve. Even in a DG that is considered one 
of the good ones when it comes to gender mainstreaming, gender equality is a goal that 
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constantly must be argued for and care taken by its advocates, both within the Gender 
Equality unit and in EPWS, for it not to fall off the agenda.  
 
Opportunities and resistance in research and science policy 
 
 
 Opportunities Resistance/obstacles 
Structural Complex policymaking process, 
with multiple points of access and 
opportunities to influence 
institutions with different 
preferences. 
 
Commission’s penchant for setting 
up European groups representing 
public interests to further its own 
competences. 
Limited EU competence on science and 
research matters (mostly ‘soft’ 
measures at EU level). 
 
Economic growth and competitiveness 
master frames in EU discourse, 




commitments to women and 
science, giving discursive backing 
to efforts from gender advocates to 
increasing presence of women in 
research and science careers and 
projects.  
Unresponsiveness to gender experts 
and reported reluctance in actively 
consulting them. 
 
Gender equality in research and 
science still a niche goal that has to be 
argued for time and again by Gender 
Team to main echelons of DG 
Research. 
Individual Commissioner Carlos Moedas’s 
interest in increasing number and 
quality of financed projects that 
mainstream gender.  
n/a15 
 
Table 11. Multi-tiered approach to opportunities and obstacles to gender change and gender equality 
advocacy in EU research and science policy 
 
 
Science and research is one of the policy fields that pioneered gender mainstreaming in 
the EU. There is thus a significant number of rhetorical commitments to improving 
gender equality in the scientific field that provide a relative welcoming environment to 
gender advocates, since formal rules to act on this are in place. Institutional 
opportunities exist for mainstreaming gender into science and research policy, including 
space for senior policymakers to further this topic according to their own political 
                                                      
15 But reported in previous research: see Lut & Mergaert 2017 
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preferences, as was the case with Commissioner Carlos Moedas and the guidelines on 
gender mainstreaming for evaluators of research projects. The Commission’s general 
attempts to prompt the formation of European organisations representing public 
interests, illustrated here with the creation of the European Platform of Women Scientists 
in the first place, is also a significant opportunity for the engagement of gender equality 
advocates in the policymaking process.  
 
These opportunities, however, appear to be offset by significant resistances. 
Notwithstanding the Commission’s initial drive to set up EPWS, space for civil society is 
often limited to reactive interventions or public consultations, with no proper 
engagement from the part of the European Commission with external stakeholders 
advocating for women’s rights. The critiques of EPWS and Helsinki Group members on 
the unresponsiveness of the Commission to expert voices, coupled with the need to 
constantly justify the importance of taking into account women’s voices, presence and 
interests in research and science, means that the goal of gender equality in this policy 
field is far from being a given in practice. This is compounded by the narrowing of the 
issue of women and science to one of presence, and the efforts to garner more women 
into scientific careers a means to achieve the higher goals of economic competitiveness 
and growth. Significant also is the fact that EU actions on science and research are 
considerably redistributive, through the allocation of significant funds to projects for 
research institutions based in the member states, but also soft in legal terms when it 
comes to incorporating gender considerations into the projects it funds. 
 
What kind of gender mainstreaming approach? 
 
The initiative of the Commission to launch a call to civil society in 2003 for the creation 
of a formal network of women scientists funded by the EU was a strong signal of its 
serious intention to engage with experts on women and science. Advisory structures 
around the issue exist, including the Helsinki Group, formed by national representatives 
appointed by member states to counsel the Commission on the subject of women and 
science. Public consultations are launched every time a new six-year funding cycle is 
approaching and before establishing the research priorities for each bi-annual period 
within the broader funding cycles. However, the policy case studies analysed in this 
chapter, chosen for the relative salience and success of EPWS’s engagement, paint a 
somewhat different picture. The formal mechanisms for consultation and participation 
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exist but their feeding into the policymaking process is limited. By its own initiative, the 
Commission does not always actively consult with external stakeholders or the experts 
from the channels it helped to set up. This was extraordinarily clear in the ‘Science: it’s a 
girl thing!’ video debacle. The Commission’s approach to gender mainstreaming in 
research and science policy thus resembles much more a top-down process, the 
expert-bureaucratic approach to gender mainstreaming. In the European Parliament, 
and particularly in relation to members of the FEMM committee, is where we find a 
closer cooperation between policymakers – in this case, MEPs – and external experts, 
as was most prominent with the FEMM report of 2008 on women and science and 
consequent EP resolution on the topic.     
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CHAPTER 8. WOMEN IN EUROPE FOR A COMMON 
FUTURE (WECF) 
 
8.1. Organisational context 
 
The first section of this chapter highlights the characteristics of Women in Europe for a 
Common Future (WECF), a transnational organisation advocating for women’s rights 
and gender equality in the field of environment, that are conducive to its capacity to 
engage with the EU institutions – in other words, characteristics that determine WECF’s 
ability to take up political opportunities presented by the EU. 
 
8.1.1. History and goals 
 
WECF is an umbrella organisation established officially in 1994 in the Netherlands. Its 
main goal is to work towards sustainable development by ‘taking the different needs and 
perspectives of women and men into account’ (WECF 2015d) Gender equality is the 
grand vision of the organisation, being simultaneously an end in itself and a means to 
achieve a ‘healthy environment, and a just and sustainable world’ (Ibid.).  
 
As the name indicates, Women in Europe for a Common Future has a specific focus on 
women’s interests (‘women’s priorities’ [WECF 2015d]) and on bringing the voice of 
women to the decision table on issues of climate change, aid and sustainable 
development. Indeed, the organisation came from an initiative of women from the wider 
European region that participated in the UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. 
These women saw the catalysing effect that their cooperation had had on policies to 
achieve sustainable development around the world and recognised that women’s voices 
were important in achieving change locally. They aimed to formalise this cooperation 
into an established institution. WECF was thus registered officially as a foundation in the 
Netherlands in 1994 with the double purpose of advocating for political change and 
implementing local development projects. 
 
There is a recognition that women are still underrepresented at the environmental policy 
table and that this denotes both a waste of potential talent, since women can work as 
‘agents of change’ in their local areas and as such are crucial actors in the 
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implementation of development projects, and also a loss of representation of diverse 
interests. Women are identified in the WECF’s website as often having different interests 
in development from men, a consequence of gender inequality, the distinct roles and 
tasks attributed to women and men, and the discrimination that women still face in many 
countries around the world (WECF 2015b). This means that women’s priorities are often 
in health issues and issues related to ‘sustainable livelihoods’ (WECF 2015b). Moreover, 
women are disproportionately affected by poverty and by the effects of environmental 
degradation. It could thus be argued that they have a special stake in participating in 
policy decisions aiming to mitigate climate change or to adapt to it. Therefore, although 
WECF mentions the need of involving everyone in the environmental policymaking 
process with the global aim of having ‘all women, men and children live in dignity, and 
share responsibilities for a healthy environment and a just and sustainable world’ (WECF 
2015d), the goal of involving women’s organisations in this process is highlighted as 
particularly important due to both their underrepresentation and their potential for 
change. The nature of WECF’s work means that the organisation focuses on 
disadvantaged women across the globe and therefore, although WECF is not explicit on 
this, there is an intersectional approach to the work of this women’s group.  
 
8.1.2. Membership and functioning 
 
WECF’s work is coordinated at present by three offices based in Europe: one in Utrecht, 
the Netherlands; other in Munich, Germany; and the other in Annemasse, France. Two 
country-specific offices are also present in Georgia and Switzerland. The formal 
headquarters of the organisation is in the Netherlands and it is this office that manages 
the projects, the networking and the finances of WECF. The organisation is led by an 
international board of trustees composed by three to seven members and which has the 
responsibility of overseeing the strategy and the financial management of WECF. Along 
with this leading body, there is an international advisory board that advises the 
organisation on the issues affecting the regions and the member organisations. The 
international advisory board is the body that represents the member organisations of 
WECF and, as its name indicates, has an advisory responsibility on the organisation’s 
work strategy and priorities. Executing the strategy defined by these two boards is the 
staff working at the three WECF offices. The roughly 40 part-time staff (WECF 2015c) 




WECF’s focus has traditionally been on the wider European region (including Western 
and Eastern Europe but also the Caucasus and Central Asia). Since 2010, however, the 
organisation has added an international division that extended its project implementation 
and membership base to other continents: the Women International for a Common 
Future (WICF). This extension meant that WECF saw its member organisations increase 
to 150 in 50 countries worldwide, and that it participated in the implementation of 
projects in Africa, Asia and Latin America, in addition to Europe.  
 
The website of the organisation lists three areas as the main activities that WECF 
engages in: capacity building, policy advocacy, and outreach campaigns. In the field of 
capacity building, WECF helps to assess and monitor the capacity of partner and 
member organisations, providing training as needed. It also works closely with local 
women’s organisations to help them develop sustainable solutions based on their own 
priorities. In the area of policy advocacy, the goal is to strengthen women’s 
organisations’ capacity to have a voice in national policies and plans, as well as 
participating in the global women’s movement to ensure that its advocacy has an impact 
internationally. Finally, in what concerns outreach campaigns, the goal of WECF is to 
raise the awareness of the public and policymakers on issues of sustainable 
development and women’s participation in the environmental decision-making process 
in order to ‘help create an enabling environment’ (WECF 2015a). The thematic areas in 
which WECF specialises are indicated as: ‘gender equality in sustainable development 
policies’ (including the fulfilment of the Sustainable Development Goals post-2015), 
‘creating sustainable and safe circular economies’ (with an emphasis on food, water and 
energy), and on ‘equitable mitigation strategies and plans’ (that include an attention to 
women’s health impacts from chemicals and women’s priorities for sanitation and 
menstrual hygiene) (Ibid.). 
 
Due to its focus on the implementation of development projects in tandem with local 
organisations, WECF makes a clear distinction between members and partners, the 
former being civil society organisations whose membership to WECF was approved by 
the international advisory board, and the latter being the local organisations that work 
with WECF on the field to implement specific projects.  
 
What we can conclude from WECF’s activities is that this organisation is not geared 
exclusively towards lobbying and advocacy work but can also be described as a 
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service-provider to local women and environmental organisations, by assisting with 
project-implementation, training and capacity assessment. WECF also participates in 
international networks of environmental policy that are gender-aware, such as the 
Women and Gender Constituency in the Climate negotiations of UNFCCC,16 and on the 
Women’s Major Group of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 
(UNCSD) (WECF 2014). Its focus is thus wider than a strictly European one. 
 
8.1.3. Involvement in EU policymaking process 
 
Like all organisations in this research, the WECF is partly funded by the European Union. 
The overall budget of WECF for all its offices and international operations has been 
between two and three million euro annually for the most part of the last decade. The 
proportion of EU funding has oscillated between a lowest of 13% of all financing of 
WECF in 2010 to a highest of 37% in 2011.17 The expectation is to keep EU’s proportion 
of funding at roughly 20% in the coming 2016-2020 period. EU funding comes in two 
forms: operating grants (financial resources for general costs of organisation 
subsistence, such as office rent, staff salaries, equipment, etc.) and action grants 
(money for specific projects to be implemented for a certain amount of time). The money 
for the action grants came from the application of WECF to general calls for actions 
published by DG Environment and DG DEVCO. These include several projects financed 
by the Life+ Programme of the European Commission, DG Environment.18 There were 
also projects funded by DG Development (e.g. Building local capacity for domestic solar 
heating, hot water and insulation for rural and remote areas in the EEC region [2011-
2015]) which reflect the WECF’s operation in non-EU member countries as well.19 The 
annual operating grants were granted by the LIFE+ project of DG ENV, which has 
roughly  EUR 9 million to award annually to non-governmental climate or environmental 
organisations in Europe. 
 
One key area of interaction of WECF with the EU institutions is thus application, 
management and reporting of funded projects. Demands for co-financing of EU project 
                                                      
16 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
17 Calculated through Sources of Funding WECF 2010-2015 p. 59 in WECF 2015e. 
18 Baltic Info Campaign on Hazardous Substances (2011-2015); ChildProtect-Life project (on protecting 
children's health from endocrine disrupting chemicals) (2014-2016); Reducing exposure to EDCs especially 
pregnant women and children (2014-2015) 
19 Please see WECF 2015a for a full list of on-going and past projects that WECF coordinated or in which it 
was a partner. 
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funding applications (i.e. the funded organisation having to cover part of the cost, 
usually 15%-20% of the total) are a source of concern for WECF. This is something that 
features in WECF’s Strategic Planning 2016-2020 as something to be thought about 
strategically, since it means that funds have to be secured from other sources, namely 
private entities. This is described and analysed in more detail in the following sections of 
this chapter, with illustrative and concrete examples.  
 
Although the focus of this research is the interaction of women’s organisations with the 
European Union institutions, it bears mentioning that the EU is but one of political 
institutions that WECF works with. The UN is frequently mentioned as a strategic 
partner, a forum to share knowledge and expertise in the field of gender and 
environment, and an international organisation to lobby (WECF A interview). It is also a 
source of funding, albeit proportionally much smaller than the EU. ‘Governments’ 
represent the largest category of funding for WECF (WECF 2015e), with the Dutch and 
German governments two of the largest contributors.  
 
There are no staff exclusively responsible to interact with and monitor the EU 
institutions. Each department keeps up to date with policy developments and news in 
their area of specific expertise and that includes monitoring the EU. There is also a 
gender coordinator in the organisation whose responsibilities include monitoring specific 
EU developments on gender equality, such as Gender Plans. Beyond application and 
reporting of co-funded projects, interaction with the European institutions takes the form 
of meetings with heads of units at the Commission, roundtables with MEPs, policy 
recommendations, and participation in public consultations launched by the 
Commission (WECF A interview). WECF is also part of the European Environmental 
Bureau, so they participate in its lobbying activities, such as drafting advocacy letters. 
 
One thing specifically mentioned in interviews as being an obstacle in maintaining a 
frequent and strong relationship with the EU institutions was not being based in Brussels 
(WECF A interview; WECF B interview; WECF C interview). Not being physically present 
in Brussels makes it more difficult to meet with EU civil servants and politicians, and also 
to organise events on expert topics for networking and debate, since WECF staff have to 




Interestingly, the UN is seen as a much more approachable partner than the EU, with 
WECF staff suggesting that the interaction with the former is made on a much more 
‘equal footing’ (WECF A interview). WECF’s interaction with national governments is 
seen as similar to the one with the EU in terms of approachability: it is relatively easy to 
get meetings with staff (i.e. access) but there is not much capacity to get its concerns 
taken seriously and they are limited in what they can do (i.e. influence) (WECF A 
interview).  
 
8.2. Advocating for sustainable development that promotes 
gender equality 
 
In contrast to WAVE and EPWS, the field of action of WECF spans several policy fields in 
which the EU has competence. The women’s group interacts with several DGs in the 
European Commission, including DG ENV, DG DEVCO, DG for Health and Food Safety 
(DG SANTE) and DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR). 
The following policy analysis will focus mostly on DG ENV and DG DEVCO, two 
institutional venues on opposing sides of the gender-awareness scale, although the 
other two will be briefly mentioned. Three cases of WECF engagement with the EU 
institutions will be analysed in detail: one on endocrine disrupting chemicals, a second 
on a DG DEVCO-funded project, and finally an attempt of instituting gender 
mainstreaming in the European Parliament’s environmental policymaking. These were 
chosen as cases where gender was a dimension considered and where WECF 
contributed to the policymaking process. 
 
8.2.1. WECF and chemicals: a policy exception 
  
One of the areas where WECF engages with the EU more systematically is chemicals 
policy. This is an issue within the broader environmental policy where differentiated 
impacts on women and men are largely acknowledged, if not always addressed in 
legislative terms. Chemicals span a very wide range of substances and products that 
are present in virtually all aspects of individuals’ lives, from their food to their hygiene, 
from their home to their work environment, from the clothes they wear to the hobbies 
they pursue and the modes of transport they use. There are several pieces of European 
legislation that deal with specific types of chemicals, including pharmaceuticals, toys, 




The REACH regulation is the most comprehensive and important piece of legislation in 
the field of chemicals since it sets up an EU-wide system of registration, evaluation, 
authorisation and restriction of chemicals (forming the acronym REACH) encompassing 
hundreds of thousands of substances traded in the European Union. Endocrine 
disrupting chemicals, a specific group of substances that affect the hormonal system of 
humans, is also a salient topic in the field of chemicals in the EU. Here greater attention 
is given to the particularities of female physiology due to its importance in reproduction, 
and to the hormonal differences of women and men and consequently the disparate 
impacts of endocrine disrupting chemicals in individuals of each sex. In the past decade 
WECF has engaged at different moments and in a myriad of ways with these policy 
topics – REACH regulation and endocrine disrupting chemicals – at the EU and national 
levels. We now take a closer look at the policy action on each of these topics, the 
frames used by the EU to discuss these issues, and WECF’s own work and advocacy 
efforts.     
 
WECF's advocacy on the REACH regulation 
 
The REACH regulation was proposed in 2003 by the European Commission with the 
intention of creating a centralised and EU-wide system to regulate chemical substances 
traded within the European Union, evaluate the ones considered to have potential 
hazardous effects for human health, and restrict the use of the ones that pose a threat 
to humans and to the environment. Indeed, one of the frames used to justify action at 
the EU level was the protection of human health and of the environment (EC 2003d). 
The then-existing system of chemical registration and evaluation, one in which member 
states were responsible for conducting the necessary tests to assess the safety of 
chemical substances, was deemed too time- and resource-consuming, ineffective, and 
bureaucratic. So the new REACH regulation was framed also as a way of improving the 
cohesion of the EU internal market, by creating an EU-wide and unique database of 
chemical properties and use instructions for all chemical substances traded within the 
EU, and also as a way of improving competitiveness of the chemical industry by 
ensuring that the registration and evaluation process ran much more smoothly (EC 
2003d). Therefore, we find three main frames that underpin the reason for action and 
the EU’s aims for legislating in this field: protection of human health, protection of the 
environment, and enhancement of economic competitiveness. Interestingly, although 
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the protection of human health and the environment are referred to throughout the 
recital of the regulation, only the competitiveness frame is translated into a legal basis 
for the regulation through reference to article 95 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (TEC), which is about the harmonisation of laws with the objective of 
improving the internal market (EC 2003d, p. 1; EP and Council 2006, p. 1). This was 
something that the FEMM committee unsuccessfully proposed to alter, adding reference 
to article 175 TEC, a provision specifically on EU goals for environmental policy, as a 
legal basis for the REACH regulation (FEMM 2005). 
 
The REACH regulation is a complex, extensive and detailed piece of legislation that took 
over three years to negotiate. It shifts the onus of proof to industry, meaning that now it 
is the responsibility of manufacturers and traders to prove that the substances they use 
are safe and to identify and manage the risks of the manufactured and marketed 
substances. One of the core issues during negotiations was therefore the costs that this 
new regulation would entail to companies (ENV B interview), since chemicals are 
omnipresent in the industrial sector and in countless other downstream businesses. The 
goal was to strike a fair balance between economic burden and human health and 
environmental protection. This concern was something already reflected in the extended 
impact assessment conducted by the Commission prior to proposing the legislation, 
which includes a very large and detailed section assessing the economic contribution of 
the chemical industry (e.g. in terms of percentage of GDP generated, employment rate, 
levels of production), and of the costs that REACH is estimated to have on it (EC 
2003b). In contrast, the section assessing the health and environmental impacts is 
much smaller, reflecting at least partially a lack of information and scientific knowledge 
on the impact of chemicals on health that the new legislation itself was supposed to fill 
(Ibid.). Another concern was reducing the number of chemical tests on animals, 
something accomplished to an extent by allowing companies to share test results and 
avoid duplication of registrations. 
 
When it comes to gender considerations, REACH's legislation itself does not address 
differences of chemical impact to women and men save for a few exceptions. The 
adopted text includes some references to vulnerable groups that may be more affected 
by chemicals than the deemed safe dose, and pregnant women and children are 
explicitly included as such groups. The FEMM committee made a contribution for this 
recognition, since the reference to pregnant women and children as vulnerable groups 
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was something that appeared repeatedly in the amendments tabled by this committee 
to the original Commission’s proposal and was later included in the final legislative text 
(FEMM 2005). From FEMM there was a general recognition that chemicals affect 
women differently due to their different physiology (i.e. more fat tissue and more 
hormonal changes throughout life with pregnancies and menopause, but also 
recognition that certain chemicals lead to a decrease of male fertility) (Ibid.). Children 
are also declared as more susceptible to chemicals in lower quantities, whose exposure 
from an early age may restrict their development (Ibid.). For FEMM, therefore, the main 
frame underlying the reason for action is solely the protection of human health and of the 
environment, something reflected, for instance, in their insistence that article 175 TEC 
on EU environmental policy be added as a legal basis for the directive (Ibid.). Although 
the regulation does not explicitly reflect preoccupation with differentiated impacts of 
chemicals on women and men and how this should be remedied, it is important to note 
that the guidance for the testing of chemical substances, which was developed later on, 
has some references that sex differences should be considered, in the design of the 
tests and the consideration of results (for instance, testing of chemicals should include 
animals of both sexes) (ENV B interview). 
 
WECF participated in the negotiations for the REACH regulation mostly as a member of 
an alliance of diverse NGOs working in environmental affairs, consumer rights and 
human rights (Long & Lörinczi 2009; WECF B interview). The goal of WECF and its 
unique contribution was to highlight the women’s perspective when it came to 
chemicals, based both on their biology (e.g. lower tolerance to chemicals, and different 
impacts from certain substances, particularly endocrine disruptors) and on their social 
roles (e.g. segregated labour market and different patterns of time use mean women 
and men are exposed to different chemicals in different environments). This was often 
not an easy task since most NGOs with a stake in chemical policy were not used to 
working with a gendered perspective. On the other hand, feminist advocates from 
general women’s groups and feminist policymakers did not always possess the technical 
expertise to understand the synergies between chemical policy and gender equality 
(WECF B interview). Despite these obstacles, chemical policy in general is seen as a 
much easier subfield to mainstream gender into due to the direct biological implications 
not easily discerned in other environmental subfields such as climate change (WECF B 
interview). Working within an alliance of NGOs was also seen as crucial to getting their 
voice heard in a negotiation process that was heavily populated by powerful industry 
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(WECF B interview; ENV B interview). This cooperative work is still credited as the only 
way to maintain the level of human health and environmental protection established by 
REACH that industry is constantly fighting to water down (WECF B interview). WECF is 
an accredited stakeholder with ECHA, the European Chemical Agency, which manages 
the new applications for chemical substances regulation, and therefore has a place at 
the decision-making table where chemicals are regulated, along with other relevant 
NGOs. 
 
WECF's work on endocrine disruptors 
 
Endocrine disruptors are a specific type of chemicals that have a negative impact on the 
hormonal system of humans. They existed as a concept at the time of the REACH 
negotiations and were considered an important type of substance to take into account 
but endocrine disruptors were seen as too complex to include in an already complex 
piece of regulation such as REACH (ENV B interview). It was also considered that 
endocrine disruptors were not explored enough scientifically for policymakers to be able 
to act, and there was still a need to formulate criteria to assess and classify these 
particular substances that impacted on human hormonal health (ENV B interview). 
Since then the EU has adopted legislation on pesticides and biocides (EP and Council 
2009; EP and Council 2012b) that includes provisions to gradually phase out endocrine 
disrupting chemicals present in these two types of products.  
 
The grand issue still being discussed and negotiated is the criteria for specifying what 
properties a chemical must have to be considered an endocrine disruptor. This is an on-
going discussion since the EU started regulating EDCs with the pesticides and biocides 
regulations, but it was exacerbated when several member states sued the European 
Commission at the European Court of Justice for failing to come up with legislation 
establishing criteria to identify endocrine disruptors by the date required in the 
pesticides and biocides regulations. The urgent need to come up with criteria to classify 
EDCs after the European Court of Justice sanctioned the Commission means that EDCs 
have become a more salient topic on the political agenda in recent years (ENV B 
interview). In June 2016 the Commission finally released a legislative proposal 
establishing the criteria to identify endocrine disrupting properties in substances, after a 




WECF was one of such stakeholders to take part in the European Commission’s 
consultations to define the criteria to identify endocrine disruptors. WECF’s work on this 
type of chemicals goes back twenty years, a period during which the organisation has 
worked hard to promote public and policymakers’ awareness of the potential hazardous 
effects of these particular substances. The work was originally done individually on 
chemicals that were known or suspected to alter the hormonal system, such as 
phthalates, bisphenol-A or parabens. However, more recently, and as a reflection of the 
increasing salience of EDCs on the EU environmental political agenda, DG Environment 
started to provide funding streams for specific projects on endocrine disrupting 
chemicals, treating these substances as a group. WECF therefore started working on 
endocrine disruptors as a group as well, to match the EU’s categorisation and regulation 
of this environmental policy issue. This shift in focus from single chemical substances to 
treating endocrine disruptors as a group was identified in interviews with WECF staff as 
a significant change in WECF’s modus operandi on this topic (WECF B interview). It 
simplified the advocacy work on this topic towards the EU institutions and the 
application to EU funding streams for projects on the issue of raising public awareness 
on substances with hormonal disrupting properties.  
 
Recently, WECF was successful in three applications for EU-funded projects on 
endocrine disrupting chemicals: the Reduce exposure to EDCs and advocating for 
better legislation project (2014-2015), the BaltInfoHaz project (2011-2015) and the 
ChildProtect-Life project (2014-2016). All of them had a two-pronged strategy of raising 
public awareness on the exposure to EDCs and of informing policymakers of the harmful 
effects of these substances. The aim of raising public awareness was to inform 
consumers of the risks posed by certain substances present in everyday products such 
as cosmetics, toys, and plastic products in order to contribute to changes in consuming 
patterns and influence businesses to voluntarily substitute hazardous chemicals for safer 
alternatives. The aim of informing policymakers about EDCs was to enable them to 
come up with national legislation on the topic, and put pressure at the European level for 
legislation to be adopted regulating the presence of these chemical substances. In the 
three EU-funded projects conducted by WECF on endocrine disruptors there was also 
the goal of activating the organised civil society of specific European countries, such as 
the Baltic states in the BaltInfoHaz project or Germany in the case of the ChildProtect-
Life project, on the issue of endocrine disruptors and thus enabling NGOs to have an 
informed voice in the policymaking process. A concrete example: in the Reduce 
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exposure to EDCs and advocating for better legislation project, one of the stated goals 
was to inform German civil society about EDCs and consequently ensure that there 
would be a significant number of contributions to the impact assessment that was being 
prepared by the European Commission on establishing criteria for identification of 
endocrine disruptors. 
 
WECF has also implemented projects on endocrine disruptors that are funded by other 
international organisations and national governments, particularly the German one, a 
country where WECF has one of its office bases. This piecemeal project strategy to the 
issue of endocrine disrupting chemicals is not ideal for the organisation since it means 
having to compartmentalise efforts to what is a common topic (WECF B interview), but is 
a practical necessity due to the difficulty in getting a longer-term and stable funding 
source on the issue of EDCs. 
 
Beyond conducting awareness-raising projects, WECF also undertook other actions on 
the issue of endocrine disrupting chemicals. The women’s organisation participated in 
the public consultation launched by the Commission in 2014 in order to set up the 
criteria for identifying EDCs, and in 2015 WECF launched an own-initiative report on 
women and chemicals, intended to be an overview of the ways chemicals impact 
women’s health specifically. In both of these activities we can see a mismatch between 
the EU’s frames on endocrine disruptors and WECF’s. Starting with the 2014 Public 
Consultation on defining criteria for identifying endocrine disruptors in the context of the 
implementation of the plant protection product regulation and the biocidal products 
regulation, organised by DG SANTE, WECF’s position was extremely critical of both the 
content and the form of the mechanism to engage stakeholders on this matter. WECF 
heavily criticised the scope of the consultation, which was limited to endocrine 
disruptors in agriculture; the format of the consultation, which featured closed questions 
on a highly technical subject; and the content of the consultation, which involved mainly 
questions geared to a preoccupation with the costs of regulation for farmers and 
industry instead of focusing on benefits for the whole society. The format of this 
consultation severely limited WECF’s capacity to introduce gender and/or sex 
considerations into the discussion.  
 
The two proposals of the Commission released in June 2016 for criteria to identify EDCs 
that were a product of this public consultation were also severely criticised by the 
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women’s organisation for the laxity of their criteria. WECF strongly condemned the 
erasure of provisions which made possible the identification of potential endocrine 
disrupting substances, not just definitive and absolutely proven ones. This, the women’s 
organisation feared, would mean that only a small fraction of endocrine disruptors will be 
identified as such, meaning that humans will not be properly safe, in particular members 
from vulnerable groups such as children and pregnant women. With this new legislation, 
the EU is abandoning the precautionary principle that regulated European chemical 
policy since the REACH regulation. This principle meant that substances suspected of 
having severe negative impacts on human health were regulated and restricted. The EU 
is moving to an absolute proof principle. This is seen by some internal and external 
voices as a setback in the protection of human health, since now there has to be very 
strong scientific evidence of cause-and-effect between a chemical and a negative health 
impact for it to be regulated, something which in some cases may take decades to 
achieve. The underlying premise that steered the Commission in its design of EDCs 
criteria, just as in the case of the REACH regulation, is achieving a balance between two 
often contradictory goals: protecting human health and the environment, and improving 
the functioning of the internal market by ensuring that industry will not be overly 
burdened (EC 2016a; EC 2016 2016b).  
 
WECF’s focus, on the other hand, is solely on the protection of human health, 
particularly that of pregnant women and children, considered vulnerable groups. In this 
regard, WECF’s report on Women and Chemicals is very telling, since it includes as a 
proposed solution for regulating chemicals to limit safe exposure of humans to chemical 
substances not by the average male standard, as is common practice, but by the most 
vulnerable group standard: children and pregnant women (WECF 2016c). The other 
proposed solutions are mandatory labelling of composition of products, making the 
precautionary principle the underlying justification in chemical regulations, and 
increasing the participation of women in chemical policymaking to ensure that diversity 
of voices leads to diversity of interests being considered. These solutions reflect a 
preoccupation first and foremost with protecting human health from definitive and 
potential endocrine disruptors and other hazardous chemical substances, and particular 
attention is paid to protecting groups that are the most vulnerable to these chemicals. In 
its Women and Chemicals report, WECF explicitly states that the organisation considers 
this issue to be part of ‘the broader concept of gender equality and sustainable 




Contrary to what often happens when the EU considers gendered differentiated impacts 
on its chemical policy, WECF does not limit its analysis of differentiated chemical impact 
on women to their different physiology. The focus is not only on women’s biological 
determinants but also on their social roles. Both determine the type of exposure they are 
subjected to and from which chemicals. The use of gender equality on chemical policy 
by WECF is therefore stretched to include both sex determinants and socially-
constructed roles. Women are constructed not just as passive vulnerable victims but 
also as potential agents of change, something reflected in the goal of strengthening 
women’s presence in decision-making and the chemical production.  
  
8.2.2. Sustainable development in third countries: WECF and DG DEVCO  
  
DG DEVCO, specifically the unit on Democratic Governance, Human Rights and 
Gender, was mentioned in interviews with WECF staff as one of the institutions more 
welcoming to the women’s organisation in the EU (WECF A interview; WECF B 
interview; WECF C interview). The DG is identified as one of the most progressive in 
terms of the adoption of gender mainstreaming, although some considerable obstacles 
are still present for its effective implementation in practice (see Chapter 5 for a detailed 
analysis of such obstacles). WECF interacts with this DG through different activities 
including meetings, public consultations, and application to co-funded projects. The 
most concrete and visible dimension of this interaction is WECF’s work as a coordinator 
of DG DEVCO’s co-funded projects, of which the International Women’s Alliance 203020 
and the Building local capacity for domestic solar heating, hot water and insulation for 
rural and remote areas in the EEC region projects are two examples. 
 
International Women's Alliance 2030  
 
One of the priorities of EU’s development policy is building the capacity of local and 
regional civil society organisations in developing countries and their cooperation with 
local authorities. The fostering of civil society in developing countries is seen as a means 
of ‘consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human 
                                                      
20 The formal title of the project is Women's NGOs networking to realise the Sustainable Development Goals, although 
WECF nicknames it International Women’s Alliance 2030, using this denomination in many of its communications. For 
practical reasons, the short version will be used in this chapter when referring to this project. 
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rights and the relevant principles of international law’, and as a way of guaranteeing an 
increased ‘sustainable economic, social and environmental development’ (EP and 
Council 2014). Therefore, the participation of civil society organisations in projects that 
DG DEVCO finances is often a requirement. This preoccupation with involving and 
strengthening civil society organisations in third countries was the justification for DG 
DEVCO to launch in March 2012 a public consultation on the issue, entitled 
Consultation on the future EU policy on “Civil Society Organisations in development 
cooperation” (DG DEVCO 2012). The goals of this consultation were to gather best 
practices and views on civil society organisations and development principles, to 
understand the challenges that civil society organisations face for action in the context 
of a shrinking legal and regulatory space, to promote civil society participation in policy 
processes and accountability, internal governance and accountability of organisations, 
and gather views on how to achieve a consistent EU engagement with local 
organisations. WECF participated in this consultation with a contribution. 
 
This public consultation fed into the EU development policy on civil society organisations 
from 2014 to 2020. In 2014 the European Parliament and the Council adopted a 
regulation that established a funding instrument for development cooperation (EP and 
Council 2014). One of the priorities of this instrument is precisely the strengthening of 
civil society and local authorities and the improvement of cooperation between the two 
types of organisations (Ibid., Art. 1). Gender equality is mentioned explicitly as a core 
principle of development policy: 'The Union is strongly committed to gender equality as a 
human right, a question of social justice and a core value of the Union's development 
policy’. Gender equality is central to the achievement of all Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). On 14 June 2010, the Council endorsed the EU Plan of Action 2010-
2015 on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development. (EP and Council 
2014). The regulation earmarks EUR 970 million for the theme of civil society 
organisations and local authorities for the period of 2014-2017. It is in this context that 
WECF successfully applied for a project on the Strengthening Regional, European and 
Global CSO Umbrella Organisations call. The aim is to build the capacity of local, 
regional and national civil society organisations in developing countries so that they are 
able to implement and monitor the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and make 
these organisations able to engage meaningfully in the policy process of their countries 
and regions (DG DEVCO 2012). Transnational civil society organisations are recognised 
as important in this task of building the capacity of local organisations, training their staff 
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and volunteers, and allowing them to cooperate with similar organisations at the national 
and international level. 
 
WECF’s project International Women’s Alliance 2030 aims to build the capacity of local 
organisations and make them stronger on aspects such as gender, policy, advocacy, 
and SDGs. The focus is on ensuring that the SDGs directly related to the environment 
(e.g. clean energy, water and sanitation) are implemented in the regions where these 
local organisations operate. This comes from WECF’s strongly-held belief, much similar 
to the one shared by the EU on development policy, that NGOs and civil society have a 
crucial role to play in the implementation of SDGs (WECF C interview). WECF has 
therefore teamed up with four other umbrella organisations for this project focusing on 
gender and women that will then share the knowledge they acquired with local 
organisations through roundtables, shadow reports, and other local activities. The 
requirement from the DG DEVCO’s call for projects to cover more than 50 developing 
countries was a key definer of the form and content of the project designed by WECF. 
This requirement ended up determining the need for including other umbrella 
organisations as partners in the project, since WECF’s own members were not enough 
to cover the 50+ country jurisdiction. It also determined the number and type of activities 
to conduct, more numerous to cover as many countries as possible but smaller in scope 
than the organisation would have preferred (WECF C interview).     
 
Other DG DEVCO-funded projects 
 
In addition to a preoccupation with strengthening the capacity of local civil society, 
WECF also manages and implements projects that aim to make tangible changes in the 
daily lives of people in developing countries through the use of improved technology. 
One such example, co-funded also by DG DEVCO, was a project to improve access to 
sanitation and hot water in rural villages in neighbouring countries such as Ukraine, 
Georgia and Belarus. The main goal of the project was to train locals in the construction, 
maintenance and use of solar collectors to improve insulation and access to hot water. 
This project had a focus on women and on improving women’s quality of life, since social 
gender roles determine that they are the ones to whom hot water is more precious 
(domestic chores like cooking and washing up are usually the responsibility of women) 
and often the ones responsible for the time-consuming hard work of collecting fuel for 
heating up water. WECF’s projects are thus gender-sensitive since they recognise that 
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the design of technological improvements and capacity-building efforts is important to 
make sure both women and men collect their advantages. Gender-sensitivity is a 
dimension of projects that fits well with the EU’s avowed commitment to gender equality 
in development and cooperation policy.   
 
8.2.3. WECF efforts for gender mainstreaming  
 
Below is an example of an attempt by a women’s group to foster gender mainstreaming 
at the EU level. In this case, the aim was to create a network that would step up efforts 
to mainstream gender into the European Parliament’s environmental policy work. 
  
The Gender + E3 working group at the European Parliament 
 
In 2013 a group of MEPs and a few NGOs got together to set up an informal working 
group at the European Parliament to discuss and promote gender issues within 
environmental policy. The group was named Gender + E3, with the 3 ‘E’s standing for 
‘equality, ecology and economy’ (WECF 2013a). WECF was invited to be a member of 
the group, along with other NGOs working in the field of gender equality and/or 
environmental issues such as the European Women’s Lobby, Friends of the Earth, 
Genanet, and the Global Water Institute. The group of MEPs included members from the 
FEMM, ENVI (public health and food safety), AFET (foreign affairs) and IMCO (internal 
market and consumer protection) committees. The main goal was ‘to work for socially, 
ecologically, and economically sustainable policies within and outside the European 
sphere’, inform diverse parliamentary forums and committees about the importance of 
taking gender into consideration on sustainable development issues, and try to make 
sure that a gender perspective was incorporated into the Commission’s proposals and 
initiative reports on the topic (Ibid.). The role of the NGOs within the group was to inform 
MEPs about conferences, workshops and latest research on gender and environmental 
issues, hence serving as a bridge between European politicians and civil society. 
 
One of the key preoccupations of the informal group was to debate ways to incorporate 
a gender perspective into the international negotiations that were happening at the time 
on the successors of the MDGs that were to expire in 2015. So in September 2013 the 
Gender + E3 group issued a position on the topic that was published by the EU-
specialised media and by WECF and the European Women’s Lobby on their own 
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websites. The group argued that there is a double standard when it comes to the EU 
promoting gender balance and gender considerations in development policy to third 
countries but stopping short of implementing it within its own borders. The text therefore 
calls for the importance of considering how men and women, due to their different social 
roles, may be affected differently by climate change and may have disparate attitudes 
towards the problem and the solutions for climate change (WECF 2013a). It denounces 
the lack of women in decision-making positions regarding climate change, and the 
gender-blindness of climate change policy in Europe, which may lead to decreased 
effectiveness in accomplishing the goals of low-carbon and climate-resilient 
development. The group calls for a two-pronged strategy to ensure that gender is 
mainstreamed into the negotiations for post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals: 
ensure gender balance at the decision-making table, and increase gender expertise of 
decision-makers through training and encouragement to rethink gendered attitudes and 
structures (Ibid.). 
 
Albeit an example of an effort to mainstream gender into the work of the European 
Parliament in environmental policy, of bringing civil society into the debate, and of a 
recognition of NGOs’ expertise in gender equality and environment issues, the Gender + 
E3 was a short-lived and, according to some members, a half-hearted attempt at gender 
mainstreaming (GEN A interview). The cost of travel for non-Brussels-based NGOs is 
once more brought up as a great obstacle in attending meetings regularly and 
maintaining the flexible and often spontaneous contacts required for these informal work 
gatherings (GEN A interview; WECF A interview; WECF B interview). After the release of 
the position of the Gender + E3 group in September 2013, there were no other 
statements issued, which reflects the lack of activity of the informal group. The overall 
issue of short-term planning when it comes to gender mainstreaming in the EU was 
mentioned by a member as affecting the effort that was put into the group, along with 
gender issues seeing their position lowered in the EU political agenda (GEN A 
interview). 
 
8.3. WECF and gender mainstreaming: organisational and 
discourse adaptation 
 




WECF’s work extends beyond advocacy and lobbying politicians and policymakers. A 
key component of the work of the women’s transnational umbrella organisation is the 
coordination and implementation of concrete projects that have practical consequences 
for the lives of local populations in developing countries, and that are steered to increase 
the capacity and the expertise of local civil society organisations on environmental and 
gender equality issues. There is also an important component of awareness-raising in 
the work that WECF does. In areas such as the effects of chemical exposure on children 
and pregnant women WECF has developed information materials for the general public 
and for national and European policymakers. All three types of work – advocacy, 
capacity building, and outreach campaigning – are shaped to some extent by the 
successfulness or failure of WECF’s engagement with the EU. The most crucial aspect 
of this engagement is the availability of relevant and accessible funding from the part of 
the EU and WECF’s ability to successfully apply for it. 
 
The funding programmes put forward by specific DGs reflect the medium-term policy 
priorities of each of them, with the sanctioning of the European Parliament and the 
Council. The general funding programmes are usually drawn out to coincide with the EU 
multiannual financial frameworks (MFF), the budget cycles for each seven-year period 
(current MFF is 2014-2020), but they are further split into smaller time chunks of award-
granting. This means that NGOs that are highly dependent on EU funding are limited in 
two fundamental ways: the type of issues they can work on, that have to coincide to 
some extent with the EU’s priorities in that policy field; and the length of time to 
undertake their initiatives. So, for instance, chemicals in general and endocrine 
disruptors in particular are topics that have been on the EU policy agenda for the last 
few years, as evidenced by the legislation proposed in the area (DG SANTE 2015; EC 
2016a; EC 2016b). WECF has therefore been able to secure funding for three projects 
related to that topic: ChildLife-Protect, BaltInfoHaz and Reducing Exposure to EDCs for 
Pregnant Women and Children in the last five years. WECF has also been able to secure 
funding for several projects aiming to increase local access to sustainable energy 
sources in EU neighbouring countries. Although all of these projects have a gender 
dimension, either by paying attention to chemical hazards for pregnant women or by 
enabling women to operate clean local energy sources, the emphasis is usually put on 
the technical part of the projects that fit EU funding priorities. In some of the projects we 





It is not just on the type of issues that WECF is limited when it comes to applying for EU 
funding. It is also on the manner of working. Funding for projects is often limited to a few 
years: the average length of projects funded by the EU and coordinated by WECF is 2.3 
years. WECF’s EU-funded projects range in length from one to five years, with projects 
of one and two years being the most common. This severely restricts the organisation’s 
capacity to plan long-term activities and negatively impacts its running stability. Other 
requirements of EU funding, such as often a requirement of consortia with business and 
governments for projects funded by DG ENV, or the involvement of NGOs based in over 
50 countries for DG DEVCO, forces the NGO to a hard trade-off between credibility and 
capacity, quantity and depth, effectively barring WECF for certain funding streams that 
would otherwise be applicable. 
 
The EU shapes WECF’s modus operandi in ways beyond funding. One example 
mentioned by WECF staff in interviews was the work on chemicals that affect the human 
hormonal and reproductive systems (WECF B interview). These different substances 
had been the target of WECF’s advocacy and awareness-raising efforts for the best part 
of the last two decades, but they were addressed individually. It was only after the EU 
started to work on them with more urgency and treating them as a group that WECF 
switched its strategy with the endocrine disrupting chemicals and began grouping them 
as well. Additionally, due to the presence of several EU institutions’ headquarters, 
Brussels functions with magnetic pull, attracting a lot of conferences, meetings, 
organisations and networks to it, meaning that regular travel to the city is an imperative 
as well as an additional strain on the budget of NGOs based elsewhere, as is the case of 
WECF.  
 
8.3.2. Frames and discourse adaptation 
 
The overarching neoliberal frame permeates all EU institutions and consequently all 
policies that they produce. When it comes to policies that WECF engages with within the 
EU, chemicals are no exception to this. Two main competing frames are used to justify 
action in this field: competitiveness of the EU internal market, and the protection of 
human health and the environment. These frames are used in parallel, but they are 
competing; indeed, one of the biggest hurdles in the negotiations for the REACH 
regulation was getting the right balance between the financial and economic burden for 
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industry and an appropriate level of health and environmental protection (WECF B 
interview; ENV B interview). Different DGs often have disparate attitudes towards the 
same issue. So, for instance, when the topic of endocrine disrupting chemicals moved 
from DG ENV to DG SANTE there was a perceptible change in the stance towards this 
topic to a more sceptical one in terms of EDC’s harmful impacts, as mentioned by 
policymakers and WECF staff in interviews (ENV B interview; WECF B interview). This 
was reflected in new legislation. Several environmental groups, including the HEAL 
platform and WECF, strongly condemned the legislation establishing criteria for 
endocrine disrupting chemicals proposed by the Commission in June 2016 as too lax 
and with a high level of burden of proof for EDCs to be identified and treated as such. 
This was seen as shattering the decades-old precautionary principle and tipping the 
scales too much in favour of industry while providing an unsuitable level of protection for 
humans (ENV B interview; HEAL 2016; WECF 2016a). 
 
Specifically when it comes to gender, and even on issues of EU environmental policy 
that do contain a gender dimension, the frames used by WECF are different from the 
ones used by the EU institutions. So, for instance, in the case of chemicals, WECF and 
the EU institutions share the general view that there is a degree of difference of impacts 
on women and on men, as well as on children, that is relevant when regulating 
chemicals. Biology and physiology are responsible for these sex differences. However, 
WECF puts an emphasis also on the socially determined gender roles that determine 
exposure to different chemical substances to different degrees, based on the time spent 
by women and men on certain environments and activities. For WECF, understanding 
these gender differences on chemical exposure and addressing them is part of a wider 
strategy towards gender equality and sustainable development, one that also includes 
getting more women participating in the chemical production cycle and its decision-
making (WECF 2016c). WECF’s position is also about making sure that the 
recommended exposure limits are brought down to the level that is safest for vulnerable 
groups (Ibid.), instead of being standardised through the average male, effectively 
ending male bias on chemical exposure limit recommendations.   
 
When it comes to gender frames in other environmental topics, it is even more of a 
struggle to WECF. Making sure that environmental legislation takes into account women 
and men’s different social gender roles and that both benefit from it is generally difficult 
in EU environmental policy within EU’s borders due to DG ENV treating policy and 
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solutions as technical issues that only indirectly at best concern people (Allwood 2017). 
Mainstreaming gender into environmental policy at EU level is sometimes also seen as 
going beyond the principle of subsidiarity and the need for EU law to maintain a basic 
standard, as opposed to a gold standard, which will be for member states and local 
authorities to decide (ENV A interview).  
 
What could be expected was a direct correlation between gender awareness of DGs 
and WECF’s success in applying to funding streams from those DGs.  The reality is not 
as straightforward. It bears taking into account that WECF’s operating grant from the 
EU, one of the most general types of EU funding there is that covers organisational 
expenses for NGOs, is awarded by DG ENV, through its LIFE+ programme. This is 
because WECF works at the intersection of two main policy issues that are themselves 
transversal to a wide range of other fields: gender equality and sustainable 
development. Aspects of each can therefore be played up or down to fit the priorities 
and general discourse of different DGs and their funding programmes. In the last 
decade, WECF managed projects funded by DG ENV, DG DEVCO and DG NEAR. 
Gender equality is a recognised and explicit goal of EU development policy and 
therefore it is easier to stress that dimension in projects funded by DG DEVCO. In 
projects funded by DG ENV, it is the technical environmental aspects that should be in 
evidence.  
 
There is a degree of discourse flexibility that allows WECF to introduce a gender 
dimension into issues that at the EU level are largely dealt with gender-blindness. This is 
done through a kind of venue-shopping for amenable institutions and matching funding 
priorities, through an adaptation of WECF’s own discourse to those priorities. For the 
same goal, WECF can change the focus and the framing of its priorities to make a 
project appropriate under DG DEVCO instead of DG ENV. For instance, the 
International Women’s Alliance 2030 project is about making sure women’s voices are 
heard when it comes to the implementation of SDGs closely related to the environment, 
such as sanitation, energy and water. This is about achieving a more gender equitable 
environmental policy. However, by framing the issue as a case of civil society 
strengthening in developing countries, and of empowerment of women in particular, it 
fits one of the funding and policy priorities of DG DEVCO. This project thus becomes 
pertinent under DG DEVCO funding programmes. In terms of projects on chemicals, 
also financed by LIFE+ programme of DG ENV, it is easier to Trojan-horse the issue of 
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gender since there is some recognition at EU level of vulnerable groups such as 
pregnant women and children. This capacity for discourse adaptation and for venue-
shopping is thus a crucial asset for a successful engagement with the EU.  
 
8.3.3. Processes of proactivism 
 
WECF has some flexibility of discourse, which means that the organisation is capable of 
adapting to the priorities of a few DGs. The next step is to address the harder question 
of whether WECF contributes to the transformation of EU’s own discourse and pol icy 
priorities. Windows of opportunity for change are limited and often unsuccessful, 
although the NGO has been involved in some of them. The Gender + E3 informal group 
at the European Parliament was a tentative way of introducing a more participative 
method of gender mainstreaming into EU environmental policy. WECF was one of the 
few NGOs involved in the set-up of the group but the group was short-lived and 
ineffectual. Its work resulted in a statement release mentioning the need to take the 
gender dimension seriously when it comes to environmental policy within EU’s borders, 
and to go beyond the goal of having more women at the environmental decision-making 
table to having more informed policymakers and politicians with gender expertise on that 
area. The timing of the statement release coincided with the preparations for the 
Conference of the Parties meeting in Warsaw in December 2013, an important set of 
international climate talks, so the text was supposed to work as a recommendation 
piece for the EU and for the 28 member states. No further statements were released 
and some of the NGOs were unable to participate in the organised group meetings, 
once again a reflection of the difficulty that elsewhere-based organisations often face to 
engage with Brussels-based policy- and decision-making.     
 
Another type of window of opportunity for change that WECF tries to take advantage of 
is the public consultations on the future of funding programmes and/or on policy 
priorities regarding a specific issue. Arguably, all public consultations conducted by the 
European Commission on policy topics prior to taking a formal stance on issues can be 
seen as windows of opportunity. However, consultations on the future of funding 
programmes, such as the Consultation on a future EU financial instrument for the 
environment (continuation of LIFE+) (DG ENV 2010) are a particular case of a chance to 
shape the organisation’s own means of financial survival. The objective of this 
consultation was ‘to gather views on the next financial instrument for the environment for 
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the period 2014-2020, especially its objectives, activities and support modalities’ (Ibid.). 
This was specifically targeted to stakeholders, including environmental NGOs, that had 
previously applied for and managed projects funded by the LIFE+ programme to share 
their views on it and point the way forward. DG DEVCO’s consultation on the priorities 
for civil society in EU development policy was also an interesting case that translated 
directly into a funding stream afterwards. WECF also contributed to this consultation.    
 
One of the critiques that WECF makes regarding EU public consultations in general is 
that they are very restricted in their form and content. Consultations are usually about a 
very specific topic and the questions are closed, sometimes offering pre-determined 
options to choose from. This severely restricts the ability of stakeholders to shape the 
terms of the debate at one of the earliest policymaking stages, since the range of terms 
possible to debate an issue is already pre-established by the European Commission. 
New topics or new ways of looking at an issue are therefore hard to introduce through 
the formal channels for stakeholder participation in the EU policymaking process. 
 
Table 12 is a summary of some of the processes of adaptation and reaction that WECF 
undertook in environmental and international development policies. 
 
 
 Processes of adaptation Processes of proactivism 
Discourse 
(Framing) 
Treating endocrine disrupting 
chemicals as a group in projects, 





Contacts in different DGs to work on a 
wide range of environmental issues in a 
wide geographical area. 
Member of informal group in European 
Parliament to bring awareness of 
gender into environmental issues. 
Raising awareness of national and 





Playing either gender equality or 
environmental technical details up or 
Participation in public consultations 
about future of funding programmes to 
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down according to each DG’s priorities 
to apply for multiple funding streams. 
help DGs establish their funding 
priorities (successful in DG DEVCO). 
 





WECF’s work on sustainable development spans several policies in which the EU has a 
competence and therefore WECF engages with diverse DGs in the European 
Commission. Its unique position as an organisation that not only advocates for gender 
equality in environmental issues but also as a service-provider in terms of training and 
projects on the ground in Europe and third-countries means that one of the biggest 
chunks of WECF engagement with the EU is application for EU co-funded projects.  
 
Opportunities and resistance in sustainable development policy 
 
Two of WECF’s main interlocutors, DG ENV and DG DEVCO, can be placed in opposing 
poles of a gender-awareness scale. The only environmental field where gender is 
considered to any extent is chemicals, more specifically endocrine disruptors, due to 
their obvious and direct impacts on women and men’s biologically distinct hormonal 
systems. DG DEVCO is one of the Commission’s units that devotes more resources and 
has the best knowledge of how to integrate gender into its policies (Reis 2017).  
 
Nevertheless, these opposing stances towards gender equality do not translate neatly 
into reduced or heightened opportunities for WECF in terms of funding: sitting at the 
intersection of environmental concerns and gender equality, WECF is able to play the 
latter up or down depending on who is its interlocutor. This means that WECF has 
successfully applied for DG ENV-funded projects that aim to raise awareness on the 
impacts of EDCs in vulnerable groups, including (pregnant) women, for instance. When 
it comes to advocacy efforts, in chemical sub-policy, the economic competitiveness is a 
ubiquitous frame that competes strongly with human and environmental protection, and 
often only concerted efforts from NGOs can offset some of the prominence of business 
lobbying. Even in chemical policy actions such as the REACH regulation, where 
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protection of human health and the environment are given as justification for the EU to 
act, legal justification is firmly rooted only in economic competitiveness (Art. 95 of TEC 
on the harmonisation of laws to improve the internal market), not on environmental 
protection (Art. 175 of TEC). Environmental policy proves a difficult one to mainstream 
gender into, even in the EP, an institution generally seen as quite amenable to gender 
equality. Nevertheless, again it is through FEMM that most of the attempts to bring 
recognition of women and men’s specificities in terms of environmental impact are 
brought up, as was the case of its opinion report during the REACH negotiations, which 
led to mentioning of vulnerable groups (including pregnant women) in the final text of the 
regulation. 
 
Below is a table that summarises the political opportunities and obstacles afforded by 
the EU to women’s groups that fight for gender equality in sustainable development, 
both within and outside the EU’s borders. 
 
 
 Opportunities Resistance/obstacles 
Structural Complex policymaking process, with 
multiple points of access and 
opportunities to influence institutions 
with different preferences. 
 
Commission’s penchant for funding 
European groups representing public 
interests in virtually all policy areas. 
Economic growth and 
competitiveness master frames in 





Long-standing rhetorical commitments 
to women and gender equality and 
institutional mechanisms in place to 
mainstream gender into DG DEVCO-
funded programmes.  
Subsidiarity principle justifying no 
gender mainstreaming at EU level in 
environmental policy. 
 
DG ENV’s preference for technical 
information as a strongly regulatory 
DG, coupled with concerns over 
competitiveness of EU economy, 









Table 13. Multi-tiered approach to opportunities and obstacles to gender change and gender equality 
advocacy in EU sustainable development policy 
 
What kind of gender mainstreaming approach? 
 
In DG Environment gender is largely absent in the policymaking process so there is 
usually no process of gender mainstreaming whatsoever. Gender is not considered or, 
at best, is relegated to the implementation phase, left to the discretion of national and 
local authorities. Nevertheless, there are opportunities for women’s groups to contribute 
with their positions through formal public consultations, much like any other interest 
group. The exception for gender mainstreaming in the environmental field appears when 
it comes to chemicals, specifically endocrine disruptors. There is recognition of the 
different impacts on women and men due to their biological composition and this 
recognition is filtered into policy documents. Again, the process through which civil 
society participates is through formal public consultations and a few organisations enjoy 
a consultative status with ECHA, the European Chemicals Agency. However, WECF has 
severely criticised the format and content of the public consultations, in particular the 
one opened in 2014 for the establishment of criteria to identify EDCs: it consisted of 
closed questions geared towards regulatory costs, with a limited focus on agriculture, 
which severely restricted the ability of the women’s group to bring gender 
considerations to the fore. There is thus a very limited concern for the gender dimension 
in environmental issues, restricted to chemicals and even then, the approach is mostly a 




DG DEVCO, on the other hand, has considerably formal structures in place to include 
gender equality and gendered impacts of its policies. The sub-unit responsible for 
gender is an illustration of the commitment to gender mainstreaming translated into a 
formal structure, and resources – funding, training and time – are allocated to this 
mechanism in DG DEVCO. Public consultations are regularly launched, and one recent 
example was on the topic of civil society organisations and their contribution to 
development, which was translated into a funding programme specifically to improve the 
capacity of grassroots organisations to engage with policymakers, educate the public 
and participate in the political debate on issues they are engaged in. This thus reflects 
some degree of responsiveness to stakeholders’ concerns. However, and despite 
greater openness to considerations of gender, the approach to mainstreaming is largely 
a top-down one that seems to be common to most DGs analysed. 
 
An attempt at gender mainstreaming that was closer to the participative-democratic 
approach was undertaken in the European Parliament with the establishing of the 
Gender + E3 group. This informal short-lived group consisted of MEPs and several civil 
society organisations with a stake on gender equality and/or environmental issues, 
including WECF and the European Women’s Lobby. It aimed to discuss the importance 
of considering gender in the negotiations for replacing the MDGs and of including 
gender in discussions of sustainable development within the EU borders as well as in 
international development cooperation with developing countries. However, and 
notwithstanding its potential to seriously recognise and include the expertise of civil 
society into the debate, the Gender + E3 group was short-lived and a somewhat 
ineffectual mechanism to that end. 
 
This section concludes the case study part of the thesis. The next chapter is a 
comparative analysis of the three women’s groups and respective policy fields when it 
comes to gender mainstreaming and opportunities for gender equality advocacy. It 
draws from the findings on Chapters 5-8 and compares them against the theoretical 
framework set out in Chapter 3.    
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CHAPTER 9. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: OPPORTUNITIES, 
RESISTANCE AND ADAPTATION 
 
After careful analysis of how gender is mainstreamed in DG Justice, DG Research, DG 
Environment and DG DEVCO, and of dissecting the frames and gendered 
considerations negotiated and adopted in several pieces of legislation and policy 
proposed by these four arenas, this chapter will discuss these findings in light of 
theoretical considerations presented in Chapter 3. It will also compare and discuss the 
strategies employed by the three women’s groups studied for this research in trying to 
adapt and proactively change the political opportunity structures that the EU affords 
them. 
 
9.1. The sources of opportunities and resistance to gender 
mainstreaming in the EU 
 
Suzanne Franzway et al. (1989), like many researchers before and after them, have 
questioned whether ‘demands [can] be made on the state to intervene in the interests of 
women when the state embodies the interests of men?’ (Franzway et al. 1989, p. 27). 
For a long time the state has been ‘culturally marked as masculine and functions largely 
as an institutionalisation of the power of men’ since it has been men that have 
dominated its echelons and thus masculine norms have been institutionalised as the 
standard (Franzway et al. 1989, p. 29). The EU has not been an exception (Abels & 
MacRae 2015; Abels & Mushaben 2012a; Kronsell 2005; Kronsell 2016; Locher & Prügl 
2009; Weiner & MacRae 2017). But if the state is not neutral, can it be made to work for 
the interests of women? 
 
What Franzway et al. argue is that the state does not embody ‘a unitary male interest’ at 
all times since it has also been ‘an important vehicle for the advancement of the status 
of women’ (Franzway et al. 1989, p. 29). Therefore, the state – and the EU – are marred 
with contradictions that make advancing women’s interests and gender equality possible 
in certain spaces and under certain circumstances. This was the rationale for looking at 
the gender mainstreaming in the EU, and the receptiveness to women’s groups’ 




In each of the case study chapters, opportunities and resistances were analysed 
through this multi-level framework, looking at what was facilitating or impeding gender 
mainstreaming and gender equality advocacy structurally, what was specific to the 
institutional arenas in a particular policy field, and which opportunities and resistances 
were due to the actions and preferences of individual actors. Bringing back Table 3 from 
Chapter 3, which was used to guide this multi-tiered analysis for each policy field, I will 
now use it to compare the opportunities and obstacles the three women’s organisations 
faced, to see how the political opportunity structures for gender equality vary across 
policy fields and whether some opportunities and resistances are endemic to the EU 
political system. 
 
 Opportunities Resistance/obstacles 
Structural Multi-level, porous system, 
democratic-deficit awareness 
Neoliberal master frame, 
neutral bureaucracy 
Institutional 
Consultations, funding (specific 
opportunities in specific units) 
Logics of appropriateness, 
regulatory vs redistributive 
policies 
Individual Feminist preferences, gender 
awareness, velvet triangles 
Ignorance, refusal 
 
Table 3. Multi-tiered approach to opportunities and obstacles to gender change and advocacy in EU 
 
9.1.1. Structural receptiveness and the neoliberal ethos 
 
In Table 3 I defined structural resistance to gender mainstreaming in the EU as 
‘resistance that stems from the EU’s constitutional make-up including the balance of 
power between its institutional components, treaty-ascribed competences, and long-
term political projects’ (see Table 2). As mentioned in the introductory section of this 
chapter, the greatest barrier to gender policy change is the institutionalisation of the 
power of men in the constitutional fabric of the EU. This is reflected in the priorities of the 
Union, with a heavy preponderance of the economic public realm in the sphere of the 
EU’s competences, in detriment to reproductive issues, relegated to the private sphere, 




The EU operates under a neoliberal ethos that is reflected not just in the predominance 
of the economic political project but especially in the assumptions made about citizens, 
in political aims and in the modes of governance to achieve them. Neoliberalism treats 
people blindly as rational and autonomous citizens, consumers and workers 
(Teghtsoonian 2004), disregarding the relationships of dependence that particularly 
shape the lives of women as mothers (Abels & Mushaben 2012b). The focus is on the 
public sphere of productive work and the goal is the realisation of the Single Market 
through the tearing down of regulatory barriers to achieve the four freedoms of 
movement. A market logic thus permeates the whole remit of EU’s action. According to 
Richard Thomas and Peter Turnbull, the Commission persuaded a varied group of 
political actors – including women’s organisations – that the market was the solution to 
Europe’s problems (Thomas & Turnbull 2016). Economic growth and competitiveness 
are thus the ultimate goals of several policies pursued by the EU. The policymaking 
process is infused with neoliberal governance features: impact assessments are 
widespread, privileging the analysis of the economic impacts and the regulatory burden 
of policies (Mergaert & Minto 2015), technical quantifiable expertise is preferred and 
issues tend to be de-politicised by widespread reluctance in analysing and addressing 
inequalities and the impact of EU policies in (gender) relations of power in society 
(Kronsell 2005). Governance efficiency, although not intrinsically a neoliberal 
governance goal, is often used as a pretext to shed features of the policymaking 
process, including gender mainstreaming, that are deemed as administrative burdens 
(Minto & Mergaert 2015, p. 12). This was illustrated in the making of Gender Action 
Plans optional for applicants to the 7th Framework Programme for Research, and to the 
following Horizon 2020 funding programme, as an attempt to streamline project 
applications and shed what was deemed as an undue bureaucratic layer for the 
scientific community (HG A interview).    
 
The assumed neutrality of bureaucracy is a significant obstacle to the effective 
implementation of gender mainstreaming, a mechanism whose goal is to shed light into 
the gendered norms permeating policymaking. Male-centred institutional practices have 
evolved and become the norm in the political system due to the predominance of men in 
positions of power (Haastrup & Kenny 2015). They are rendered invisible because they 
constitute the norm, and seen as gender-neutral because they are presented as 
common-sense. Thus, the male-as-norm/women-as-deviant model of the EU neoliberal 
single market project is invisible, and its modes of governance masquerade as neutral 
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and objective. This renders women-advancement strategies as ideologically biased and 
running contrary to norms of neutrality and de-politicisation (Chappell 2006; Minto & 
Mergaert 2015). As such, ‘[b]ureaucractic objectivity takes the high ground as free of 
values’ and any attempts to challenge it, such as gender mainstreaming, ‘may be readily 
construed as value-laden, as political, not objective’ (Franzway et al. 1989, p. 144). This 
is more pronounced in more markedly neoliberal institutional settings such as the ones 
that deal with competition and trade (Locher & Prügl 2009), and in arenas that are 
heavily regulatory such as environmental policy. As Chapter 5 showed, the penchant for 
technical expertise in DG Environment, along with the de-coupling of environmental 
issues and their impact on people, is a strong determinant of the general refusal to 
mainstream gender into environmental policy (see also Allwood 2017; Reis 2017).      
 
This is the result of a neoliberal master frame that permeates all EU areas of action 
(Thomas & Turnbull 2016). Gender equality is thus subjected to the resilience of this 
master frame and its meaning is often narrowed to economic-related issues (Lombardo 
et al. 2009) or justified through the benefits that it brings to economic growth and 
competitiveness (Elomäki 2015). This was something pervasive in the case studies 
analysed here. EPWS’s efforts to bring attention to the gender dimension lacking in EU-
funded research fell largely on deaf ears due to the Commission’s main focus on the 
numerical under-representativeness of women in science careers and research teams 
(see Chapter 7). This is not only because the presence of women is easier to 
understand, quantify and thus to address than the gender dimension of a research 
project, but also because the issue of women and science has been traditionally framed 
as one of untapped human resources that can be used to improve the competitiveness 
of the European economy and foster economic growth. In the case of WECF and 
chemical policy, there is an ongoing struggle to tip the balance in favour of human 
health and environmental protection, and away from concerns of industry burden, that 
were quite stark in the negotiations for the pesticides and biocides directive proposals 
(EP and Council 2009; EP and Council 2012b).     
 
So the neoliberal ethos combined with the invisibility of the institutionalisation of men’s 
interests through the male-as-norm model creates an overall institutional environment 
where it is easy for the gender mainstreaming commitment to be filtered out in practice. 
Yet this institutionalisation of masculine interests is ‘uneven’ (Franzway et al. 1989, p. 
41) and sometimes contradictory, and the EU affords several opportunities for feminist 
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advocates to pursue gender change. The multi-level and complex nature of the EU 
political system makes it porous for interest groups – it affords multiple points of access 
to them (Bache & Reardon 2016; Hooghe 2008; Imig & Tarrow 2001). The EU 
institutions welcome information that interest groups provide it but this information is not 
restricted to technical expertise; information on the European aggregated interest is 
something both the Commission and the European Parliament long for, in order to 
imbue their policy positions with representative legitimacy and close the perceived 
democratic gap of the EU policymaking process. That is why the Commission actively 
contributes to the setting-up of gender equality organisations, as was the case of the 
European Platform of Women Scientists (see Chapter 7) and all three women’s groups 
analysed in this research are or have been financed by the European Commission 
through several funding programmes. The porousness of the political system is also 
attested by the diverse routes that these women’s groups have taken in their lobbying 
efforts. Both WAVE and EPWS have used MEPs to put pressure on Commission’s 
proposals, as was the case of the victims’ rights directive and Marc Tarabella MEP’s 
formal question to the Commission on gender considerations in a Horizon 2020 work 
programme, respectively (see Chapters 6 and 7 for more details). Nevertheless, there 
are differences in the levels of receptiveness of institutional arenas to women’s groups’ 
advocacy that limit where and what they can lobby for.    
 
9.1.2. Institutional logics of appropriateness and EU competences 
 
The divergent levels of implementation of gender mainstreaming across venues and 
policy fields in the EU reflect different modi operandi or gendered logics of 
appropriateness in these institutional settings. These largely determine the behaviours, 
norms and values used by each of these political units. Most importantly, they limit the 
ways in which an issue is handled, and the frames used to debate it. The distinction 
between whether a policy is regulatory or redistributive is a relevant determinant of 
receptiveness to gender mainstreaming: policies such as social affairs and international 
development are traditionally used to address inequalities so they are more amenable to 
the inclusion of a gender dimension into their work, whereas competition policy is more 
markedly market-oriented and less accustomed to considering and redressing 
disadvantages to certain groups (Coen 2009; Locher & Prügl 2009; Pollack & Hafner-
Burton 2000). Moreover, due to their depoliticised context and the attention to technical 
detail, regulatory policies also reflect a stronger adherence to the idea of a neutral and 
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objective bureaucracy (Reis 2017). This is true for environmental policy, a regulatory 
giant among the EU’s competences. This research confirmed previous findings on the 
non-existence of gender mainstreaming due to the prevalence of competitiveness as a 
main concern in this policy area (Allwood 2017), as attested by the ubiquitous presence 
of economic costs and the regulatory burden in impact assessments overall (Mergaert & 
Minto 2015), and the perceived incompatibility of this mechanism with the principle of 
subsidiarity (see Chapter 5; see also Reis 2017).  
 
The regulatory-vs-redistributive dichotomy, however, is not the only factor that explains 
variance in gender mainstreaming implementation. Whether actions in a policy area are 
mainly undertaken through legally binding measures or through soft instruments is a 
crucial distinction to make. Two policy fields generally associated with progressive 
mainstreaming apparatuses – research and international development – are examples of 
redistributive policies in which the EU acts mostly through project-funding. This policy 
strategy is important to sustain specific initiatives on gender equality and for supporting 
women’s groups, both within and outside the EU’s borders, but they are not enough. 
Project-funding is about redressing inequalities with ad hoc measures but not about 
structurally overhauling the biased status quo. Additionally, the inclusion of gender 
considerations is often not a requirement for projects to be successful in their funding 
application, as is the case in Horizon 2020, the current multi-annual financing 
programme for research and science. In addition, the issue of gender equality in science 
is reliant on soft measures such as the OMC, since there are no directives or ECJ court 
rulings on the matter. Therefore, progress on the topic is dependent on the good-will of 
governments and private stakeholders. The gender mainstreaming apparatus is thus 
more developed in areas where it is the least disruptive to the status quo.     
 
The above is related to another important factor when considering differences in the 
strength of gender equality provisions at the EU level in diverse policy areas: the EU 
competences in these policies. It is important to distinguish between domains where the 
EU has ‘legal and political supremacy’ from those where it has only a shared 
competence or a competence to coordinate or support member states’ actions (Walby 
2004, p. 15). This is because for domains that fall in the last two categories, binding 
legislation continues to be produced mostly at the national level, and the EU, due to the 
principle of subsidiarity, has a reduced role in policymaking. The realisation of the 
internal market is the strongest justification for the EU to act legislatively and this is 
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reflected in virtually all of its legislative acts, sometimes overlooking other EU-level 
commitments that could also be used as legal basis for legislative action. A case in point 
was REACH, a comprehensive regulatory piece of legislation in the field of chemicals 
that, although the EU used the protection of human health and environment as an 
additional justification to act, was firmly rooted only in the improvement of the Single 
Market (Art. 95 of TEC, on harmonisation of laws to improve the internal market, was 
used, and subsequent Parliament amendments to add Art. 175 of TEC on environmental 
policy were dismissed). This is a striking example of a structural feature of the EU 
political system influencing the institutional logic of appropriateness of a specific 
institutional arena.    
 
It is not mentioned that the EU has an exclusive, shared or coordinating and supporting 
competence in gender equality policy in the treaties, although due to the cross-cutting 
nature of this field this omission is to be expected. Moreover, a gender mainstreaming 
approach makes it irrelevant for there to be a specific gender equality policy, since, if 
implemented in its most revolutionary approach, gender equality is catered for in all 
other policy areas. In practice, the delimitation of legislative powers when it comes to 
gender equality is complex. Employment-related issues, ‘where the EU has been legally 
supreme for some time’, continue to be the strongest core of gender equality provisions 
at the EU level (Walby 2004, p. 15). Other policy areas have made significant efforts to 
contribute to gender equality but through soft policy measures, as in the case of 
research and international development (see Chapters 7 and 8). Interestingly, the 
principle of subsidiarity is often perceived as a barrier for the inclusion of gender 
considerations in legislation, as in the case of DG Environment (see section 5.4.1) and 
on DG Justice’s reluctance to legislate directly and specifically on violence against 
women (see Chapter 6). Notwithstanding this, there is also recent evidence of gender 
mainstreaming being used to circumvent the issue of EU competence in matters such 
as violence against women. This was the case in the victims’ rights and the European 
Protection Order directives, where gender provisions were inscribed into general 
legislation (see Chapter 6). Other areas where the EU has a strong political and legal 
competence, such as trade and some aspects of macroeconomics, have been virtually 
untouched by gender mainstreaming (True 2009). This lends credit to the argument 
that, with some exceptions such as criminal justice, gender mainstreaming has been 




Yet despite all of this, there are still opportunities for the engagement of women’s groups 
even in regulatory venues. Public consultations are still launched, funding to NGOs is 
still available and networks are still in place for the articulation of public interests. The 
most striking case is DG Environment which, although the most gender-blind unit 
analysed in this research, has provided funding for an environmental organisation with a 
strong gender equality penchant, WECF, almost continuously for more than a decade 
(see Chapter 8). Opportunities for project-funding, although limited in their scope, 
should not be dismissed as irrelevant; they are very often lifelines for women’s 
organisations and they make a difference between their capacity to contribute to the EU 
policymaking or not. This is very much a reflection of the structural drive of the 
Commission to be seen to include citizens’ voices in the European policymaking process 
to counter critiques of the European democratic deficit.  
 
9.1.3. Individual agency and windows of opportunity 
 
Individual actors can make or break institutional change; they are the ones that link 
rhetorical commitments to practical action (Cavaghan 2012, p. 33). That will in part 
depend on an individual’s gender expertise and gender equality commitment. For 
instance, Lut Mergaert and Emanuela Lombardo identified a series of resistances to 
gender change in DG Research by individuals who refused to mainstream gender due to 
insufficient time, resources and training (Mergaert & Lombardo 2017). The logic of 
appropriateness of institutions only matters because individuals enact the script 
provided by these logics. But if individuals can resist institutional change and are 
constrained by the logic of appropriateness prescribed in each institution, they can also 
be propellers for change. This was the case with the adoption of gender mainstreaming 
in the 1990s in the EU, which, through a combination of favourable circumstances and 
committed individuals, was inscribed in the Treaty of Amsterdam as a mandatory 
instrument. The story of EU gender equality policy is in fact one of specific individuals 
fighting for gender change: from the Belgian lawyer Eliane Vogel-Polsky who pursued 
the Defrenne v Sabena cases,21 to the series of feminist female civil servants that 
propelled the equal pay and equal treatment legislative actions in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and the impetus that Agnès Hubert, head of Equal Opportunities unit from 1992-1996, 
                                                      




and Swedish commissioner Anita Gradin gave to the adoption of the gender 
mainstreaming mechanism (Stratigaki 2005).  
 
More recently, as this research has shown, individuals in strategic positions have also 
been responsible for furthering gender equality provisions at the EU level. Viviane 
Reding, the Justice, Fundamental Rights and Gender Equality commissioner during 
2010-2014, was crucial in the proposal for a directive on gender corporate quotas, and 
for the legislative impetus on victims’ rights, a recent example of gender having been 
mainstreamed to a considerable extent into binding legislation in criminal justice matters 
(see Chapter 5). Moreover, the role of two feminist rapporteurs in the Parliament for the 
victims’ rights directive was also decisive in the gender-awareness of that piece of 
legislation (see Chapter 6). An example of individual action for gender change in 
research and science was the recent case of commissioner Carlos Moedas’s desire to 
develop gender guidelines for funding application evaluators (see Chapter 7). 
 
Individual agency is thus important to explain change in institutions. Sometimes a 
powerful feminist actor can change the opportunities for women’s groups at a certain 
point in time, as in the cases above. However, these actors benefitted from institutional 
and structural windows of opportunity in which they were able to act to realise change. 
Therefore, the more receptive an institutional environment is, the more opportunities 
arise that put together the right circumstances for committed individuals to enact 
change, which can be argued was the case both with commissioner Moedas in DG 
Research and, to a larger extent, commissioner Reding in DG Justice. These two 
institutional arenas are some of the most progressive in terms of gender mainstreaming 
in the European Commission, so the work of these two senior politicians in furthering 
gender equality in precisely these policy areas is hardly a coincidence. 
 
9.2. Women’s groups’ adaptation to opportunities and resistance    
 
This section is about the strategies that women’s groups employ to take up the 
opportunities for engagement presented by the EU institutions and to circumvent the 
resistances to gender policy change that are there. As a guiding framework for laying 
out and comparing the strategies employed by the three women’s groups, I reprise 
Table 4 from Chapter 3. This table distinguishes between three main types of strategies 
– discourse through framing, actors through teaming up with institutional allies, and 
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resources through application for funding programmes. These strategies are anticipated 
using insights from the literature on EU interest representation, particularly the resource 
exchange and venue shopping theories, with their emphasis on appropriate resources 
and groups’ agency in searching for amenable interlocutors (see Chapter 2), as well as 
the wider framing literature and its emphasis on discourse adaptation (see Chapter 3). It 
also draws from previous research on the contribution of women’s groups for furthering 
gender equality policy at the EU level (see Chapter 2).  
 
Table 4 also distinguishes between processes of adaptation to opportunities and 
constraints, and processes of proactivism, in an attempt to establish whether women’s 
groups are capable of influencing the access criteria of the institutions they interact with 
and/or contribute to gender mainstreaming implementation in them. The table, as 
presented in Chapter 3, sets out a few strategies that I anticipated that women’s groups 
would use in both processes. 
 
 Processes of adaptation Processes of proactivism 
Discourse 
(Framing) 
Framing the issue in a way acceptable to 
EU policymakers in a different DG / in that 
same DG 
Influencing the terms in which 
issues are discussed 
Actors 
(Institutional allies) 
Linking up with policymakers that have 
feminist preferences / venue-shopping for 
those 
Training policymakers to have 
feminist preferences (e.g. through 




Developing their capability to interact with 
EU institutions and to improve their 
expertise in their field 
Advocating for budgeting for these 
programmes in the first place 
 
Table 4. Women’s groups’ strategies for take-up and creation of political opportunities in EU 
 
The following section will be a reflection of findings from Chapters 6-8 that determine if 
the strategies used in practice correspond to the ones anticipated in the theoretical 




The table was used in Chapters 6-8 to summarise the processes of adaptation and 
proactivism that could be observed for each women’s group. The purpose of reprising it 
here is to make a comparison in the following sections between the strategies used by 
each of the groups and see how they correspond to the ones anticipated in the 
theoretical framework of Chapter 3.    
 
9.2.1. Reacting through discourse: framing strategies 
 
The process of adaptation of discourse is a prominent strategy that interest groups use 
when engaging with political institutions (Benford & Snow 2000). It involves choosing to 
emphasise the aspects of a problem and solution that are more likely to resonate with a 
specific institutional culture and its political and policy priorities. This is to maximise the 
chances of their position being heard and accepted as pertinent by policymakers. It is 
often closely related to venue-shopping, whereby interest groups actively search for 
venues that will potentially be more welcoming to their position. In this research, several 
examples of this strategy were found. WECF, the environmentalist women’s 
organisation, was found to be particularly adept at this. By virtue of its broad work on 
sustainable development, WECF engages with several DGs that have differing levels of 
receptiveness to a gendered perspective of their work. But through its position at the 
intersection of two broad concerns – gender equality and environmental sustainability – 
it can play each up or down in accordance with the logic of appropriateness of the 
institution it seeks to interact with. When applying for DG DEVCO funding streams, it is 
usually easier for WECF to stress the gender dimension of the project, as was the case 
with the International Women’s Alliance 2030. This was a project concerned with 
achieving a more equitable environmental policy by improving women’s access to 
decision-making in the implementation of environmental SDGs (e.g. sanitation, water 
and energy). By framing the issue as a case of civil society strengthening in developing 
countries, and of empowerment of women in particular, it fits one of the funding and 
policy priorities of DG DEVCO and thus makes it appropriate for that funding stream. 
When applying for DG ENV’s LIFE+ funding programme, it is the technical aspects of 
WECF’s work that are put into salience and the gender dimension is downplayed. This 
framing strategy allows the women’s group to obtain funding from one of the most 




When it comes to lobbying for specific legislative pieces, however, there are still 
difficulties in getting a gender dimension into the environmental debate. In chemical 
policy, an exception in environmental legislation when it comes to awareness of 
differences of impact on women and men, the gender dimension stops short at 
biological differences between the two sexes in EU documents, while the position of 
WECF encompasses a consideration of women and men’s different social roles that lead 
to a general exposure to different types and volumes of chemicals. The women’s group 
has been unsuccessful in broadening the EU’s understanding of the gender dimension in 
chemical policy to include social differences. 
 
Other groups may struggle to tailor their discourse to diverse institutional venues. EPWS 
has repeatedly mentioned that the organisation struggles with being at the intersection 
of science and gender equality: often gender equality experts are not attuned to the 
importance of promoting a gender dimension to science and research or are not 
comfortable with the particularities of that field, with the opposite also being the case. 
EPWS’s members are experts on research and research development so their 
involvement is mostly with DG Research, not with general gender equality structures. 
Gender equality in research, however, is a soft policy issue at the EU level, meaning that 
provisions for the integration of a gender dimension into funding programmes are mostly 
optional, left at the discretion of applicants and therefore weak. DG Employment and 
Social Affairs used to be an alternative contact due to its remit on employment affairs 
and thus on the issue of women’s careers in science and research. This was intensified 
by the presence of the Gender Equality unit in that DG prior to 2011. With the move of 
the GE unit to DG Justice and the reduction of EPWS’s work capacity to a voluntary 
basis, however, these contacts were essentially lost. This significantly reduces the 
group’s opportunities for policymaking engagement at the EU level. In fact, the capacity 
to venue shop and frame their demands accordingly is in principle not always an easy 
task for single-issue organisations such as the ones under study in this research; there 
is often a very limited number of venues that deal with their policy topic, as is the case of 
EPWS.   
 
Often with gender equality in the EU, and particularly when an issue has not been dealt 
with before by that political institution, discourse adaptation involves framing that issue 
in a way that makes sure the EU has a legal competence to legislate on it. This was the 
case with sexual harassment framed as workplace discrimination by activists in the 
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1980s (Zippel 2004) or of unpaid care work framed as a labour market policy concern 
(Locher & Prügl 2009, p. 188). So the alternative way that groups can use framing as a 
lobbying strategy is to make certain aspects of the problem salient so that the issue falls 
under the responsibility of a venue that is already amenable to their demands (Princen & 
Kerremans 2008). This can be considered as a process of discourse proactivism (see 
Table 4). This is a rare phenomenon and the closest example in this research was found 
on the issue of violence against women. The problem was the same as with the case of 
sexual harassment in the 1980s: violence against women is an issue where the EU has 
an unclear mandate to legislate on and in which the Commission has avoided proposing 
binding legislation, hence the framing of sexual harassment as workplace discrimination 
instead of gender-based violence in the 1980s. In the beginning of 2010s, WAVE used 
framing to push for legislative provisions for victims of violence against women. Both 
pieces of legislation that establish provisions for victims of crime analysed in this 
research contain a considerable gender perspective that seeks to cater to some extent 
to victims of violence against women. By highlighting specific instances of violence 
against women as a curtailment of women’s freedom of movement, WAVE stressed the 
EU’s competence in establishing a European Protection Order (see Chapter 6).  
 
Another important feature of reaction strategies of women’s groups through discourse is 
their adaptation to the prevalence of the economic frame in their own fields. As argued 
by Thomas and Turnbull, ‘the Commission uses the “master frame” of neoliberalism to 
establish a mandate for sector-specific policies’ (Thomas & Turnbull 2016, p. 1). This 
frame thus permeates virtually every DG, to a smaller or larger extent. The present 
research corroborates this finding, as all three women’s groups working in diverse policy 
fields had to contend with an economic framing of the policy problem they were trying to 
lobby (WAVE to a much lesser extent than EPWS and WECF). In the case of chemical 
policy and WECF, two frames were seen to compete for primacy: protection of 
environment and human health on one hand, and economic competitiveness of 
European industry on the other. In REACH, the most important regulatory instrument for 
chemicals in Europe, the tension between both is notable, while in subsequent 
Commission proposals to define pesticides and biocides, the pendulum swung heavily 
towards the goal of economic competitiveness with prejudice for environmental human 
health protection (ENV B interview; WECF B interview). In the case of women and 
science and EPWS, the main focus has been on the presence of women in scientific and 
research careers, and the problem has been framed mostly in terms of untapped human 
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resources that could improve the competitiveness of the European economy through 
research innovation. EPWS tried to use this frame and skew it towards the goal of 
diversity, instead of simply economic competitiveness, and reinforce the importance of 
the gender dimension, with limited results. Both women’s groups are considerably 
constrained by the prevalence of the neoliberal master frame and the economic framing 
that permeates the logic of the institutional culture they try to engage with.     
 
9.2.2. Institutional allies and velvet triangles 
 
An important element of employing the venue-shopping strategy successfully is the 
presence of allies within the political institutions that interest groups are trying to access 
(Baumgartner & Jones 1993, p. 1050). Policy networks of feminist policymakers, 
politicians and civil society advocates have long been credited with furthering gender 
equality policy at the EU level (Locher 2007; Locher 2012, p. 64; Woodward 2003). 
Linking up with allies within the EU institutions continues to be an important strategy for 
women’s groups to access the European policymaking process and to try to influence it 
through the dissemination of their positions. Several authors speak about the loosening 
of the velvet triangles after the adoption of gender mainstreaming (Jacquot 2010, p. 
129-130), a consequence of the dispersion of the gender equality policy mandate. This 
loosening of once very tightly knit and informal networks was further accentuated with 
the migration of the Gender Equality unit to DG Justice (Jacquot 2017; O’Dwyer 2017). 
 
There seems to emerge a trade-off regarding the impact of gender mainstreaming in 
gender equality policy networks: if, on one hand, the broadening of the scope of gender 
equality results in the widening of the pool of potential institutional allies, on the other, it 
has negative repercussions on the strength of old networks for furthering gender 
equality legislation. This paradox was at the crux of this research and constituted the 
starting point for analysis. Nevertheless, the present research has found that traditional 
institutional allies continue to be important forces with which the advocates of women ’s 
groups link up for furthering a gender dimension into mainstream legislation. Two main 
dynamics were found to garner results: making FEMM a joint committee and using MEP 
questions to pressure the Commission into action.  
 
In the two analysed cases of legislation that more fully integrated a gender dimension, 
the FEMM committee was attributed joint responsibility in the legislative process. The 
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victims’ rights directive and the European Protection Order directive were dealt with 
jointly by the FEMM and LIBE committees, in an unusual dual attribution of responsibility 
in the European Parliament. The exceptional gender dimension of both directives is 
credited to a large extent to the lead work of the FEMM committee (FEMM A interview; 
JUST A interview; WAVE A interview; EP GM study). WAVE was proactive on this issue, 
having keenly lobbied for the inclusion of FEMM as a joint committee before the victims’ 
rights directive was proposed (WAVE 2011). This is thus a remarkable example of a 
strategy of venue-shopping whereby an interest group attempts to bring into the 
policymaking process a venue that they already know is amenable to their demands and 
is therefore an institutional ally. Interestingly, bringing FEMM in in order to incorporate a 
gender dimension into mainstream legislation seems to produce results, albeit to a 
lesser extent, even when the opinion of FEMM is merely consultative. This was the case 
with the participation of FEMM in the legislative process for the REACH regulation, 
where the committee released an opinion report that contributed to the inclusion in the 
legislative text of a recognition of (pregnant) women and children as vulnerable groups 
(see section 8.2.1.). 
 
Linking up with the FEMM committee to further a gender perspective in mainstream 
policies is also acknowledged as crucial by EPWS. The women scientists’ platform refers 
to the importance of contacting MEPs with gender-awareness to maximise their 
chances of having some influence in the policy at stake. An illustrative example was the 
formal question that an MEP member of the FEMM committee addressed to the 
Commission, at the instigation of EPWS, regarding DG Research’s plans for including 
gender equality provisions in the following work programme of Horizon 2020 (see 
section 6.2.2). This warranted a response from commissioner Moedas, which, although 
of limited practical results, is testament to the political importance of this mechanism. 
Nevertheless, the neoliberal master frame, a structural feature of the EU political system, 
also permeates the institutional logic of appropriateness of the most sophisticated 
gender-aware arena, the FEMM committee, to some extent. This is reflected in the 
overwhelming presence of the under-representativeness of women in science as the 
main problem of gender equality in this field, to the detriment of the gender dimension in 
the content of research and science projects. Additionally, all three women’s 
organisations were seen to regularly use a pincer strategy in their lobbying efforts, 
consisting in pressing both European policymakers and MEPs, along with national 
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politicians, to increase support for their position in all institutional arenas and at all 
policymaking stages. 
 
Evidence of processes of proactivism when it comes to attempts by women’s groups to 
shape the preferences of policymakers and turn them into allies is rare. For the three 
analysed groups, only two cases were found that resembled such an attempt. WECF 
participated in the establishment of an informal working group to promote gender issues 
in environmental policy in the European Parliament. The Gender + E3 group was 
created in 2013 and its main goal was to raise the profile of the gender mainstreaming 
mechanism in environmental policy in the Parliament and in the Commission and 
educate policymakers on the mechanism. This effort, however, was ephemeral and did 
not last beyond the event that was the main propeller for its inception: the negotiations 
for the successors of the Millennium Development Goals (see section 8.2.3). In the case 
of WAVE, there were continued efforts in the implementation stage of the European 
Protection Order to educate judges and other judicial practitioners on the instrument 
through the organisation of training workshops nationally (see section 6.4).    
 
Another example of proactivism in shaping policymakers’ preferences, albeit an external 
one to the three groups analysed, was the European Women’s Lobby training workshop 
on gender mainstreaming that was organised in December 2015 at the European 
Parliament. The goal was to educate MEPs and parliamentary staff on the mechanism 
and how it related to different policy areas (EWL A interview). The obviously optional 
nature of the workshop, however, might have meant that only participants who already 
had some degree of gender-awareness and/or a feminist preference chose to attend it. 
 
9.2.3. EU as a source of resources: funding programmes 
 
Opportunities for women’s groups in the EU are not limited to engagement with the 
policymaking process. Civil society organisations in general, and transnational ones in 
particular, have several opportunities for applying for EU funding programmes to finance 
their daily operations and specific actions in their field of work. All three women’s groups 
analysed in this research have benefitted from European funding streams. The 
operationalisation of this funding, from monitoring and application to implementation and 
reporting, is a substantial part of the workload of these groups. The criteria for 
application to these funds have shaped substantively the way the groups organise 
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themselves and the topics they decide to work on. WECF’s work on chemicals is 
spurred to a significant extent by the EU’s recent attention to this issue that has been 
translated into funding streams allocated specifically for projects that aim to focus on 
endocrine disrupting chemicals. This increases the EU resource opportunities for 
interest groups working in this field. For a group that has a broad remit of work on 
sustainable development, EU priorities in the environmental field also determine to some 
extent their own work priorities in the short to medium term. The EU’s continued focus 
on combatting violence against women as one of its priorities for gender equality means 
that WAVE is the only organisation of the three to receive a multi-annual grant from the 
Commission’s equality-purposeful funding stream, the Rights, Equality and Citizenship 
Programme of DG Justice.    
 
What this research has found is that it is not just EU funding priorities that shape 
women’s groups’ work priorities; the requirements of these funding programmes are 
powerful determiners of how women’s groups operate. The most striking example is that 
of EPWS, the platform of women scientists that lost eligibility to EU financing due to its 
inability to secure the 20% funding from alternative sources; a requirement for all EU 
funding applications. This had a tremendous impact on the viability of EPWS; it 
dramatically changed the purview of the platform’s work, its capacity to stay on top of 
policy developments and its ability to interact with the EU institutions (see section 
7.3.1.). The other two women’s organisations, to a less dramatic extent, were also 
impacted by EU funding requirements. For WECF, it was the shape and form of their 
project on civil-society capacity building that had to be tailored, broadening the number 
of partners that resulted in a more geographically-spread project but less ambitious in 
terms of content than the organisation’s original plans (see section 8.2.2.). For WAVE, 
the adaptation involved a structural change in the legal status of the organisation, which 
in 2014 became a legal entity based in Austria, from what had originally been a loose 
network (see section 6.3.1.). 
 
These findings lend credibility to the claims of the bureaucratisation of feminism. When 
feminists engage with political systems and enter their bureaucracies, feminism has to 
adapt to them by adopting ‘Weberian principles of hierarchical authority, functional 
rationality, objective expertise [i.e. the removal of the emotional and praise of the 
rational] and regulated impersonal structures’ (Franzway et al. 1989, p. 143). This 
improves their capacity of survival, by enabling these women’s groups to take 
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advantage of resource opportunities provided by political institutions, but it restricts the 
content and form of their own work and strategies.  
 
There have been a few attempts captured in this analysis by the women’s organisations 
to shape the funding programmes of the European Commission – what could be termed 
as processes of proactivism regarding resource opportunities. WECF has contributed its 
position to consultations on the future of current funding programmes in DG 
Environment and DG DEVCO, aiming to shape their policy priorities and thus align future 
resource opportunities with the women’s group’s own priorities (see section 8.3.3.). 
Likewise, EPWS has formally registered its discontentment and its difficult experience 
with the co-funding rule of the Commission’s funding programmes (see section 7.2.2.). 
These formal consultation processes have a limited chance of success for interest 
groups, however, since they often are restricted to pre-defined answers or rating scales, 
and the often thousands of stakeholder responses are quantitatively assessed. Women’s 
groups thus have a very limited ability to shape resource opportunities for themselves at 




In this chapter I summarised the empirical findings from my analysis of gender 
mainstreaming implementation in four DGs of the European Commission and 13 
instances of policymaking where women’s groups interacted with the EU institutions. 
The aim was to provide a cross-cutting analysis of the political opportunity structures for 
gender equality advocacy in the European Union and the strategies employed by 
women’s groups to access them. A multi-tiered framework guided the comparative 
analysis. All three organisations benefit or have benefitted in the past from the 
Commission’s public interest entrepreneurship that drives it to make specific funding 
available for transnational organisations representing societal interests, including 
women’s interests and gender equality. Despite this structural opportunity, induced by 
the Commission’s zeal to be seen to include citizens’ interests in the policymaking 
process and the fact that involvement in the debate is not hard for interest groups, in 
reality the road to access and actual influence is an arduous one. Public consultations 
are routinely launched before legislative pieces are proposed, but they often demand 
closed answers to limited-issue questions, which makes it difficult to introduce new 




Gender equality advocates grapple with two main obstacles that seep into the logics of 
appropriateness of different institutional arenas: the omnipresence of the economic 
master frame and the delicate balance between the EU’s and member states’ 
competences. These constitute two significant similarities across the cases. The 
economic master frame determines the terms in which issues and solutions are 
discussed, and it can determine whether gender equality is considered at all in a policy 
field (such as environmental policy) and the form that it assumes as a problem (such as 
the under-presence of women in science careers as the overwhelming concern in 
gender inequality in research). This in turn strongly determines the types of frames that 
women’s groups such as WECF in sustainable development and EPWS in science and 
research can successfully deploy. EU institutions, in particular the Commission, can be 
wary of acting legislatively, including reluctance to introduce a gender perspective in 
certain policy actions, for fear of violating the principle of subsidiarity and risking the 
Council blocking its proposals. This was particularly acute in the violence against 
women policy field, where the Council’s averseness to the EU legislating bindingly on 
violence against women was illustrated in the severely limited EU’s accession to the 
Istanbul Convention. Even in policy areas with a relatively sophisticated gender equality 
rhetoric and commitment, such as science and research and international development, 
these two structural obstacles – the economic master frame and the EU’s limited 
competences translated into soft policy measures – are present. In this context, 
individual actors are crucial in spurring gender equality considerations in specific 
policies.     
 
Framing, as a strategy to circumvent these resistances to gender mainstreaming, is a 
useful one, albeit limited by the ubiquitous economic master frame. The employment of 
framing is another similarity between the cases explored. It was used to bring to the fore 
a gender equality institutional ally, the FEMM committee, which put strong pressure for 
gender considerations to be included in several occasions. Framing, along with teaming 
up with institutional allies, are thus two important lobbying strategies that garner results 
for women’s groups. Framing is also a useful strategy to deploy to make women’s 
groups’ priorities match those of EU funding programmes and for groups to be 
successful in applying for those. 
 




In sum, the three case studies reveal that the women’s organisations grapple with 
similar challenges when engaging with the EU institutions, but they are also faced with 
distinct circumstances specific to their policy area and their own organisational situation. 
All three groups regularly engage with EU actors and all of them are or have been 
substantially funded by EU programmes. Both WECF and EPWS operate in policy fields 
where the economic master frame is heavily used and gender equality, when taken into 
account, is subservient to it. The delicate balance between member states’ and EU’s 
competences is another important cross-cutting issue that all three organisations have 
to deal with, as gender equality goals are often timidly pursued as a result of the sharing 
of competences or the use of soft measures.  
 
Notwithstanding the similarities across the cases, there are significant key differences. 
The first has to do with the attention given to gender in their policy field by the EU 
institutions responsible for it. As examined in this chapter, the logics of appropriateness 
of each DG determine to a significant extent if gender has a chance of being considered 
or not and thus explain the variation of EU engagement success among the women’s 
groups. But other dimensions such as the competences of the EU in that field, the 
overall EU priorities for gender equality and the existence of powerful actors with gender 
equality on their agenda are also crucial in determining receptiveness to gender 
equality. WAVE here had a distinct advantage as violence against women has been on 
the EU agenda consistently for the last two decades and was given a strong impetus 
under Commissioner Viviane Reding and through the new powers the Lisbon Treaty 
gave the EU in criminal matters. On the other hand, the ability to employ strategies to 
circumvent the resistances faced was significantly different for each women’s 
organisation. This variation was largely explained by the amount of resources each 
group possessed: money, staff and contacts. WECF was surprisingly good at navigating 
between DGs to further gender equality in a wide-range of environmental topics, 
including in some of the most gender-unaware DGs such as DG ENV, whilst EPWS, a 
voluntary-based organisation, found it difficult to engage with DG RTD, considered one 
of the most gender-friendly institutions in the European Commission.   
 
The next chapter will wrap up this thesis. It will consist of reflections on the gender 
mainstreaming paradox, and on the women’s groups’ interaction with the EU institutions 
and involvement in gender mainstreaming process. It will also include general reflections 
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on the theory and methodology used to guide the empirical findings of this research, the 
contribution of this research, and suggestions of ways forward for researching the topic 




CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX REVISITED 
 
In the final chapter of this thesis I will re-visit the paradox laid out in Chapter 2 in light of 
my findings and draw some final conclusions on the kind of access that women’s groups 
have to the EU institutions. After this reflection on the findings comes a reflection on the 
theories used, the theoretical framework that was designed and the original contribution 
it makes for the theoretical literatures from which it draws. A reflection on the use of 
critical frame analysis is provided in the following section. Finally, the thesis closes with 
the description of the contribution of this research to knowledge and some remarks on 
possible routes for future research.  
 
10.1. Reflections on the paradox: new opportunities but weak gender 
mainstreaming 
 
Gender mainstreaming has presented a paradoxical opportunity for women’s 
organisations in the EU. The revolutionary dimension of this mechanism is its recognition 
of inequality between women and men as a structural problem that can only be solved 
with a complete overhaul of the way policy is made and the purpose for which it is made. 
Thus, gender mainstreaming has the potential to spread gender equality as a policy goal 
for diverse fields and put it at the very centre of the European project. However, the 
considerable research that has been conducted into the implementation of this 
mechanism in the EU for the last two decades tells a different story. Uneven adoption in 
the different policy fields, with implementation stopping short at rhetorical commitments 
with no resources committed to it or proper regulation and coordination of the 
implementation of gender mainstreaming leaves it much to the discretion of individuals 
to actually make it work. Although the EU’s strategy has been a dual approach, with 
gender mainstreaming mandated in parallel with women-specific policies so as to 
correct any disadvantages of existing policies, the fear that many scholars have 
expressed is that gender mainstreaming would replace commitment to legally-binding 
policies targeting inequalities between women and men. With the mal-implementation of 
gender mainstreaming as the backdrop, this would indeed be a worrying development, 
since gender mainstreaming could be used as window-dressing while the existing 
gender equality apparatus could be quietly dismantled. So the paradox was about the 
potential for new political opportunities being created in traditionally gender-blind fields 
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for women’s groups while the conventional networks were being eroded. There is 
evidence for both parts of the paradox in this research. 
 
Three diverse issue-organisations and respective policy areas were chosen purposefully 
to assess opportunities for political engagement regarding gender equality and women’s 
rights in gender-pioneering and gender-laggard policies. Gender mainstreaming 
implementation varies considerably from policy area to policy area, ranging from 
substantial awareness of gender in policy venues such as DG DEVCO and DG Justice 
to complete absence of gender equality commitments or document mentions in DG 
Environment. Nevertheless, and interestingly, this research found that the correlation 
between the implementation of gender mainstreaming and the existence of opportunities 
for women’s groups in a policy area is not necessarily linear. WECF has successfully 
applied for multiple environmental funding streams for gender-equality-targeting projects 
while EPWS has reported several difficulties in engaging with DG Research, considered 
a pioneer in gender mainstreaming in the European Commission. This is because both 
organisations have different levels of work capacity, a consequence of their divergent 
sizes, which determines their capacity to adapt and frame their discourse to access 
political opportunities in diverse venues. In short, opportunities for women’s groups exist 
in new policy areas, but they largely depend on the ability of these groups to take 
advantage of them.  
 
The policies with the largest gender mainstreaming apparatuses – such as international 
development and research – tend to be redistributive policies where the EU acts mostly 
through soft measures. International development and research and science at the EU 
level are overwhelmingly conducted through funding for projects which, although 
necessary and sometimes life-changing for recipients, fall short of the overhauling of the 
structural male bias that gender mainstreaming promised. The opportunities for 
women’s groups’ engagement in these policy fields are thus mostly limited to 
applications for project- or organisation-funding, with limited chances of shaping the 
EU’s priorities in the fields and compelling gender inequalities to be addressed in these 
funding programmes in a compulsory way.  
 
Justice is be an exception. This policy area was given a significant boost with the Lisbon 
Treaty in what concerns the EU’s competence to legislate on it. A flurry of legislation in 
the field of criminal justice followed in 2010-11 that considered gender seriously by 
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including provisions specifically targeting women victims of gender-based violence. In 
this case, the EU has used mainstream legislation to extend the scope of its action on an 
issue where the political appetite of member states for the EU to use its competences is 
limited: violence against women. Although with their share of criticisms from both 
policymakers and women’s groups, the victims’ rights directive and the European 
Protection Order directive are two interesting examples of binding legislative pieces that 
were gender mainstreamed to a considerable extent. 
 
Although this research finds that, indeed, women’s groups have been able to take 
advantage of political opportunities in diverse policy areas and in ones without a tradition 
of gender awareness, such as WECF in DG Environment, parallel events have 
weakened the traditional networks that propelled EU gender equality for several 
decades. The most significant was the change of the GE unit from DG Employment to 
DG Justice in 2011. Although this change symbolically ascertained gender equality as 
an issue of fundamental rights as opposed to restrictedly a labour market issue, it 
disrupted established contacts between policymakers and civil society, while making it 
harder for GE unit staff to monitor employment matters and mainstream gender into this 
weighty economic issue. Moreover, the rising importance of macroeconomic policy at 
the EU level with the sovereign debt and Euro crises – a policy that has been impervious 
and at times hostile to gender mainstreaming (Cavaghan 2017b; Hoskyns 2008) – has 
translated into reduced opportunities for gender equality advocacy in economic matters. 
 
Far from fulfilling its revolutionary potential, gender mainstreaming has thus been used 
mostly in an ad-hoc way, heavily dependent on the preferences and priorities of actors 
in high ranks with the ability to mobilise resources to it, and on the work of traditionally 
feminist institutions such as FEMM. As put clearly by Elaine Weiner and Heather 
MacRae, gender mainstreaming was supposed to displace existing modus operandi and 
to be ‘ubiquitous’; instead, it was ‘layered on, to some extent, to the prevailing 
institutional order’ (Weiner & MacRae 2017, p. 81, italic original)                   
 
10.2. Women’s groups and the EU: what kind of access? 
 
Reprising the concepts of engagement developed by Darren Halpin and Bert Fraussen 
(2017) (detailed in Chapter 2) is a useful way to draw some closing remarks. 
Engagement with the EU policymaking process has degrees of depth and breadth. In 
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terms of increasing depth, interest groups may experience involvement, access or 
prominence in relation to the EU institutions. All three women’s groups that were 
analysed for this research are regularly involved in the European policymaking process, 
through responses to public consultations and sending letters to EU politicians and civil 
servants in specific crucial moments of policymaking. This is the lowest and easiest 
mode of engagement and is open to all stakeholders that wish to undertake it. It is 
bounded only by the capacity and priorities of the women’s groups themselves, which, 
at least in the case of EPWS, face nonetheless significant restrictions. Access, the next 
level of engagement, is different in the sense that there must be a degree of 
responsiveness from the EU political institutions: policymakers function as gatekeepers 
in the engagement of interest groups with the policymaking process since they decide 
which groups to meet with, to invite, and to establish as members of advisory groups 
and other formal policy networks. Our women’s groups do enjoy some degree of access 
in this sense, with WECF being an accredited stakeholder with ECHA, the European 
Chemical Agency, EPWS having been invited to meetings with the European Economic 
and Social Council, and WAVE having had meetings with the parliamentary rapporteurs 
of the European Protection Order directive. Prominence is arguably not enjoyed by any 
of the three analysed women’s groups, with only the European Women’s Lobby being 
seriously considered by the EU institutions as prominent when it comes to gender 
equality policy.  
 
Allies continue to be crucial and members of FEMM as well as high-up officials with a 
commitment to gender equality are still extremely important in getting a foot in the 
policymaking door. However, access is far from being a synonym of influence, not least 
because women’s groups have to contend with other interest groups that are also 
striving for involvement and access into the EU policymaking process. These groups are 
often more resourceful and sometimes more successful than women’s groups, in part 
due to a closer alignment with EU frames in particular fields, such as the case of 
industry groups on chemical policy and endocrine disruptors specifically. A struggle that 
is particular to women’s groups is that they have to spend time and resources having to 
convince people that gender is relevant in virtually any policy field that they wish to lobby 
(Cavaghan 2017b, p. 55). This matters for the successful representation of women’s 




Anyone whose preferred perspective is systematically replicated within an organisation 
no longer needs to expend energy or resources arguing their case, making themselves 
intelligible, or refuting others, with the same intensity as their opponents (Callon & 
Latour 1981, p. 285 quoted in Cavaghan 2017b, p. 55) 
 
Gender equality advocates by contrast are likely to become embroiled in extremely 
resource intensive contestations where they confront a policy process characterised by, 
for example, gender-blind and gender-biased rhetorical policy, implementation 
procedures and impact assessment procedures, which must all be tackled 
simultaneously. (Cavaghan 2017b, p. 55)  
 
This constitutes a 'significant hurdle to gender equality advocates trying to disrupt 
refusals of knowledge, analyse and rectify the gendered impacts of policy' (Ibid.) and it is 
a reflection of the reduced or non-existent traction that gender mainstreaming and 
gender equality as a policy goal has had on many policy areas. 
 
The core of the present research was to analyse the breadth of engagement of women’s 
groups with EU policies in order to gauge whether political opportunities are widespread 
for these interest groups by virtue of gender mainstreaming adoption. What it found was 
that sometimes women’s groups are successful in influencing certain aspects of EU 
policymaking but not in core areas. Research and international development, two of the 
areas with larger gender equality apparatuses, are dominated by soft measures, mostly 
funding mechanisms in which gender considerations are optional. On the other hand, 
environment, a considerable area of EU policy competence in the form of regulatory 
binding measures, is largely untouched by gender considerations. Although WECF is 
successful in receiving grants from DG ENV and is part of formal advisory networks in 
this field, its success in influencing legislation and policy priorities is extremely limited. 
Justice seems like a promising policy field, although the EU’s competences here are 
very new – dating from the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007 – and limited in most cases to 
recognition efforts between member states’ legislations rather than harmonisation. 
Women’s groups’ influence, therefore, is limited to peripheral areas of EU competence, 
away from the core economic realm. Although neither trade nor competition or 
macroeconomics were part of the policy fields analysed in this study, previous research 
has highlighted the hostility of macroeconomics to gender mainstreaming (Cavaghan 
2017b; Hoskyns 2008) and exploratory interviews for the present research have found 
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the very limited engagement of women’s groups with macroeconomic policy at the EU 
level (EWL A interview).  
 
These findings thus lend weight to the argument that although women are present in the 
structure of the political system, they have unequal power: not only are women usually 
present at the lower levels of decision-making, they are also concentrated in units that 
are peripheral to the core internal organisation of the political system (Franzway et al. 
1989, p. 31). FEMM, the institution most strongly associated with successful 
implementation of gender mainstreaming, continues to be a committee with relative low 
power within the European Parliament compared with economic policymaking units in 
the EP and in other EU institutions.    
 
Finally, the fact that neoliberal framing seeps into all areas of policy at the EU level 
means that women’s groups have to adapt and/or restrict their discourse to it. Gender 
mainstreaming, and gender equality as a consequence, continues to be subordinate to 
the neoliberal project, with a few clusters of opportunities here and there. Elaine Weiner 
and Heather MacRae highlight ‘the dependence of the EU’s gender equality project’s 
path on the EU’s economic oscillations’, stating that ‘the gender equality project has 
never been able to dislodge the reigning neoliberally informed rules of the game’, with 
‘the changes incurred hav[ing] almost exclusively taken shape when they pose little or 
no challenge to the neoliberal conventions of the Common Market.’ (Weiner & MacRae 
2017, p. 79-82, italic original). The revolutionary potential of gender mainstreaming is 
unrealised, as radical discourse and structural changes are ignored in favour of proof of 
added value of gender equality to existing policies (Lang 2009, p. 339). As Gabriele 
Abels and Joyce Marie Mushaben put it simply, gender mainstreaming continues to be 
an extension to the European Integration project, not part of its core (Abels & Mushaben 
2012b). 
 
Lessons learned: conditions for success for women’s groups’ engagement with EU 
 
In light of the different policy cases that were analysed for each case study chapter, and 
the comparisons drawn between the women’s groups and respective policy fields, we 
can draw some conclusions in terms of what makes the difference between success 
and failure when lobbying for gender equality. The degree of awareness of gender within 
an institutional arena and its commitment to gender equality is certainly important and 
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groups will experience added difficulty advocating for gender equality in a gender-blind 
field such as environment. However, there does not seem to be a perfect correlation in 
the cases examined between rhetorical commitment to gender equality and women’s 
groups’ success in achieving their interaction goals (i.e. through influence or funding). 
Other factors seem to have an important role. 
 
The existence of institutional allies is one of these factors. Women’s groups seem to be 
able to engage with the policymaking process in a more significant way when there are 
individual actors in senior positions who have gender equality on their agendas. This 
was the case with EPWS and Marc Tarabella MEP, Research Commissioner Carlos 
Moedas in DG RTD, and the combination of Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding, EP 
rapporteurs and the Spanish Presidency with strong commitment to combatting gender-
based violence from 2010. Committed individuals are able to act more strongly when 
institutional conditions are favourable – in other words, when there are already 
institutional commitments and structures in place to further gender equality. This was 
the case with all the examples given in this paragraph. 
 
On the part of the women’s groups, the ability to employ framing successfully is crucial 
for their success of engaging with the EU. This can be done in two ways.  
Groups can frame their discourse on gender equality to match EU’s priorities in a given 
policy field to increase their chances of being heard and/or of being funded. However, 
this very often means engaging with economic frames, so it may limit women’s groups’ 
capacity to introduce new ways of understanding a problem and effective solutions. 
More importantly, albeit more difficult, is using framing to pull powerful allies from 
elsewhere into the debate. We have seen how involving the FEMM committee in the 
policymaking process was a crucial factor in mainstreaming gender into policies, 
particularly when FEMM was included as joint committee for the reading stage at the 
European Parliament.  
 
Framing, along with teaming up with institutional allies, are thus two important lobbying 
strategies that garner results for women’s groups and can result in successes even in 





10.3. Final reflections 
 
10.3.1. Theoretical reflections 
 
The main focus of this research was the analysis of the political opportunities for 
women’s groups in the EU policymaking system. In order to study that, an analysis of 
gender mainstreaming implementation was crucial since the mechanisms behind 
resistance to GM would also explain, to a large extent, the lack of political opportunity 
structures for women’s groups in certain fields. Feminist institutionalism, with its focus 
on formal and informal institutions as the main drivers in explaining political outcomes, 
was an extremely useful theory to explain uneven levels of implementation in different 
policy fields and institutional arenas. Different gendered logics of appropriateness were 
helpful in explaining diverse degrees of resistance to the formal requirement of gender 
mainstreaming.   
 
But the EU does not just present obstacles or resistance to gender mainstreaming and 
to gender equality advocacy; women’s groups have been successful in some instances 
of policy change in the EU and gender equality legislation is the most developed field of 
EU social policy. Moreover, the literature on political opportunity structures and EU 
interest representation signals certain characteristics of the EU political system that are 
conducive to welcoming interest groups in general, including women’s groups. So the 
EU as a political system also affords opportunities for women’s groups engagement and 
influence. Thus it was important that I considered both the opportunities and the 
resistances that the political system of the EU provides to gender equality change and 
advocacy.  
 
In the existing literature on gender mainstreaming implementation in the EU there are 
common threads of opposition to this policymaking mechanism that can be found 
across different policy fields. The EU interest representation literature, from its part, 
presents clear cues on the general opportunities for interest group lobbying, as well as 
different requirements of information in specific institutions that make access easier for 
some types of groups. Both feminist institutionalism and interest representation 
literatures point to the importance of individual actors for institutional change or 
resistance and as institutional allies for interest groups’ access. Therefore, there seemed 
to be different levels of analysis worth dissecting here that would impact each other, but 
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were worth analysing separately in order to have a full picture of the political opportunity 
structures for gender equality advancement in the EU as a whole and how and why 
these varied between specific arenas. These observations on the multi-level nature of 
the EU as a political opportunity enabler and resister, rooted in the review of the 
literature and in the preliminary findings brought about by the first interviews and 
document analysis, were the basis for the refinement of the theoretical framework 
designed prior to my starting the fieldwork. There was therefore an approach informed 
by grounded theory in the sense that the empirical stage was initially guided by the 
theoretical framework that was consequently considerably revised because it was 
informed by the empirical findings. Data collection was guided by theory, and theory was 
informed by empirical findings. 
 
So, in relation to the theoretical dimension, the major contribution of this thesis is to put 
two major theoretical fields – EU interest representation theories and feminist 
institutionalism – in dialogue with each other, in order to arrive at a framework nuanced 
enough to allow for the mapping of political opportunity structures for women’s groups 
and for gender equality advancement in the EU political system. The gender 
mainstreaming implementation literature is abundant with instances of resistance to the 
mechanism, but it does not distinguish sufficiently the tiers of resistance and how they 
impact each other. Therefore, I used Mergaert and Lombardo’s original framework 
distinguishing between institutional and individual resistances to gender change, 
expanding it to include an additional macro level of structural resistances, while using 
insights from EU interest representation literature to include a column of opportunities 
for each of the three levels, along the one for resistances. In this way, the analysis of the 
EU as both an enabler and an obstacle for gender equality advancement is fully 
captured and the paradox of gender mainstreaming for women’s organisations better 
understood. 
 
This, however, provided only part of the picture. Political opportunity structures are 
defined not just by the characteristics of the political system that establishes them, but 
also by the characteristics of the interest groups that determine whether these groups 
are able and willing to take advantage of them. Moreover, opportunity structures are not 
fixed but rather are dynamic; they are impacted by the very interaction between groups 
and the political system, since a process of learning and preference shifting may occur 
during these exchanges. In order to capture these dynamics, and in particular to find out 
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whether women’s groups were able to circumvent resistances and therefore change the 
political opportunities for gender equality advancement, including contributing for the 
implementation of gender mainstreaming, focus was also put on the characteristics of 
women’s groups. For this, EU interest representation theories, such as resource 
exchange, venue shopping, velvet triangles and, more generally, framing, were used to 
look for the characteristics that would impact women’s groups’ ability to take advantage 
of political opportunities and dodge resistance.   
 
Two frameworks were thus designed and applied in the empirical stage or research: a 
multi-tiered analysis of opportunities and resistances to gender change and advocacy, 
and a framework of strategies of adaptation and proactivism on the part of women’s 
groups to take up the opportunities and combat resistances. Although designed 
specifically with gender equality policy and women’s rights’ group in mind, with a few 
small adjustments, these two frameworks lend themselves well to the analysis of political 
opportunities for other types of interest groups working in different policy fields.  
 
10.3.2. Methodological reflections 
 
During the operationalisation of the first framework I encountered two main obstacles. 
For each chapter I sorted my findings on the implementation of gender mainstreaming in 
the specific cases analysed into examples of structural, institutional or individual 
opportunities or resistances. It quickly became clear that an instance of resistance or 
opportunity was sometimes difficult to classify neatly as structural or institutional. The 
tiers were therefore more fluid – particularly between the macro and meso levels – than 
what the original theoretical framework might have indicated. Nevertheless, the 
distinction between what are characteristics of the political system of the EU, 
constitutionally derived and seeping into all its institutional components, from the diverse 
characteristics of the diverse institutional arenas that compose it, is still an important 
one to make. This distinction signals what is more or less likely, easier or more difficult to 
change. In relation to the micro level – the individual opportunities/resistances – these 
were often non-existent in my analysis and they were the hardest aspects to identify 
through my methods as I did not use ethnography or participative observation within the 
EU institutions. The logistical constrains are explained in more depth in the methodology 
chapter (see Chapter 4). If overcome, it may have been possible to bring new insights 
into the daily practice of gender mainstreaming in the different policy arenas under 
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scrutiny here. Nevertheless, I do not anticipate that they would have brought fresher 
insights into the 13 specific policy cases analysed for this research, since they were all 
finished processes at the point of data collection and analysis.22  
 
A large part of my empirical analysis consisted of extracting the frames used in policy 
documents to talk about gender inequality in diverse fields. The purpose of this was 
twofold: 1) to look at how the problem was documented, the solutions proposed, and 
the actors involved in the problem and solution; and 2) to find out, for each instance of 
policymaking, how the meaning of gender equality was being used and the final purpose 
of its use. The former was to check how gender equality is understood by different 
actors along the policymaking process and across policy areas, and how these match 
the gender equality frames used by the women’s groups. Caution was taken when 
women’s groups’ frames matched EU institutions’ to not automatically conflate that with 
influence, since matching frames could be down to coincidence. Interviews and 
document analysis provided the context in which to analyse whether each matching 
could be attributed to influence or to coincidence. The latter purpose – analysing the 
gender equality meaning used by each actor in each instance of policymaking – was 
useful for understanding how gender equality was being instrumentalised in different 
policy fields and it is an accurate way of finding out whether gender mainstreaming is 
being taken seriously and to the point it was originally intended. I used a combination of 
critical frame analysis with the typology of gender equality meanings to achieve this two-
pronged purpose. 
 
The set of questions originally intended for critical frame analysis was helpful to direct 
my own analysis to often rather extensive documents. Although nearly all policy 
documents under scrutiny had some sort of gender dimension to them, the relevance of 
that dimension varied across policy fields, with the environmental policy documents 
predictably being the more gender-blind ones. The method of critical frame analysis thus 
proved useful not just to identify how gender equality was being framed but also how 
some of the other problems justifying a legislative solution were being framed by the EU 
institutions (e.g. chemical regulation as simultaneously a solution to human health and 
environmental hazard, and to low levels of economic competitiveness of industry). The 
                                                      
22 The exception to this is the EU’s accession to the Istanbul Convention, which had not been legally formalised when the 
interviews with WAVE staff and policymakers were conducted (July 2016), and the process for the establishment of the 
criteria for EDCs in pesticides and biocides, which was not yet finalised at the point of writing this thesis (January 2018). 
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analysis of the gender equality meaning proved trickier since the scarce inclusion of a 
gender dimension in some of the policies meant that it was not always clear the purpose 
for which gender equality was being used, or even if gender equality was being used at 
all. Nevertheless, gender equality meaning analysis was conducted for each of the 
documents listed in Appendix 1, even if the finding turned out to be non-applicable (the 
template used for critical frame analysis and gender equality meaning analysis for each 
of the documents listed in Appendix 1 is provided in Appendix 2 and an example of how 
it was used is provided in Chapter 4).     
 
10.4. Contribution and ways forward 
 
 
10.4.1. Contributions to literature 
 
In 2016, Kronsell lamented that '[w]hen gender is included in EU scholarship, for the 
most part it studies the policy implications of European integration on gender equality 
with a focus on women’s working conditions and care responsibilities’ (Kronsell 2016, p. 
104). It rarely considers how ‘gender relations are reproduced in European integration 
through masculine norms and gender power’ (Ibid.). One of the goals of this research is 
to analyse the gender-awareness of areas not traditionally associated with women’s 
issues, such as the environment. It is to contribute to the full picture of how (gendered) 
power is distributed within the EU institutions and how the EU shapes gender relations 
by its own framing of the problem and the solution for gender inequality in different policy 
areas. 
 
Concretely, this thesis makes an original contribution in several ways. 
 
Firstly, this research is partly about the implementation of gender mainstreaming in 
diverse DGs of the European Commission. DG Justice, DG Research, DG Environment 
and DG international Development and Cooperation are the main institutional arenas 
analysed. However, room was made to consider the constraints to the full 
implementation of the mechanism that, on one hand, are common across DGs and, on 
the other, are specific to the action of individuals. Therefore, I contribute to the 
comprehension of gender mainstreaming implementation by setting out the barriers for 
gender change that exist at different organisational levels: the micro/individual, the 
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meso/institutional, and the macro/structural. This multi-tiered analysis of resistance to 
gender mainstreaming gives a fuller picture of the problems with the implementation of 
the mechanism and brings together several of the different critiques that have been 
aimed at it by feminist scholars. 
 
Secondly, by focusing the analysis on the interest groups, this thesis develops an 
analytical framework that considers political constraints and opportunities for interest 
representation of women’s rights and gender equality. This may prove a useful 
framework for analysis of other interest groups and the political opportunity structures 
that the EU presents for their policy theme.   
 
Thirdly, this thesis makes a substantial empirical contribution to the EU public policy 
literature. By policy-tracing pieces of legislation in diverse policy fields and analysing 
how the frames changed throughout the legislative process, I generated new empirical 
data that can be expanded on. Two of the most recent pieces of legislation scrutinised – 
the European Protection Order and the victims’ rights’ directives – with a few 
exceptions, have not yet been given much academic attention, in particular their gender 
considerations. 
 
Finally, the focus of this research is on the three European women’s organisations that 
serve as the case studies for the comparative approach of the thesis. These 
organisations have not been the targets of deep academic research before (Antonucci 
2014 is an exception on the EPWS). The intensive analysis of the organisational 
structure, membership, utilised frames, interaction with the EU institutions and 
application for EU funding programmes gives a comprehensive picture of interest 
groups that advocate for women’s rights at the EU level beyond the prominent European 
Women’s Lobby (EWL). 
 
10.4.2. Avenues for future research 
 
This research analysed gender mainstreaming implementation and political opportunities 
for women’s groups in varied European policy fields. Justice, research and science, and 
environment and international development were chosen so as to encompass gender-
pioneers and gender-laggards, regulatory and redistributive policy areas. However, 
European policy action is spread across dozens of subjects; the current European 
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Commission has 37 Directorate-Generals, which vary in size and scope, but each in 
charge of a thematic field. An analysis of gender mainstreaming in a wider number of 
policy fields would confirm – or deny – the findings in the present research on the 
dichotomies of regulatory/redistributive and hard/soft measures. A framing analysis of 
prominent pieces of legislation in other subjects, along the lines of the one conducted in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8, would shed further light on the stickiness of the neoliberal master 
frame: Is it prevalent in all policy fields? Are there exceptions? What about the economic 
case for gender equality; is it argued everywhere? The case-study approach of this 
thesis was to match single-sector transnational women’s groups with the relevant EU 
DGs. Future research could be conducted on organisations that work on topics that 
were not analysed, such as the European Network of Migrant Women (ENoMW), 
Women in Development Europe (WIDE), Business and Professional Women Europe 
(BPWE), to name but a few. 
 
Research on the EU governance of the economic and Euro crises of the last decade is 
abundant, and the gendered impacts of the austerity measures implemented in the 
aftermath of the 2007-8 financial crash are well-documented (see for example Kantola & 
Lombardo 2017; Karamessini & Rubery 2013). Recently, there has been research 
conducted on the consequences of the new EU macroeconomic governance 
mechanisms for gender equality policy (Cavaghan 2017b; Jacquot 2017; Weiner & 
MacRae 2017). Interesting analyses could be undertaken on women’s groups’ 
engagement with economic policy at the EU level, not just in the traditional field of 
employment and social affairs but, more importantly, with macroeconomics and new EU 
governance instruments such as the European Semester. An analysis is also lacking on 
gender mainstreaming implementation and women’s group involvement in core 
economic DGs such as DG ECFIN, DG Trade or DG Competition.   
 
Finally, although this research focused on organisations that directly advocate for 
women’s rights and gender equality, it would be interesting to analyse whether 
mainstream interest groups also pick up the gendered aspects of their policy sectors 
and include them in their lobbying strategies and demands. Tentative research has been 
undertaken on the inclusion of women’s interests in trade unions’ and business 
associations’ policy positions (Reis 2011), particularly the European Social Partners, but 
there is scope for broader and deeper analyses. Other fields lack any such analysis: for 
example, do environmentalist organisations such as Greenpeace or WWF include a 
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gender perspective in their positions? Environmental organisations are a potentially 
interesting research focus on this since interviews with WECF have confirmed that the 
women’s environmentalist group worked together with these organisations. 
 
In their engagement with the EU political system, women’s organisations face resource, 
funding and framing challenges. The gender mainstreaming mechanism, as adopted 
and implemented by the different institutions, has brought new challenges but also new 
opportunities for women’s organisations. This thesis sought to provided nuanced clarity 
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Appendix 1. Documents that undertook critical frame analysis 
 
 
Victims’ rights directive 
 
Date Author Title 
unknown European Commission 
Proposed Indicators for the implementation of the Victims Rights Directive 
(through GBV lens) (internal document) 
2011.05.18 European Commission 
Executive summary of the Impact Assessment Accompanying the 
document Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament to the Council, to the European Economic and Social 
Committee and to the Committee of the Regions – Strengthening victims’ 
rights in the EU(COM(2011) 274 final) 
2011.05.18 European Commission 
Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of 
victims of crime (COM(2011) 274) (COM(2011) 276) 
2012.01.26 
European Parliament 
(Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs; Committee on 
Women’s Rights and Gender Equality) 
DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing minimum standards on the 
rights, support and protection of victims of crime (COM(2011) 0275 – C7 
– 0127/2011 – 2011/0129(COD)) 
2012.07.18 
European Parliament 
(Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs; Committee on 
Women’s Rights and Gender Equality) 
Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and 
protection of victims of crime (COM(2011) 0275) 
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2012.11.14 European Parliament and Council 
Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and 
protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2011/220/JHA 
2015 European Institute for Gender Equality An analysis of the Victims’ Rights Directive from a gender perspective 
2015 European Institute for Gender Equality 
Recommendations for the Implementation of the Victims’ Rights Directive 
with a focus on the needs of gender-based violence 
2013.12.19 European Commission 
DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and 
implementation of Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the 
rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2011/220/JHA 
 
 
European Protection Order 
 
Date Author Title 
2010.01.22 Council of the European Union 
Initiative for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the European Protection Order – Explanatory memorandum 
(Interinstitutional File: 2010/0802 (COD)) 
2010.01.22 European Parliament and the Council 
Initiative for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 





(Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs; Committee on 
Women’s Rights and Gender Equality) 
Report on the draft directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the European Protection Order (00002/2010 – C7 – 
00006/2010 – 2010/0802(COD)) 
2011.12.21 European Parliament and the Council 
Directive 2011/99/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on the European protection order 
 
 
Istanbul Convention EU accession 
 
Date Author Title 
2016.03.04 European Commission 
Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of the Istanbul Convention 
(COM(2016)0111) 
2016.03.04 European Commission 
Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Istanbul 
Convention (COM(2016)0109) 
2017.05.11 Council 
Council Decision (EU) 2017/865 of 11 May 2017 on the signing, on behalf 
of the European Union, of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing 
and combating violence against women and domestic violence with regard 
to matters related to judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
2017.05.11 Council 
Council Decision (EU) 2017/866 of 11 May 2017 on the signing, on behalf 
of the European Union, of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing 
and combating violence against women and domestic violence with regard 
to asylum and non-refoulement 
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2017.09.12 European Parliament 
European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2017 on the proposal for 
a Council decision on the conclusion, by the European Union, of the 
Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence 






Date Author Title 
2011.12.07 Women Against Violence in Europe 
OPEN LETTER: Joined Competence between LIBE and FEMM 
Committees on the Victim’s Directive 
 
 
Research funding programmes 
 
Date Author Title 
2008.04.22 
European Parliament 
(Committee on Women’s Rights and 
Gender Equality) 
Report on women and science (2007/2206(INI)) 
2008.05.21 European Parliament 




2013.12.20 European Parliament and Council 
Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 December 2013 establishing Horizon 2020 – the Framework 
Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) and repealing 
Decision No 1982/2006/EC 
2016.03.09 European Commission 
Horizon 2020 Work Programme 2016-2017 (European Commission 
decision C(2016)1349 of 9 March 2016) 
2016.03.21 
European Commission 
(DG Research and Innovation) 





Date Author Title 
2008.03.03 
European Platform of Women 
Scientists 
Best practices in terms of what has worked in attracting more female 
scientists to research careers and retaining them 
2010.01.13 
European Platform of Women 
Scientists 
Response of the European Platform of Women Scientists to the Public 




European Platform of Women 
Scientists 
EPWS Position Paper on the EU Framework Programme for Research and 
Innovation Horizon 2020 
2012.06.29 
European Platform of Women 
Scientists 





Date Author Title 
2003.10.29 
Commission of the European 
Communities 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency and 
amending Directive 1999/45/EC and Regulation (EC) (on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants) SEC(2003 1171) (Explanatory memorandum) 
2003.10.29 
Commission of the European 
Communities 
Commission Staff Working Paper “Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation 
and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European 
Chemicals Agency and amending Directive 1999/45/EC and Regulation 





(Committee on Women’s Rights and 
Gender Equality) 
Opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality for the 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety on the 
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency and 
amending Directive 1999/45/EC and Regulation (EC) (on Persistent 





Date Author Title 
2016.06.15 European Commission 
Draft Commission delegated Regulation (EU) …/… of XXX setting out 
scientific criteria for the determination of endocrine-disrupting properties 
pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 (C(2016) 3752 project) 
2016.06.15 European Commission 
Draft Commission Regulation (EU) …/… of XXX setting out scientific 
criteria for the determination of endocrine-disrupting properties and 
amending Annex II to Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 (C(2016) 3751 project) 
 
 
DG DEVCO funding 
 
Date Author Title 
 
 277 
2015 European Commission 
Strengthening Regional, European and Global CSO Umbrella 






Date Author Title 
2012 
Women in Europe for a Common 
Future 
Annexes to the report on the key results of the on-line consultation on the 
issues paper “CSOs in Development Cooperation” (row 264) 
2015.06.12 
Women in Europe for a Common 
Future (European Commission as 
contracting authority) 
Strengthening Regional, European and Global CSO Umbrella 
Organisations – Application form for a Framework Partnership Agreement 
and related Grant Application Form 
2016 
Women in Europe for a Common 
Future 
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Appendix 3. List of events for participant observation 
 
(Code and organisation, event, location, date) 
 
EWL 1 – Seminar 25 Years of Feminist Activism Across Europe & Beyond (Brussels, 
2015.05.29) 
EPWS 1 – General Assembly 2015 (Berlin, 2015.11.04) 
EPWS 2 – Ready for Dialogue Conference (Berlin, 2015.11.05) 
EWL 2 – Why Women Will Save the Planet (Brussels, 2016.05.23) 
WAVE 1 – 18th WAVE Conference – Step Up! Europe – Unite to end violence against 
women and their children (Berlin, 2016.10.19-21)  
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Appendix 4. List of interviews 
 
(Code, organisation, date) 
 
EPWS A – European Platform of Women Scientists (2015.05.11) 
WECF A – Women in Europe for a Common Future (2015.07.01) 
ECHO A – DG Human Rights (2016.01.28)  
EPWS B – European Platform of Women Scientists (2016.02.03) 
ENV A – DG Environment (2016.02.03) 
DEVCO A – DG Development and International Cooperation (2016.02.16)   
CLIMA A – DG CLIMA (2016.02.17) 
EWL A – European Women’s Lobby (2016.02.26)   
WECF B – Women in Europe for a Common Future (2016.03.01)   
GEN A – Genanet (2016.03.04)   
JUST A – DG Justice (2016.05.23)   
JUST B – DG Justice (2016.05.23) 
JUST C – DG Justice (2016.05.24) 
JUST D – DG Justice (2016.05.24)   
EPWS C – European Platform of Women Scientists (2016.06.02) 
JUST E – DG Justice (2016.06.22) 
FEMM A – FEMM committee (2016.06.22) 
ENV B – DG Environment (2016.06.24) 
WAVE A – Women Against Violence in Europe (2016.07.01)  
WECF C – Women in Europe for a Common Future (2016.07.11)  
ENV C – DG Environment (2016.10.12)  
RTD A – DG Research and Innovation (2016.10.13) 
HG A – Helsinki Group (2016.10.2) 
